ADVANCE PRAISE FOR MAKING A KILLING

"Bob Torres' Making A Killing draws a very straight line between capitalism and the oppressive system of animal agribusiness. Drawing from social anarchist theory, Torres provides a convincing argument that in order to fight animal exploitation, we must also fight capitalism and, in doing so, animal rights activists will need to reconsider their methods and redirect their focus. While his critiques of the animal rights movement's large organizations may not earn him friends in high places, such considerations are crucial to keeping the movement on track and for preventing stagnation. Making A Killing is an important work from a new voice in animal advocacy, that will surely spark heated discussions amongst activists from all corners of the movement."

—Ryan MacMichael, vegblog.org

"In Making A Killing, The Political Economy of Animal Rights, Bob Torres takes an important and timely look at the animal rights movement, calling for a synthetic approach to all oppression, human and animal. His analytical framework draws together Marxism, social anarchist theory, and an abolitionist approach to animal rights to provide a timely social analysis that will no doubt have profound effects on the animal rights movement and its associated literature."

—Gary L. Francione, Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University

"Bob Torres's socioeconomic analysis of nonhuman animal-use is a welcome and important addition to the understanding of human-nonhuman relations at the beginning of the 21st century. In particular, Making A Killing, makes a vital contribution to understanding the role of the property status of animals and the continuing strength of various welfarist positions on the ethics—and indeed the economics—of the human utilization of other animals. Making A Killing will become required reading for social scientists and others interested in modern social movements and the socioeconomic forces that shape their activities and their claims-making."

—Dr. Roger Yates, Lecturer in Sociology at University College, Dublin, Republic of Ireland

"This is the book I've been waiting for. Making A Killing is a rare and powerful example of first-rate scholarship, searing critique, and a lively declaration of the rights of animals and humans. You will walk away from this book with a clear understanding of why social justice movements for people must take animal rights seriously, and vice versa. Bob Torres has forever deepened my thinking about these relationships."

—David Naguib Pellow, vegetarian, animal rights and anti-racist activist, and Professor of Ethnic Studies, University of California, San Diego; and author of Garbage Wars: The Struggle for Environmental Justice in Chicago and Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice
MAKING A KILLING
The Political Economy of Animal Rights

by Bob Torres
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To Jenna

and

to Emmy, Michi, and Mole
THOUGH THIS BOOK BEARS my name, it would not even exist were it not for the generosity and friendship of many.

I am deeply indebted to my friend, lover, confidant, and partner in all things, Jenna Torres. Jenna and I wrote our first book about veganism together, and the way she sees these issues has deeply influenced my own thinking. Her careful reading, attention to detail, and willingness to entertain my sometimes far-fetched ramblings were invaluable in the production of this work. Without her support, this book would never have been written. I consider myself truly fortunate to have a life partner with whom I can share and grow in every aspect of my life.

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ment to write this book was what ultimately pushed me to propose this manuscript. Presenting with Ramsey at the Renewing the Anarchist Tradition conference also helped me to think through some of the ideas in this book. Ramsey: rock on! Working with Zach Blue throughout the writing of this book was a real pleasure. Zach is the kind of editor that writers dream about: he was not only resourceful, understanding, and perceptive, he was also keen to work in a way that maintained my voice. This book is a great deal stronger because of Zach.

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Though I bring forward many critiques of the animal rights movement in this book, there are people within the movement whose energy and dedication inspire me. Among these people is Sarah Kramer, who was kind enough to provide some quotes about me at the outset of this project. Certainly, I make some controversial claims in this book, and I hope that no one thinks that her endorsement of me implies agreement! Sarah is a true and tireless activist, and if we all had only a tenth of her energy and talent, the world would be a much better place. Another activist and scholar for whom I have enormous admiration and respect is Professor Gary L. Francione. The influence of his work is clear throughout this book, and his decades of activism, writing, and speaking for the voiceless—even when it is unpopular to do so—serve as a source of inspiration for me. Animals are fortunate to have such an intelligent and eloquent defender on their side.

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During the time I wrote this book, I spent a great deal of time with my companion animals Emmy, Michi, and Mole. Emmy spent a year in a no-kill shelter prior to coming to us, and she and the rest of the animals with whom we live remind me every day that animals are complex creatures with emotions, thoughts, and feelings. The
companionship and love that my non-human family has shown me is profound, and I am grateful to have them in my life.

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This book bears my name, but there is little doubt that it is a collective effort. Thank you all.
AS A SPECIES, OUR relationship with animals is admittedly odd. We have 24-hour cable television channels devoted to shows about animals, and at least in the global North, the institution of companion animal ownership is deeply embedded in our cultural traditions. With the advent of stores like Petsmart, shopping with your animal companion has become a regular part of the lives of many. At Petsmart, for example, you can take your dog in the store with you to browse the toy section and sniff provocatively around the aisles of dog food. Our companion animals have occupied a place in our lives that is closest to the role of children. We spend billions annually on our companion animals in North America, buying them treats, toys, premium foods, and furniture. Many dogs even share our beds.

Any of us who live with companion animals know that they are sensitive, intelligent, and thinking creatures. Any dog or cat owner does not need to get into long-winded and abstract philosophical debates about the nature of mind to know that dogs and cats have a sense of themselves. They understand their surroundings. They have wants. They can feel pleasure and pain, and they have moods. So many of us know this about the animals we live with daily, yet, it hardly ever oc-
curs to most of us that other animals are capable of these same things. What of the cows, the chickens, the pigs, and the sheep? Can we safely presume that they also do not want the companionship, comfort, and pleasure that the animal companions we know also want? We have created a false dichotomy between behaviors attributable to companion animals and those of other species that blinds us to the inherent worth and needs of all animals.

The problem is that we have constructed a society in which we are rarely forced to think about where what we consume comes from, and this extends to the animals reared for our consumption. While we pamper one set of animals, another set of animals becomes our food. The main difference is that we come to know one set of these animals, while the other set is raised and killed for us, delivered in plastic wrap and Styrofoam, and served up as dinner. If nothing else, this belies the deep moral confusion that we have about animals as a culture. What makes our dogs family members, while pigs become our pork? And how do we justify the difference?

Throughout this book, I urge you to be open-minded enough to consider these questions. Though it is easy to dismiss people who care about animals as sappy sentimentalists or judgmental, lecturing idiots—I know, because I used to think this way myself—I present an analysis in the coming pages that relies upon a clear-eyed understanding of our economy and society. In looking at how commodities are produced, I locate animal agriculture and related industries, which profit from the exploitation of animals, within the larger dynamics of capitalist exploitation. Like most other products, the processes and methods involved in the production of the animal goods we consume are hidden behind an elaborate system of production and consumption. In the coming pages, I ask you to consider these conditions, and to think about whether we can truly justify what we are doing—day in and day out—to billions of sentient creatures.

For those of you who are skeptical: I understand your skepticism, and I ask **you** to be patient. Admittedly, it took me more than a decade to really come to terms personally with much of what is in this book, and I fought my own awareness along the way, warring with my own intellect each step along my own long path. After a birthday a few years ago, I took stock of my life and came to the realization that if I
was serious about my ethics and principles, and serious about living in a world that challenged domination and hierarchy, that I had only one choice—to step away from participating in animal cruelty as much as I could. This was a choice that was motivated not only by my desire to end the suffering I saw, but also by a desire to live my life critically as a social anarchist. Though there are probably as many anarchisms as anarchists, I generally tend to root my own social anarchism in the broad desire to promote liberty and to challenge hierarchy, domination, and oppression. While social anarchism draws on the power of collective responsibility to restructure a better, more just, and more equitable society, I also think that to be an anarchist, first and foremost, is to think critically about hierarchy—why it exists, who it benefits, and why it is wrong. By examining forms of domination like sexism and racism that are naturalized in our culture, one begins to see that domination is not merely a natural artifact of human society, but rather, that it is a set of historical relations used to benefit one class or group of people over another. When I turned a similar lens towards our relations with animals, I could not help but be struck by the fact that our relations with animals are structured with many of the same hierarchies, and that a great amount of suffering is taking place, either to produce profit, or to fill human wants and needs that could be filled in other ways.

In short, when I thought long and hard about it, and decided to be honest with myself, I found that my own politics and ethics could not justify domination based merely on the category “species,” just as I could not justify domination based merely on gender, or race, or nationality. When I looked at how animals are exploited as commodities, I saw similarities with how humans are exploited as labor power. When I thought seriously about whether I could continue to cause suffering simply because it was easy and made my life more convenient—even though I had the means to do otherwise—I realized I could not in good conscience.

What it comes down to is this: if we are serious about social and economic justice and reject a world view where “might-makes-right,” then we must expand our view to everyone—especially the weakest among us. There can be no half-justice for the weak, or justice means nothing at all and we live in a world of might-makes-right. As a social anarchist reared in a broad tradition that roots itself in the work of
thinkers like Peter Kropotkin and Emma Goldman, I found myself thinking about these difficult questions, critically querying my role in oppression, and coming to the conclusion that I could no longer be part of it simply because it was the “way it has always been.” As you work your way into this book, I’d encourage you to open yourself to the same critical inquiry, to do the hard work of taking stock of your own ethical positions, and to decide if you, too, can justify your participation in one of the most pervasive and deeply-rooted forms of domination in our contemporary culture.

Though this book makes extensive use of anarchist theory—particularly the work of Murray Bookchin and his ideas around what he calls social ecology—I also draw broadly on a framework of Marxist political economy to provide an understanding of how the relations of animal exploitation are extended, deepened, and maintained through the dynamics of capitalism. Others before me—most notably, David Nibert, in his book *Animal Rights / Human Rights*—have used Marxist and sociological analyses to understand animal oppression. Nibert’s analysis is vital, because it traces out the long history of animal exploitation, rewriting history from the stance of the oppressed. Most compellingly, though, Nibert begins his work by providing a sociological analysis of oppression that shows how oppression has structural causes rooted in the economics, ideology, and practices of a society. Nibert’s ideas show how the ideological components of a society necessarily have a material dimension, or, put more simply, the way that we’re socialized to see the world influences how we act in it. This socialization is broadly responsible for re-creating the social and economic processes that keep people and animals in oppressed positions. In short, it helps us to understand why we aren’t encouraged to think about these issues more often, and how our not thinking about them maintains power.

Nibert turns this lens towards our relations with animals, with a desire to understand how our domination of animals occurs at both ideological and material levels. Citing a broad failure of some key theorists—including the “father” of the animal liberation movement, Peter Singer—to think critically about how oppression has a structural component based in ideological and economic relations, Nibert draws on sociological analysis to create a more encompassing theory of op-
pression. Looking at categories such as race, class, gender, and species as “interlocking” and “interactive systems” of oppression, Nibert’s framework identifies all of these oppressions as related and mutually reinforcing. He writes:

The oppression of various devalued groups in human societies is not independent and unrelated; rather, the arrangements that lead to various forms of oppression are integrated in such a way that the exploitation of one group frequently augments and compounds the mistreatment of another.²

The important thing to note here is that, for Nibert, changes in this oppressive arrangement require changes in the structure and ideology of society—not merely simple changes in individual behavior. The economic structures, arrangements, and processes of a society matter most significantly in this analysis, even if our particular intentions are good (or bad). Through long-term socialization, particular world views become part of our psyche, sort of like an invisible, but always-present, script for understanding how it is that we should approach, categorize, and understand the world—including oppressed groups.

Maintaining our current understanding of the world is central to the functioning and maintenance of the relations of power within capitalism. Capitalism is marked by a division between classes, with one class holding private ownership of the means of production, and another class forced to sell their labor to live. Through the use of workers’ labor power, the owners of the means of production—the bourgeoisie—extract value in production, paying workers less than the actual value they are producing. This basic class division is essential for capital; without the labor power that adds value to commodities, the owner class would be unable to leverage and expand their own worth. Within the system of capitalist production, competition is central in two main ways: First, competition between workers for the morsels tossed to them by the capital-holding class helps to weaken solidarity among oppressed groups and to fracture evolving resistances to the power of capital. Second, market competition and a grow-or-die mentality drives the owners of the means of production to constantly retool and rethink production in a multitude of ways. This not only has disruptive effects on labor, it also leads to what economists call
"externalities," or the side-effects of the desire for infinite growth on a finite planet. As the ecosystem groans under the burden of supporting a system that needs to grow at all costs, the externalities become clear: our ecosystem becomes burdened with the toxins we dump into it, our oceans empty as we pull net after net full of fish out of them, and those who cannot escape pollution suffer as victims of environmental classism or racism. The effects of this entire system on humans, animals, and the ecosystem are devastating. We not only come to devalue our fellow humans and animals as mere laboring machines, but we also are led to believe that this is the only option for human survival and happiness. Consequences be damned.

Seeing humans as world-transformative and inherently creative creatures, Karl Marx argued that as we made our lives in the world, we then made others who propagated that same kind of life, and that our consciousness of the world is a social product based in this materiality. "Life," Marx wrote, "is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life." In this sense, then, the way we make our living in the world materially connects us to others, a process that is as old as humanity itself. In making these theoretical arguments about humanity and its mental life, Marx is tying our material forms of life to our ideological forms.

Ideology—a set of social and cultural scripts that we use to make sense of the world—is the tool by which the world is remade on a daily basis. Ideology explains to us our place in the world, it gives us the tools for understanding how the world operates. By living through the ideology we have inherited, we recreate the conditions such that the world, as it is, can be reproduced through social institutions and practices. Given this, ideology is never neutral; it is, instead, imbued with the relationships of power that govern our society. For Marx, the ruling material force of a society was also its ruling intellectual force. Those that run the productive forces of a society are, at the same time, able to rule the means of mental production, creating ideas in all of us that "are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships," or ideas that justify the dominance of a particular ruling class. Considering that we live within a capitalist society run by a capitalist economy, our heads are bound to be full of ideology that upholds the domination inherent in capitalism. To many of us, this
ideology is completely familiar, the everyday scripts that explain the world to us. In many of my introductory sociology classes, I often begin discussions about poverty by asking students why people are poor. Inevitably, people tell me that poor folks are lazy or unintelligent, that they are somehow deserving of their poverty. However, if you begin to look at the sociological literature on poverty, a more complex picture emerges. Poverty and unemployment are part and parcel of our economic order. Without them, capitalism would cease to function effectively, and in order to continue to function, the system itself must produce poverty and an army of underemployed or unemployed people. Simple little mantras that so many of us have floating around in the back of our heads about the lack of industriousness are hardly a way of explaining what is essentially a core part of our economic order.

Nevertheless, students—and many others, including a significant number of those in poverty themselves—will argue that poverty is based wholly on individual behavior, not that it is produced by our social and economic order. By drawing on the example of poverty, one can see that ideology can be horribly injurious if it justifies and recreates unjust social orders. In the case of poverty, ideology gives us the mental machinery to blame people who are victims of a rapacious economic order for their own victimhood, while simultaneously protecting the privilege of wealth and capital. If we’re all led to believe that poverty is just a matter of laziness or stupidity or whatever other justifications we come up with, then we’re not likely to be in a real position to do much about it when it comes to attacking the root causes of the problem. Instead of demanding a more equitable system for the distribution of social and economic goods, we blame the victim. This is insidious, because ideology is something we carry around with us in our heads; it forms the basis of our day-to-day understanding of the world. The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci argued that the unique constellation of economic and social forces created a hegemonic order, one that was constantly being rewritten in a struggle between the oppressive drives of capital and the oppositional forces of liberation.

For Gramsci, this evolving hegemony sculpted our day-to-day “common sense,” defining the boundaries of the possible and the believable for us, defining the topology of the maps that we use to
live and to understand the world. This is the mental technology of domination, and whether we like it or not, we’re all living it. It is as relevant to understanding poverty as it is to understanding sexism, racism, and even speciesism. Oppression operates within this ideological framework, a combination of mental and physical forces that work to maintain the status quo through social institutions. To understand this relationship, Nibert developed a three-pronged theory to explain how oppression takes place through mutually reinforcing social and economic mechanisms. The first factor in maintaining oppression is the notion of economic exploitation or competition, driven by difference. If it is in the economic interests of a society, that society will generally tend to exploit or drive out a group perceived to be an “other.” This requires that the dominant group actually has the power and ability to drive out or economically exploit the “other,” which brings us to the second prong of Nibert’s theory: there must be unequal power, with a large measure of control vested in the (capitalist) state. Power and violence sanctioned and provided by the state allows the dominant group to enforce the exploitation developed in the first prong, and to reinforce any exploitation already in place. Third, ideological manipulation based on the economic order established in the first two parts of the formula helps to create attitudes, beliefs, and prejudices that simultaneously drive and reinforce exploitation.

Considering these points, exploitation becomes a phenomenon that is part of our economic and ideological systems, not just something that can be attributed to mere individual prejudices. Racism, for example, can easily be considered through the framework that Nibert proposes. Within the history of capitalism, racism has functioned as a profitable and manipulative force, dividing the working class, and providing cheap labor to a burgeoning capitalist system. The boundaries of racism may change depending on the society in question, but its form is constant, and it serves a key role in maintaining social and economic hierarchies within a capitalist economy. Providing a justification for those who work in the least desirable sectors of the economy and who get paid the least, racism provides the ideological glue that holds parts of our economic order together. Racism provides the logic that non-whites in American society generally should get the worst jobs because they are less intelligent and less industrious—and therefore,
less deserving. Simultaneously, racism structures and socializes classes of people to play what Wallerstein calls the “appropriate roles” within an exploitative economic order. All the while, racism allows for the exploitation and oppression of an entire class of people without any real justification beyond their membership in the socially constructed category of a race. Instead of seeing a history of enslavement, oppression, and exploitation, we simply see a racial “other” who is deserving of her structural disadvantages.

Given this economic and structural base of racism, it is important to remember that even if a significant number of people stopped using racial epithets tomorrow, the root causes and the economic structures that drive racism would still be in place; we’d still have institutional racism, the pernicious and persistent economic and social injustice for racial “others,” that, in the US at least, has been maintained and established over several hundred years of exploitation. Similarly, if we stopped being sexist tomorrow, we’d still have a systematic sexism that devalues the labor of women and which exerts pressure upon women to do labor—such as the maintenance of the home—that serves as an invisible subsidy to capitalism.

Though many people are resistant to the notion, speciesism functions in a similar way. Far from being a simple prejudice against animals simply for being animals, speciesism is woven into our mental, social, and economic machinery, and reproduced through the interaction of these parts—it is a structural aspect of our political-economic order. Using Nibert’s three-pronged theoretical frame, even an elementary analysis of the way animals are integrated into our lives, cultures, and economies shows they are oppressed. Taking the first part of Nibert’s theory—that maintaining oppression relies upon economic exploitation or competition—it is clear that we exploit animals for our own interests and tastes. We directly consume the bodies of animals for food, but we also use them as factories for milk, eggs, and other products; we wear the skins and fur of animals; we use animals for medical and scientific experiments; and we exploit them for the purposes of our own entertainment and companionship. Animals have even played a direct role in the development of industrial capitalism, functioning as our property—as chattel slaves—and in this regard, they should be considered part of the working class. As I will discuss in Chapter 3,
animals are mere property under the law, and it is this very status that allows us to continue exploiting animals. It is simply tradition, desire, and profit.

The second bit of Nibert’s theory—that the dominant group have unequal power and the ability to exploit the other, with control vested in the state—is abundantly clear in the case of animals. We chain animals up, confine them, and cage them, and we do this to animals as our property, with the blessing of the law. Though there are animal cruelty statutes in most of the industrialized world, these rarely apply to farmed animals, and are infrequently or unevenly enforced in the case of other animals. This legal framework for exploitation helps to reinforce and extend exploitation.

Finally, ideological manipulation convinces us that this order of oppression is natural, desirable, and beneficial for all. This, in turn, drives the processes of exploitation in the first two parts of Nibert’s theory. To understand how the oppression of animals seems natural to us, one need not look further than the average grocery store. Shelves are lined with products made with the bodies of animals or their excretions; our coats are made of leather and down; our shoes are made of hide. To the vast majority of us, this seems normal. Most of us give the consumption of animals and their products about as much thought as we do the oxygen we breathe. Whites who benefit from white privilege infrequently, if ever, have to think about the nature of their privilege. They don’t have to understand its history, its origins, or its implications to benefit and accept it as natural. They don’t even have to know that it exists. Much as whites in our society enjoy the economic and social benefits of whiteness, all of us humans enjoy the economic and social benefits of our species. In the same regard, we don’t often have to think about its history, origins, or implications to enjoy the benefits of being, as many remind me when arguing against my veganism, “on top of the food chain.” (I shall return to a discussion of all of these notions in Chapter 2.)

Much as we live in an economic and social order that is structured to exploit people, we live in one that is structured to exploit animals. We’re encouraged to understand both are natural and inevitable, but neither are. Both exploitations have long and contentious histories as part of the development of our modern economic order. Understand-
ing this order, and the roots of domination within it, is essential for understanding how all of these oppressive forces have their foundations in the economic dynamics of capitalism. If we’re to be successful fighting oppression—whether based on race, class, species, or gender identity—we’re going to need to fight the heart of the economic order that drives these oppressions. We’re going to have to fight capitalism.14

Following on the heels of my predecessors, I take critical aim at capitalism throughout the pages of this book. As the economic order of our day, capitalism is an alienating, exploitative force that puts the production of capital above just about all else. While it is certainly the case that animal exploitation could exist without capitalism, the structure and nature of contemporary capital has deepened, extended, and worsened our domination over animals and the natural world. The commodity system under which animals labor in capitalism is particularly grueling, and in Chapter 2, I develop a more thorough analysis along these lines. While we can often conveniently ignore the animals that suffer for our dinner plates, it is worth noting that within the highly-industrialized, capital-intensive agriculture that we now have in most of the global-North system, animals become mere ends towards the production of greater capital. In essence, animals become nothing more than living machines, transformed from beings who live for themselves into beings that live for capital. Capital has literally imprinted itself upon the bodies of animals, not only with the obvious marks of ownership like brands and tattoos, but also by the way it has changed the bodies of animals through breeding—making them better commodities—particularly in the last few decades. My goal throughout this book is to provide an analysis of these developments, to understand their roots and how they figure into the political-economic relations of capital. I also draw on the theory of Murray Bookchin to argue for an approach which challenges the hierarchy that we exert not only over animals, but also over one another.

Working from understandings of how capitalism deepens, extends, and maintains the exploitation of animals in contemporary society. I also critically dissect some current trends in animal activism over the last few decades, showing how it fails to understand the dynamics of capitalism in its work. In concluding the text, I draw upon the history
of social anarchism to suggest a new direction for those who wish to advance the status of animals in our society today. Though social anarchists have not always been quick to integrate a concern with animal suffering into their work or lives, I do believe that anarchism’s own tools can be turned back on itself to understand and correct this historical blind-spot. Out of all of the political traditions of the Left, social anarchism presents the most fertile ground for planting the seeds for a politics of equality, including an equality that recognizes species membership.

Lastly, I offer up a final note on the issue of “rights.” In its title, this book uses the word “rights,” which may seem like a curious title for an anarchist to choose. After all, rights are granted by states, and anarchists generally do not find states to be liberatory or desirable institutions. Moreover, contemporary states are almost always shot-through with the logic of capitalism, or at least ruled by an elite that is either capitalist or beholden to capitalism. Thus, one could argue that my invocation of “rights” has the danger of propping up the state, particularly if what I am pushing for is legal in nature. While I would not as a practical matter deny that legal rights—even those granted by a capitalist state—could be helpful in stemming some animal exploitation, I’m rather hoping for something more important: the recognition that animals have interests that deserve to be respected. Along these lines, I use the term “rights” in a broad sense to indicate a recognition of these interests. Considering how much the state, itself, has invested in maintaining the relations of domination that extend to the profitable exploitation of animals, I do not expect that the state will be a progressive force in granting these rights to animals (or even, significantly, to humans). Instead, it seems these rights will come only from one source: a widespread social recognition that the interests of animals matter, and as a result, that they should not be exploited. This is the kind of sea-change in human thought that requires the broad-based activism of a social movement, not the interventions of a state apparatus that is wedded to business interests. My hope is that this book will prove useful, not only analytically, but also as one more in the vast chorus of voices clamoring for justice for the least among us.
II

CHAINED COMMODITIES

NOT LONG AGO, I had the chance to walk around a so-called “lifestyle center.” In case you happen not to frequent the wealthy suburbs of the United States, let me explain. A “lifestyle center” is essentially an upscale outdoor mall, designed to mimic the feel of an intimate shopping district, including comfy benches, beautiful landscaping, quaint streetlights, and even, perhaps, brick-lined streets to invoke the days of old. The “lifestyle center” I visited even piped in Muzak to complement the experience of shopping at exactly the same upscale chain stores that you can find everywhere else.

Though I’ve never been a huge fan of Jean Baudrillard, I started to understand very quickly what he meant about the disappearance of reality.

In a weird way, these “lifestyle centers” are destinations for consumers who seem to enjoy the intimate sense of community that they provide. I, however, found it to be a weird trip to a sort of Disneyland vision of what small-town America used to be like, constructed, perhaps, by someone who wasn’t all that familiar with the original. This was essentially a recreation of the kind of downtown feel that these very chain stores in the “lifestyle center” had been keen to destroy. Yes,
corporate America would have its small downtown and intimate lifestyle, but it would only have it on its own terms. Why bother with the pesky heterogeneity of small, local businesses when you could have your Starbuck’s triple mocha grande venti whatever exactly the same way in every corner of the world? Why bother with pesky small-scale retailers when you can have corporate domination with a smile, and 200 bonus plus points on your Borders rewards card?

The point here is that we’re a society that loves to consume. Our consumption, however, has its associated costs. In the case of lifestyle centers and the construction of American suburbia, the associated and immediate cost to most communities was a near-total loss of community shopping districts owned by local people. What has evolved is a concrete expression of the political and economic dynamics of corporatized America, of conscious choices to promote a car-centered development, and of the desire to avoid the discomfort of a heterogeneity of consumer choice. Thus, our consumerism and the system of production have material aspects and consequences. We may not think of these consequences when we consume the things we do, but nevertheless, those consequences are there, and they reach quite deep, affecting many lives along the way.

Because we must consume things to live, most of us never really give much thought to the consequences. For those of us who can afford to buy the things that we need to sustain ourselves, we scarcely—if ever—think about what we’re doing beyond the obvious aspects of purchasing something. We simply know that if we have a want, we have to buy, scavenge, make, or steal what we’re after. Those are pretty much the choices handed to us, and really, many of us only see one real choice there (hint: it isn’t scavenging or making or stealing).

When we buy things, we’re entering into a sort of cyclical process in which production and consumption are mutually conditioned, each representing a moment in a singular process that drives the totality of capitalist production. In this regard, buying something isn’t just a simple satisfaction of a consumer want; it is participating in a larger process, with attendant affects throughout the culture and economy. By consuming, we are essentially giving value back to those who own the means to produce, allowing them to produce more. They then use the value from our consumption to produce more, which we con-
sume again. We keep this process going by selling our labor (production), which we then use to obtain the things we need (consumption). To most of us, though, this process is largely transparent. We go through our lives not thinking much about what's behind what we consume. We happily buy iPods, steaks, books, computers, and other goods without thinking about all of the complex relations of production that are behind them; we shop at the “lifestyle center” without thinking about the impacts of this choice on our lives. We either need the goods to survive (food) or we want them for our own entertainment (iPods), and if we have the means, we make the products ours, without much thought to what went into their production.

Sociologists, however, have given these relationships a great deal of thought. There is an entire school of analysis within sociology and related social sciences devoted to uncovering “commodity chains,” or following the productive life of a good from start to finish. For even simple goods, these analyses can be exceedingly complex. In her book Tangled Routes: Women, Work, and Globalization on the Tomato Trail, Deborah Barndt examines the seemingly simple commodity from its historic and contemporary roots in Mexico all the way to its final consumption in fast-food outlets and grocery stores. What evolves in examining a product this way is a portrait that defies our simplistic notion of commodities. Rather than seeing a simple, straightforward line from the producer to the consumer, we begin to see a process of production that is tied in to politics, power, gender, technology, and environmental quality. The production of something we consider so basic and simple—a supermarket tomato—becomes a lesson in the dynamics of social power, cast over the course of several thousand miles. A portrait of the gendered division of labor emerges, not only in Mexico where the tomato is produced, but in the US and Canada, where the tomato is sold and consumed. As Barndt plays out the tomato trail over the course of her book, it becomes easy to see that commodities have life histories that are complex, multi-faceted, and beyond our simplistic understandings. What we see in stark relief is that the production of goods is about social relationships. It is no mere accident of climate that tomatoes destined for US and Canadian markets are produced in Mexico; instead, that very fact becomes an entryway into an exploration of how and why it is cheaper to produce tomatoes in Mexico, and
what the relations of national economic power are that allow Northern consumers to relegate such production to the global South.

As production has become more and more geographically diverse under the social and economic processes of capital that we call globalization these days, the complexity of the processes involved in the production of the commodities we consume increases. Nevertheless, most of us continue through life happily and guiltlessly consuming, and rarely (if ever) thinking much about the social relations behind our consumption. This state of affairs really couldn't be any better for producers. Would you be so keen to consume tomatoes if you knew that, say, women and their children working in the fields were being slowly poisoned to death to produce them? Not knowing is better for us on the whole, since we can consume as we wish without the burdensome pangs of conscience.

Yet, on occasion, some of us have experiences that help us break through this blissful ignorance imposed by the ideological machinations of our capitalist society. Maybe—like a number of students over the years in my class on food—you'll read *Fast Food Nation* and decide never to eat meat again, or perhaps you'll be the target of some kind of environmental racism or classism that brings what economists blithely call the negative "externalities" of production to your soil, water, or air. There are a million paths to a sort of consciousness about the things we consume, and though a significant number of us wish to cling to our comfortable little myths about how good things are, we sometimes cannot deal with the cognitive dissonance before us, and we're forced to acknowledge the exploitative dynamics behind our economic order.

I've had a number of moments like this across the span of my lifetime, and in each case, I clung to my comfortable understanding for much longer than I should have, in retrospect. Yet, there's a comfort in the little myths that we live by, and having those myths taken apart in front of your own eyes is difficult. Here is how one myth in particular was shattered for me:

Like most people in the US, I grew up eating meat, and lots of it. Apart from the everyday consumption of meat and animal products, I lived relatively close to Chinatown in Philadelphia, and I spent a
lot of time there, eating all manner of animal products at Cantonese restaurants. Indeed, I ate just about everything with 4 legs, except the table. Looking back, I remember that one of my favorite dishes was lamb Hunan-style, but really, I’d eat just about anything. At the time, it only abstractly occurred to me that I was eating an animal. Sure, it was meat, but the connecting thread between “meat” and “living, breathing being” was far from strong. If, in my moments of passing weakness, I ever thought about the ethics of eating meat, I just imagined that the animals killed for meat lived happy lives. I mean, why wouldn’t they have?

All of this began to change rather radically for me as I entered high school and college. I went to a vocational-technical magnet school in Philadelphia that was designed to train its students for working in agriculture, horticulture, and related trades. We had greenhouses, a small working farm, some fields, a small engine shop, a butchery “lab,” small animal “labs,” and even an aquaculture installation. At this school, and for the first time in my life, I actually had the chance to get to know animals we commonly refer to as “farm animals.” We had pigs that behaved more like dogs, and cows that actually knew certain people and got visibly excited when they came near. Throughout my time there, I took courses on “meat science” as well as animal husbandry, but my real emphasis was in the plant sciences. Still, I believed that most animals in contemporary American agriculture were raised by caring people and in conditions that were as good as they possibly could have been. We often heard that farmers took better care of their animals than their children, and that as an “investment,” their herd was too vital to treat any other way.

Upon graduating high school, I was offered a scholarship to attend Penn State University, with the proviso that I pursue a degree in their College of Agricultural Sciences. This was an opportunity I could not resist, and though I didn’t plan on spending my life as a farmer, I would have been a fool to have turned down the opportunity Penn State offered me. I took up two majors at Penn State—philosophy and agricultural science. Philosophy enriched my analytical side, while agricultural science spoke to my practical side and let me leverage my high school experience. As an ag-science major, though, I had to again take courses from a range of disciplines. Doing the plant sciences was
simple and fun for me, but I put off taking the required courses that dealt with animals. I wasn’t eager to get involved with animal “production” classes, though there came a point when I couldn’t wait any longer if I wanted to graduate, and so I enrolled in a dairy production class to help fulfill my last requirements.

The dairy production class was mostly full of good-ol’-boys from farms scattered throughout the state, and the vast majority of them actually had experience with their own herds of cattle on the family farm. They entered the class knowing about the fat content of milk, hundredweight prices, and lactation cycles. I, however, was a skinny, lactose-intolerant kid from the city who knew nothing about any of this in any real depth, despite my time in a vo-tech school that had the then largest chapter of Future Farmers of America in the country. In class, though, I began to learn all about the economics of dairy production. I was taught to view cows as producers; these producers required inputs, and as a presumed future dairy farmer, my job was to reduce the cost of the inputs required to produce milk. Reducing the production costs meant understanding feed ratios, sourcing the bulk and protein of cow feed from the cheapest possible outlets, and understanding mechanized milking systems that used radio identification tags to track the production of each cow. We learned about how much (or how little) space one could give a dairy cow, and that increasing the number of cows in a space meant increased profit, within certain limits. We also learned that the only way to remain successful in production agriculture was to “get big or get out.” Even then, I wondered how many of these good-ol’-boys felt about the “get big or get out” when their smaller family farms were often on the “get-out” end of the equation. Still, the lessons were clear: treat animals like the producers they were, give them the cheapest possible inputs you can, and squeeze every last bit of production out of them—to do otherwise was economic suicide in an industry of extraordinarily marginal profits. Not only was this economically sensible, our professor reminded us, this was a matter of sheer necessity in such a competitive economic age, particularly with the price of milk declining so rapidly.

What I found interesting was that the economic logic of animal-based production was strikingly similar to the logic of production that I’d recently read in Communist Manifesto, over in my class on political
philosophy. I guess that not too many aggies got over to the liberal arts college—and vice-versa—but I was straddling these worlds, and the connections between them were becoming clearer and clearer to me. Animals were being used as productive machinery, and I was learning how to exploit them efficiently. *I was the bourgeoisie to the cattle proletariat!*

This was probably one of the first moments that I truly began to think about the exploitation of animals in any serious way. Prior to my classes in production agriculture, I'd had some pleasant notion of animals living lives of bucolic bliss, frolicking in fields, chewing their cud, and sauntering over to a milking station twice a day to happily share their bounty. This notion was rapidly shattered by my training in animal exploitation and the maximization of profit—profit made literally on the backs of animals. I came to see the power relationships underneath something that we'd consider very mundane indeed—a glass of milk or a steak or even a piece of chicken. For me, this exposure to the economics of animal production shattered the myth that animal products are just another commodity. Milk wasn't just a drink or an additive for my coffee anymore, it was the product of animal labor—labor that was being forced upon exploited animals in horrendous conditions. I learned that animals were simultaneously producing commodities (as in the case of milk, eggs, leather, wool, and such) and serving as commodities themselves (as when they are slaughtered for meat). Moreover, this was happening to them in ways that were remarkably similar to what we would normally think of as slavery. Animals aren't workers that are free to return home at the end of the working day; instead, they are owned outright, the property of another, disposable and fungible just like any piece of inanimate property.

Like many other forms of injustice, no one seemed to be questioning this, nor did anyone seem to care that much. But like other forms of injustice, it can take us time to recognize the layers of oppression that exist around us, particularly if we are raised to see that oppression as “normal” or even desirable. It gets worse if we *enjoy* and benefit from the oppression itself, or if it is so deeply woven into our daily lives that it is practically transparent. Odds are good that if you're not a vegan already, you're probably wearing some animal yourself, as leather or as wool, or that you've eaten parts of an animal or animal products...
today. Multiply your consumption of animal products outward some, and you can begin to get a sense of how centrally animals figure into our economy. Animal products are all around us, all the time in the obvious ways (as eggs, milk, meat, leather, dairy, and the like), but also in non-obvious ways, such as through the use of the by-products of slaughter in industrial processes. Our economic order is tightly woven around the exploitation of animals, and while it may seem easy to dismiss concern about animals as the soft-headed mental masturbation of people who really don’t understand oppression and the depths of actual human misery, I hope to get you to think differently about suffering and pain, to convince you that animals matter, and to argue that anyone serious about ending domination and hierarchy needs to think critically about bringing animals into consideration. It is the least we can do if we can truly say that we care about the least among us.

In *Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?* Gary Francione raises a compelling hypothetical that is worth considering here. Let’s say that there’s a guy named Simon who—for his own pleasure and no other reason—enjoys burning his dog with a blow torch. If you ask Simon why he is blow-torching his dog, Simon simply replies that he enjoys it—it is something that gives him great pleasure, and Simon finds it’s an entertaining way to spend an afternoon. Now, let’s say that Simon’s neighbors complain about what he is doing. Simon’s case becomes a police matter, and garners the attention of a nation shocked by what we’d consider to be horribly unnecessary cruelty. (Such animal abuse cases are not strangers to national attention; as I was working on this chapter, two teenage brothers in Atlanta were sentenced to 10 years in prison for cooking a puppy alive.) Odds are good that a significant number of people would find out about the case over their evening dinners, while watching the news. Odds are also good that those same dinners will include some kind of animal excretion or animal flesh. Surely, over chicken legs, rump roasts, and baby-back ribs, Americans would express their outrage at such unnecessary cruelty. After all, Simon’s only defense was that he enjoyed himself.

In this scenario, we can begin to see what Francione calls our “moral schizophrenia” towards animals. While we can practically all agree that we should not impose unnecessary suffering on animals, we,
as a society, also cause harm to animals for reasons that are a distant cry from true necessity. In Simon’s case, we can all (I hope) see that blow-torching a dog for pleasure is just plain unnecessary and cruel. No one, we reason, should be able to inflict that much suffering on an animal simply for their own pleasure. Moreover, we object to inflicting that kind of suffering on the dog because we recognize, at a very basic level, that the dog is sentient: we feel a duty and obligation to put an end to the torture, and all agree that Simon’s pleasure cannot possibly be a valid reason for making this poor animal suffer so much.

In the case of our average American diners watching the news report, though, they likely justify the moral wrongs inflicted on animals as “necessary” to feed us. Most of us assume that the animals had to die to nourish us. Some of us might even find that a sad state of affairs, but we still look upon it as a necessary evil, and we may even buy the oxymoronically-named “humanely raised” meat to assuage our consciences. And many of us—if we even think about it—will argue that we’re up here at the top of the food chain, and nature is red in tooth and claw anyway. We may even think, “This is the way that the world is, and sad or not, we cannot change it.”

But do we really need to eat meat or animal products to live well? Certainly not; a growing body of evidence—much of it backed by long-term epidemiological and clinical studies—would indicate that leaving animal products out of your diet is the more healthful choice in the long run. Given this clinically-proven fact that we don’t need animal products to live healthfully, how then do we justify eating them? Most people, including very thoughtful and intelligent people, resort to arguing that “this is the way it has always been,” that it is our “culture,” our “tradition,” and on top of that, they enjoy the way animal products taste. But if animal products are not necessary to live healthfully, and if we can easily derive nourishment in ways that do not inflict suffering, the question becomes this: In what way does Simon’s blow-torching of the dog for mere enjoyment become different than our abuse of billions of animals a year for our food? In both cases, neither imposition of suffering is in any way necessary, and both are related to pleasure in the final analysis. Yet, we see one as absolutely horrific and the other as the quotidian. If you’re honest with yourself, this should induce at least a little cognitive dissonance into your life.
This hits directly at the heart of what Francione considers to be our moral schizophrenia. The average person agrees that we should not inflict unnecessary suffering on animals, yet they'll say so while consuming a hamburger—and they'll often do so without the sense of tragic irony befitting the situation. In the case of Simon torturing the dog, we recognize that the dog has an interest in avoiding suffering because the dog can experience pain. We therefore feel an obligation to end such suffering. We base this not on the dog’s intelligence, and not on its ability or inability to communicate in our language, but because we know the animal to be sentient. To be sentient means to be capable of “subjective mental experiences,” to have a sense of an “I” who is conscious of pain and pleasure. All sentient beings—humans, primates, cows, pigs, chickens, and rodents—are “similar to each other and dissimilar to everything else in the world that is not sentient.” If cows and chickens and dogs are all sentient, and if we agree, at least implicitly, that we should avoid inflicting unnecessary harm on sentient beings, then our infliction of suffering on a chicken destined for our dinner plate merely because we like the taste of chicken, is no more valid than Simon inflicting suffering on his dog for the mere pleasure of it—particularly when we can survive and thrive on a plant-based diet.

At this point, some of you may be wondering about plants. If we should avoid inflicting unnecessary harm on animals, why, then, can we inflict harm on plants? And how do we know they are not sentient? In the book that I co-authored with Jenna Torres, Vegan Freak: Being Vegan in a Non-Vegan World we pose this hypothetical to answer this common critique: take a head of broccoli and a pig, and apply a hot poker to each. Upon applying the hot poker to the broccoli, it burns, but it doesn’t scream out in pain, run away, or show any reaction at all. Why? Because broccoli has no central nervous system or pain receptors. It literally cannot feel anything; it is not sentient. But if you apply the hot poker to a pig, it will squeal out in pain, run away, and try to avoid the subjective experience of more pain. Like us, the pig has a central nervous system and pain receptors. Though we cannot know directly whether or not the pig is feeling pain, the pig evidences many of the same behaviors we would were we in pain; the broccoli does nothing, because it cannot have any subjective awareness.
Plants, then, cannot be said to feel pain in any way that matters to us or to them as a subjective experience. Plants are not sentient in any meaningful sense of the word, but animals clearly are, given that they possess the same elemental neural machinery that we do for experiencing pain and pleasure. For the past 200 years, at least, our laws (as regressive as they often are) have even recognized that inflicting “unnecessary” suffering on animals should be punished as a criminal matter, and that we should balance our interests in producing animal suffering over the interests of animals to be free of that suffering. The “humane treatment principle” dictates that if no real human interests are at stake, and if we can find alternatives to animal use in a particular situation, we should pursue those alternatives as a matter of principle. However, we tend to approach every animal use as an emergency situation, a “them-or-us” scenario in which we must decide between the interests of animals and humans as a life-or-death situation. As Francione points out, “the overwhelming portion of our animal uses cannot be described as necessary in any meaningful sense of the word; rather, they merely further the satisfaction of human pleasure, amusement, or convenience. This wholly unnecessary animal use results in an enormous amount of animal pain, suffering, and death.”

What, then, is the solution to this moral schizophrenia we have about animals? According to Francione, we only have two choices: we either continue to treat animals as we are now, by inflicting suffering even for unnecessary ends and recognizing our commitment to humane treatment as a farce, or we can recognize that animals have a morally significant interest in not being subjected to unnecessary suffering, and change how we approach conflicts of animal and human interests. To do the latter, however, requires that we apply the principle of equal consideration to animals. This, Francione argues, is stunningly simple: in its most basic terms, we need to treat like cases alike. Though animals and humans are clearly different, they are alike in the sense that they both suffer and are both sentient. For this reason, we should extend the principle of equal consideration to animals.

This means that we should guarantee animals the right not to be treated exclusively as a means to the ends of another, or the right not to be treated as things. Animals, however, are mere things today, the property of their owners (more on this in Chapter 3), and—at
least legally—not much more. Francione emphasizes that we used to have humans that were also mere means to the ends of another: we called them slaves, and human slavery functioned in much the same way as animal slavery does. We abolished human slavery because we recognized long ago that all humans have intrinsic and inherent value beyond their ability to serve as a resource to others. For Francione, inherent value is:

merely another name for the minimal criterion necessary to be regarded as a member of the moral community. If you do not have inherent value, all of your interests—including your fundamental interest in not experiencing pain and your interest in continued life—can be “sold away,” depending on someone else’s valuation.

In order for the concept of inherent value to protect humans from being treated as things, we must regard all humans as having equal inherent value.9

The notion of equal inherent value applies even if a human is, say mentally incapacitated: few of us would ever agree that we could use a severely mentally disabled person for medical experiments. Why? Because we recognize and respect their inherent value not to be the end of another. This basic right not to be treated as a thing is, Francione illustrates, the minimum necessary requirement for membership in the moral community. A “hybrid” system that requires us to balance the interests of like cases differently cannot possibly uphold the notion of equal consideration. Note also that this basic right not to be treated as a thing extends even to those that lack what we would consider rationality or self-awareness. Very young infants have neither rationality nor self-awareness, yet we extend them the basic right not to be treated as things, and we also grant them the right to be free of unnecessary suffering for the ends of another. An infant clearly has a very different set of capacities than a full-grown adult, and we may not grant infants every right that a full-grown adult has (for example, infants can’t vote or drive), but we do, as a moral matter, grant them this stunningly simple yet vitally important right: namely, that they cannot be treated simply as the ends of another.

Just as humanity has extended this basic equal consideration to humans (including those who were once outside of our moral commu-
nity), we must extend this basic equal consideration to animals if we are going to treat like cases alike. Animals are very clearly in possession of a subjective experience of their own lives. Anyone who lives with companion animals knows this is true. I live with two dogs and a cat, and I know that each of them has wants, moods, desires, and needs. They are not mere automatons, reacting machine-like to the stimuli around them as behaviorists would likely argue. Instead, they are beings that are aware of themselves, their environment, and those around them. Our dogs communicate with us; Emmy will often run to where her leash is, staring up, and barking if she wants to go out. Mole will often come and drop toys in our lap when he wants to play. During the time I wrote this book, I spent just about 24 hours a day with these animals, and I know them to be more than simple Cartesian machines made up of whining gears. Instead, they seek out pleasure and affection and avoid pain, and it is entirely clear to me that they have a subjective mental life. We can argue about their intelligence (which we would likely define in human-centric terms anyway), their ability to understand human language, or even the extent to which they really understand and know the world around them, but there’s no argument that can convincingly show that animals don’t feel pain, and that they have no interest in avoiding that pain. If anything, animals are more sensitive to the world around them than we are, given their heightened sensory abilities.

Though I use the example of the dogs with whom I live, I have also been around enough animals who are embroiled in agricultural production to know that they are also capable of forming bonds with others and with humans, and that they, too, are capable of feeling pain and pleasure. Let me be clear: I’m not some milquetoast sentimentalist who thinks that every animal in the world is like his dogs or his cat. Instead, I’m simply following Francione in thinking things through to their logical ethical conclusions: namely, that if we’re going to be consistent about how we treat alike cases, we ought to recognize the fact that animals have as much an interest in avoiding suffering as we do. “In the case of animals,” Francione writes “the principle of equal consideration tells us that if we are going to take animal interests seriously and give content to the prohibition against unnecessary suffering that we all claim to accept, then we must extend the same protection to
animal interests in not suffering unless we have a good reason for doing so."

Note that neither our taste, nor our convenience, desire, culture, nor tradition constitute a "good reason" here, just as we would not accept "culture" as a good reason for the slaughter of human beings—particularly if the slaughter was as systemic as our slaughter of animals is. There are no "humane" forms of exploitation that make it acceptable to use animals instrumentally, as means to our ends. The moment we use another being instrumentally, we have denied that being its right to exist on its own terms, whether that being is human or non-human. While production agriculture is patently exploitative and by far the biggest source of animal suffering on the planet today, other so-called less exploitative forms of exploitation and instrumental use are still morally wrong. These include hunting and fishing, the use of animals for fiber and food, and the use of animals for experiments. Despite what some particularly trendy grocery chains say these days, here are no "humane" animal products, as each of them turns animals into mere instruments for our ends. Having a few chickens in your backyard for eggs may not be horribly torturous for the animals, but in doing this, you turn another being into a subject whose primary ends are to fulfill your wants; it reifies human dominance, and exploits another for your ends.

Like any societal privilege, many of us directly and indirectly benefit from this particular form of oppression. Many of us, even the most progressive and aware among us, enjoy leather jackets, "happy meat" from Whole Foods, and other animal products. Yet, if we uncover the dynamics of the commodity form, we can begin to see these products as sullied by a long history of social relations in which animals are dominated for our wants, tastes, and pleasures—and nothing more. Because of this almost unilateral benefit that many of us have by virtue of our species, we are by and large unwilling to see how this oppression affects the animal "other." People who do work educating whites about white privilege and structural racism run into the same phenomenon. Those who benefit from whiteness, or patriarchy, or class standing, or any of the other social structures that ensure the reproduction of privilege in our world, often fail to see how they are privileged; it is so thoroughly taken for granted that it is like trying to explain water to a fish. Similarly, our dominance as humans is
so taken for granted that explaining our species privilege— even to people who profess to be deeply concerned about social justice issues of all stripes—is quite difficult. Nevertheless, these are relations of economic and social power that we are participating in on a daily basis. The fact that we can confine and kill animals for our ends (even incredibly frivolous ones) says a great deal about the hierarchy that we exercise over animals and the rest of the natural world. By compelling animals to produce for us, we (knowingly or unknowingly) take part in maintaining the domination of humanity over the natural world and its inhabitants, and such exploitation is often justified with stunningly simplistic logic. People who otherwise spend their time concerned about equity and justice will often argue that animals are “here for us” to consume, that our might-makes-right, and that there is really no other choice if we want to eat. Such logic only serves to prop up an exploitative and violent system of dominance, much like every other exploitative system of dominance and hierarchy that humanity has dealt with over the ages. Part of this stems from the fact that a good portion of this relationship is hidden from our view by the very nature of capitalism and the commodity production system itself. Like any other product that comes out of the exploitative capitalist system, animal products come out of a set of social relations based on dominance, unequal power, and exploitation. Justified by ideology, structured by relations of profit, and reinforced by our behavior, the exploitation of animals is deeply rooted in our society and culture, and deepened significantly by the commodity-based nature of capital.

At first glance, most commodities seem like simple things that we can buy, sell, and use. And indeed, at the most basic level of our everyday lives, this is what a commodity is. But commodities are not just the simple consumables we tend to think of them as, and it is here that we can begin to uncover the productive relationships behind them. Because these relationships—so basic and so central to the functioning of capital itself—help to cement exploitation and extend relations of domination, they are worth exploring in some depth, after which I will return to their relation to animals.
COMMODITIES, CAPITAL, AND
THE NATURE OF LABOR

First and foremost, a commodity is something that satisfies a human need. A loaf of bread can be used to satisfy your hunger, clothing keeps us warm, iPods play music. This is the most basic sense of a commodity in capitalist society, but beneath the veneer of simplicity lurks a world of interrelations that lie at the foundations of capitalist production. Commodities do satisfy our human needs and wants, but at the same time, they express a social relationship to production and speak to the way work and labor are structured within our society.

To begin to uncover these relations, it is helpful to consider the categories that Marx used to understand the concept of the commodity within capitalism. Challenging the earlier economists of his day, Marx was keen to show how the products of capitalism did not just magically appear, nor did they have inherent value. Instead, Marx wanted to show that the value derived from commodities was part of a specific kind of social relationship—one in which the labor power of workers added value to commodities. In this way, the notions of commodities and labor lie at the center of understanding how Marx viewed capitalist relationships as inherently exploitative, as the dominance of one class (the bourgeoisie, or the owners of the means of production) over another class (the proletariat, the working class, or those who have nothing to sell but their labor). Proletarians were lending labor power to the production process, transforming goods into saleable commodities, and receiving only part of the value generated in this process. To Marx, this was wholesale thievery; the expenditure of human effort to produce commodities was the actual expenditure of human life, of the limited time that any of us have on this planet, and it came at the expense of us realizing our actual nature as productive, creative beings that generated meaning through our labor. Marx believed deeply in the notion that humans were creative and that we could be positively world-transformative. Through our labor, we not only make the world, but we also express the best part of ourselves as a species. The hijacking of all of this for the productive ends of the bourgeoisie—for mere profit—was, to Marx, a horrible crime being perpetuated on the weaker by the stronger.
At the political-economic heart of understanding this exploitative relationship are Marx's ideas about commodities—indeed, we could think of capitalism itself as "a social system based on the imposition of work through the commodity form." As I wrote earlier, commodities are things that satisfy our human needs, but they are also a social expression of a historically-dependent form of labor rooted in the dynamics of exploitation. To put it more simply, the commodity form represents a set of power relations imposed upon the working class by the more powerful bourgeoisie, those who control production. Instead of thinking of commodities as static, simplistic entities that we buy, we need to begin to think about them as containers for sets of social relationships, and as caught in evolving and dynamic processes of domination and contestation. By thinking of them as containers, we can begin to draw back the curtain on them, transforming them into analytic categories that help us understand the real social, political, and economic relationships they're caught in. In this way, commodities are not merely the mechanistic categories caught in cycles of supply and demand that economists often reduce them to. They are, instead, part of the entire capitalist system, caught in a process that is both contested and imposed, and the result of historical and evolving relations of power between exploited groups and those that exploit them.

Before we can step into these power relations in any depth, though, we have to consider the commodity form itself. Marx argued that commodities could be understood through two different lenses: use value and exchange value. The use value is the part of the commodity that we commonly think of as being useful to us. Consider the commodity of bread. It tastes good, it provides the ends for a sandwich, and ultimately satisfies our hunger or cravings. The use value in the example of bread, or of any other commodity, is rather straightforward. In the most simple terms, use value is what we use a commodity for, and use values make things qualitatively different from one another. You can't eat your iPod, play music with your toast, or use a hammer to cook with (unless you happen to be a very resourceful cook). This lack of interchangeability means that these products of human labor and effort are qualitatively different from one another in ways that are central to their very existence. The problem comes in when we see
use values usurped by the logic of exchange, with commodities being compared in ways that erase their qualitative and useful differences.

While it is true that we cannot play music with our toast (at least not without getting really creative) or eat our iPods (unless you happen to be in a side-show), we can still compare these commodities in terms of one another, even if their uses are not interchangeable. For example, about 100 loaves of hand-made sourdough bread from my local co-op bakery are probably equal to the value of a top-of-the-line iPod. iPods and loaves of handmade bread have little in common qualitatively, however. One is the product of clean-room production in Asian factories, while the other is born of ground wheat, kneading, and brick ovens. The products themselves are qualitatively different in their uses, and qualitatively different in the labor that goes into them. Yet, because of the structure of capitalist relations of production, I can bring these two commodities into comparison with each other, representing one in the value of another. This brings a common element to these two very different commodities, and it makes their values commensurable in exchange. Though this seems like a straightforward maneuver to us, it, in fact, is a relationship that underlies our entire economic system. By bringing commodities into comparison with each other in the marketplace, all commodities become comparable to each other. As this happens, use value tends to become generally less important.

What Marx argues is that in our social and economic order, the uses we have for the commodities we buy, fade into the background and that exchange matters foremost. This may seem to violate our basic ideas of why we buy things. After all, we buy things mainly to get use from them. We eat the bread, and listen to podcasts on our iPods, and these are clearly uses. But consider this hypothetical, and you’ll begin to understand Marx’s point: You’re walking down the street, and you bend down to tie your shoe. When you look down, you find a fresh, snappy $100 bill on the sidewalk. No one is around, no one would be ready to claim it, and you feel no harm or injustice in laying claim to the money. Being the very hungry consumer you are, though, you decide that you’re going to treat yourself to $100 worth of hamburgers from the local fast food joint. You pop on in, step up to the counter, and order your $100 worth of burgers. Though the folks
behind the counter are surprised by such a large order, they comply with it, and you walk out with 5 or 6 bags full to the brim with standard-American-diet greasiness. Now, imagine that on your way out the door, you experience a moment of compelling clarity and decide that you will, from this moment on, reject the heart disease, diabetes, and other problems that would come from continuing to subsist on your burger diet. No, you won’t have any part of it, and to prove your resolve, you’re going to throw the burgers out—right now! Taking your new-found clarity to heart, you chuck the burgers in the nearest bin, and walk off happily as an agent of your own health.

Admittedly, this is a unlikely scenario embellished to prove a point, but think about this: does the local burger joint care what you do with the burgers once you’ve purchased them? If you answer honestly, you’ll know that they don’t particularly care if you eat them, give them away, throw them out, or turn them into some kind of pop-art burger sculptures to make a point about consumer excess. What matters to the burger joint is that you bought the burgers, not what you do with them. Thus, in this simple example, we can see Marx’s point, that use value becomes less relevant, and exchange, or getting you to buy the burgers for your hard-earned or even your serendipitously found money, is what matters the most.

The issue here is that exchange becomes predominant in capitalist social relations to such a degree that it begins to affect and shape the other social relations of our society. Each commodity serves a unique and different function, but in capitalism, this uniqueness—and the corresponding labor power that produced it—gets shunted into the abstraction of exchange value. Use value, then, disappears and all commodities become comparable through quantitative exchange value. This robs each commodity of its qualitative distinctiveness, and because of the way that capitalist social and economic relations structure production and consumption, we rarely understand just how commodities differ in their manufacture. To the average consumer, a piece of steak is comparable to an iPod, which is comparable to a loaf of handmade sourdough due to the fact that we can walk into a store and buy each, though they are very different from each other, not only in use, but also in the processes that lead up to their production. Torn apart from the social systems in which each was made, every com-
modernity appears as simply another thing that we can buy. Sadly, though, this eliminates the back story of the productive forces and relations behind each commodity.

Marx’s notion that exchange rising above use value alters our social relations is not an idea that should be taken lightly. Though many of us are accustomed to thinking of the economy as a distinct realm from our cultures and society, Marx saw them as deeply interrelated and intertwined. This idea—called historical materialism—helps to explain how it is that our economic activities and social and ideological structures are inextricably tied together. In what is perhaps the most concise statement of this theory, Marx, in one of his earlier writings, stated:

In the social production of their life, men [sic] enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.15 (italics mine)

What is worth noting here is Marx’s contention that our social life determines our consciousness—that we are, in essence, social creatures, born into and socialized into particular kinds of social arrangements. These social arrangements, Marx argues, are conditioned by the overall productive structure of society, the totality of forces that make up production. Taken in this way, the economic forces of a society deeply influence its social, political, and intellectual aspects. The economy, then, is not separate from the social, cultural, or political. At the very least,16 these realms influence one another, and how we make our way in the world influences our vision of the world and even our own place (and the place of others) within it.

If the economy influences society, then the predominance of exchange value over all else will have impacts on the social world. This is
precisely the problem that Marx saw with use value declining and exchange value rising to the fore. In a social and economic arrangement where exchange becomes predominant, people begin to relate to one another primarily through a logic of exchange, and human interaction becomes increasingly like the interaction between things. As exchange dominates, people begin to see value as part of commodities themselves, rather than as something created, and part of a social system of production. This divorces the producer from the product, and creates a kind of veil behind which the totality of production functions. This has significant impacts in terms of understanding commodities, their origins, and the exploitation involved in them, whether it is of humans or of non-human animals. In my own case, my lack of understanding of animal agriculture led me to some rather abrupt awakenings in my college career. And in this book, I will continue to explore the productive system that goes into many of our everyday food products. This whole project is part of uncovering the relations of power that are behind these commodity relations, rather than simply accepting them as given entities.

**HOT FOR COMMODITIES**

Commodities look like simple things; as I mentioned at the outset of the chapter, we live in a world in which we are compelled to purchase things to live. Buying things requires that those things be produced by an expenditure of labor power, and that we have the means to purchase them. However, this seeming truism represents a terrain of contestation that has historically played out between those who own and manage production and those who produce. To most of us, this is just the way the world is, and any consideration beyond that is mere navel-gazing for people with too much time on their hands. But that attitude—itself an ideological product of our social and economic order—is not useful if we're going to understand the complexity of production and the exploitation and oppression inherent in it.

In many of my classes, I initiate a conversation about these ideas by talking about what Marx called the "fetishism of commodities." Though Marxist political economy is hardly ever something that my students are on the edge of their seats for, the word "fetish" usually...
perks up any class quickly. Starting a class by talking about fetishes guarantees that even the most disinterested student pays attention for a little while, and it also lightens the thick atmosphere that surrounds the fairly complex theory around commodities, value, labor, and the like. Though these conversations border on scintillating, I'll reproduce the same exercise here, not because I think you need scintillation to continue through the discussion, but because the scintillating bits actually do help to explain the theory. Plus, with all this Marxist political economy, I have to keep you reading some way or another, don't I?

When you think of a fetish, what comes to mind? Be honest with yourself. No one else is around; you're safe. You can think whatever you'd like, and no one will know. Consider it our secret. If you are honest with yourself—and if you have something of a dirty mind, like me and the vast majority of my students—the first thing that came to mind was probably something like an obscene love for feet (this one has always topped the list over the years), or maybe spanking, or perhaps even whips and chains and such. To make the example easy, we'll take the most commonly provided case: that of the foot fetishist. Yes, a significant number of us are genuinely repulsed by the notion of feet being an object of sexual desire or stimulation, yet for some people, feet represent the pinnacle of sexual arousal, as strange as that may be to the rest of us. Without judging the sexual tastes of another—I am a social anarchist who believes deeply in personal expression and freedom, after all—let's consider the foot as a sexual object. To most of us, the foot is at worst ugly, smelly, and dirty, and at best, utilitarian. But to the fetishist, the foot has somehow risen out of the lowly status most of us hold it in, and become the ultimate in sexual desire. Putting aside the Lacanian psychoanalytic reasons that anyone might feel this way, it is safe to say that there is nothing inherent in the foot that makes it an object of sexual desire or arousal. Despite this, however, the foot fetishist has endowed this body part with a power that it does not innately have. To most of us who aren't into feet, this is kind of weird. We have difficulty imagining why people would be into feet, and why anyone would find them even remotely sexually attractive. Yet, the fetishist has attached a mysterious power to the foot, and it comes to mean something more to the fetishist, something much more.
Though we have no way of knowing whether or not Marx was into feet, we do know that he was concerned with a different kind of fetish: the commodity fetish. Much as the foot fetishist attaches special powers to the foot that it does not inherently have, we attach special powers to the commodity that it does not inherently have. When we do this, we figure that commodities are actually the things that bear value, yet that value is always, in every instance, derived from labor power. Still, within capitalist social relations, commodities appear to take on a life of their own, torn away from the very economic and social relations in which they are produced. We see commodities as simple, trivial, and easily understood, but beneath this exterior of simple comprehension lies a vast, concealed network of productive forces and relationships. By covering up, distancing, and pulling the commodity away from its conditions of production, the labor that produces commodities becomes individualized rather than social. When this happens, we have the working class distanced from the products of its own labor. They produce commodities, receive payment for them, and then return to the marketplace to buy more commodities, likewise produced by those who are alienated from their own labor. What happens is that all labor becomes individualized, and what were originally social relations between people end up becoming social relations between things—namely, the commodities they're purchasing and producing. As such, commodities appear to magically have a life of their own, apart from those who have produced them. Fetishism, Marx writes, is “a definite social relation between men [sic], that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.”

Marx further writes:

When we bring the products of our labour into relation with each other as values, it is not because we see in these articles the material receptacles of homogeneous human labour. Quite the contrary: whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this. Nevertheless, we do it. Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic.
The remarkable point here is that the commodity fetish serves as a way of covering up or obscuring the true relations of production as a social hieroglyphic. The true conditions of production are covered, difficult to determine, and superseded by the exchange value of a particular product. When this happens, we can all essentially behave as though the conditions of production are immaterial. Covered up behind value, the long commodity chains go unnoticed, and, to borrow an overused metaphor, we’re always seeing the very tip of the iceberg.

What we need to do, however, is uncover some of these productive relationships that lie underneath everything. Rather than seeing only exchange value, we need to see and understand how particular commodities are part of elaborate systems of production, and therefore, tied into social relations of power, dominance, and oppression. In his book *Reading Capital Politically*, Harry Cleaver argues that we must see past this fetishism to really understand the social relations of capital. Cleaver writes:

> We must ... see behind Marx's own exposition of the commodity-form in which commodities appear to interact with one another on their own ... There are certain regularities, or 'laws,' of commodity exchange just as there is a logic to the commodity-form itself, but that logic and those laws are only those which capital succeeds in imposing. What Marx shows in *Capital* are the 'rules of the game' laid down by capital. These rules reflect its own internal structure—the contradictory struggle of two classes.20

This is a vital notion, for it vivifies Marx’s ideas and prevents their abstraction as mere theoretical categories. What Cleaver argues for is an analytical and political praxis, married to Marx’s theory, that includes a way of understanding how the categories and “rules of the game” that Marx discusses are part of a larger system, imposed through struggle, and thoroughly part of a capitalist system of production. Uncovering the aspects of commodity production, we can begin to see how commodities are not abstract entities that magically arrive on store shelves, or just appear in our cabinets and refrigerators. Instead, we can begin to see that the imposition of the commodity-form itself is an historically-specific mode of struggle, and is, itself, part of the larger productive trends of capital.
To return to my earlier point about coming to terms with the production of milk and other animal products, it was a moment for me where this ideological veil of the commodity fetish was lifted. As I began to learn about animal-produced and derived commodities, these commodities became more than just food items. They took on a whole different meaning when I was able to locate them within a larger field of productive forces. Learning about how intensive animal production operates showed me what I’d failed to see for years. Instead of relating to these commodities as mere things, they soon took on a greater meaning to me, and had a social value that I began to understand with rather more clarity than I really wanted at the time. While it taught me a great deal about how animal agriculture functioned, it also taught me a great deal about how capitalism functioned. If something as simple as a glass of milk had such a stunningly complex and exploitative back-story, what about other common things?

It is important to understand that the structure of capitalism itself is caught up in this process of distancing us from production and from producers. Marx saw this as a problem of human relations becoming more “thing-like,” with attendant negative effects in the social realm, but I also think that this notion can easily be extended to consider our relations with animals. Marx, of course, would have balked at this notion. Thoroughly a product of the Enlightenment, Marx shared the Enlightenment views of animals as more simple and mechanistic than humanity, the supposed pinnacle of rationality. Animals had a relationship with their environment, but for Marx, that relationship was more of an immediate one, far more basic than the relationship that humans had with nature in their world-transformative ways. Still, despite these period-specific limitations of Marx, the categories he provides can be harnessed to understand animal exploitation today. Similarly, Cleaver argues that we need to understand and uncover the relations of capital to understand the relations of class struggle. By extension, I imagine, Cleaver would imply that this would be human class struggle.

Nevertheless, we can consider animals in our analysis of the machinations of capital, and it makes sense to include them in an analysis of commodity production, exploitation, and struggle. In the quote from Capital above, Marx is concerned about equating different kinds of human labor; certainly, we could extend this notion given our system of
globalized and industrialized agricultural production to include animals. Indeed, in terms of pure misery, animals are likely even worse off than the contemporary working classes; as literal chattel slaves and the property of humans (more on this in Chapter 3), they are never outside of the grasp of this productive system, and they serve the interests of those who wish to profit from them 24 hours a day, for their entire (often foreshortened) lives. 

In some regards, animals are both like and unlike the working class in a Marxian analysis of labor and commodities. On the one hand, as Jason Hribal argues, animals do perform unwaged labor, and have served a key role in the development of industrial capitalism. Animals produce commodities like eggs, dairy, and wool within a system that is designed to leverage that labor power for profit; their very bodies often serve as a commodity, as in the case of meat products; and they are often used as unwilling experimental subjects. In the case of modern, industrialized agriculture, human labor has been replaced by massive investments in capital, with animals almost fully integrated with the machinery of agricultural production technology. Considering the role of animals in this massive productive machinery, there is a compelling case for thinking of animals—literally, the “living stock” of others—in an analysis of the working class. As unwaged laborers, animals not only become commodities themselves, but they also provide energy, food, and clothing that supports the development of industrial capital. Though the labor of these animals is unwaged, there is a history of “expropriation, exploitation and resistance,” and the designation of animals as “living stock” comes from the perspective of humans. Considering the situation from the point of view of the sheep, cow, horse, or pig, leads to a different history, one where animals are not “living commodities, or the ‘means of production.’” Comparing the state of animals to human slaves, child laborers, home workers, and sex-workers, Hribal argues that this kind of unwaged labor is part and parcel of the processes of accumulation, and should not be ignored.

From a productive angle, Hribal’s approach makes sense. But thinking more critically about what Marx saw as the revolutionary potential of the working class, it seems that using “working class,” to describe non-human laborers can obscure some key differences between humans and animals and the forms of exploitation each experiences.
While Hribal argues that animals do indeed struggle against capital, their struggle is necessarily qualitatively different than the global proletarian revolution that Marx hoped for in his understanding of the working class. Animals cannot unite and break the chains that compel them to labor; their resistance to capital is necessarily more limited, if only by the singular and absolute power that humans wield over animals. Animals are somewhat more like human slaves throughout history, but in this regard they are also different: human slaves can resist, plan, revolt, and even struggle for their own freedom in some cases; non-humans cannot meaningfully do any of these things. They are exploited and suffer voicelessly, and we rarely hear their cries. Thus, while animals have traditionally occupied a historical role in the development and maintenance of industrial and agricultural capital that looks a bit like outright slavery and a bit like wage slavery, it may be useful to be a bit more specific about how we conceptualize the role of animals within capital, rather than relying on the working class designation or the simple designation of slavery. As neither exactly like human slaves or exactly like human wage laborers, animals occupy a different position within capitalism: they are superexploited living commodities. Animals never see a separation between “home” and “work,” and find themselves within the grasp of productive capital at all times. Though some may balk at the notion that animal subjectivity matters or even exists, Barbara Noske argues that we should see animals as “total beings whose relations with their physical and social environment are of vital importance.” If this is the case, we have no right to violate the integrity of animals by exploiting them, making them living commodities. How we relate to animals as voiceless beings suffering under the forces of capital becomes an ethical question, much as the question of how we relate to any other group that suffers under the exploitative forces of capital.

Considering the totality of animal being, Noske presents the process by which animals have become “de-animalized” in the workings of contemporary capitalism, and presents four ways—following Marx—in which animals have become alienated. First, animals are alienated from the product; when these products often include the actual offspring of animals, they are generally separated at birth or immediately thereafter, as in the case of separating veal calves from
their mothers. In the case of vivisection and animal testing, the very bodies of animals become an agent of their own suffering, used as a tool to another's ends. Second, animals become alienated from their productive activity. The bodies and functions of animals have been completely appropriated by capital, and, subsequently, put to use in a single way only, subordinating the total animal being to this single productive activity. Hens are meant to lay eggs. This function, in and of itself, becomes the single activity focused on by those who wish to leverage the bodies of animals for profit, and every other aspect of its being is suppressed in so far as those aspects are an impediment to production. Third, animals are alienated from fellow animals. Noske points out that animals are not just biological automatons; they require and benefit from socialization, contact, and play. Yet, within the confined and intensive systems of animal production, both in agricultural facilities and laboratories, animals are denied these essential aspects of their being. During my time as a student in the agricultural sciences, I learned about "optimal stocking densities," for making the most profit on the backs of animals within the least amount of space. Having animals confined also allowed for easier management, and the reduction of human labor expense. These intrinsic processes of capitalist production which seeks to decrease costs and increase profit ignores the social needs of animals, subjugating them to the logic of capital, instead. Fourth, and finally, animals are alienated from surrounding nature. Animals, now turned into simple machines for the production of value, are pulled out of the ecosystem of which they were formerly a part; many animals under the sway of agriculture live their lives in systems that are completely synthetic, designed by human beings. Taking all of these cases together, Noske writes that "animal alienation amounts to alienation from species life."

To understand how the commodity form is at the heart of animal alienation and exploitation, let's take the example of a very common commodity: an egg. By tracing some of the processes of production involved in the average egg purchased in the US, we can examine how these relations of oppression and domination play out for animals.

To put the egg industry into some perspective, in 2005 total US egg production was 76.98 billion table eggs. Like much of the rest of
production agriculture, egg production is a game of increasingly large producers and economies of scale: 64 companies involved in egg production control 1 million-plus laying hens, and 11 companies control more than 5 million birds for egg production. In total, there were some 286 million hens involved in egg production in the US in 2005, and the average person in the US ate some 21 dozen eggs in the same year.\(^3\)

Similarly to my experience with dairy products, few of us have any real understanding of how the commodity of an egg is produced. Equated with all other products on the marketplace and field of exchange, to us, an egg is like pretty much any other foodstuff we might buy in the grocery store. Yet, the seemingly simple form of the egg covers up the significant character of the suffering going on to produce this product. 98% or more of the commercial egg production in the US is derived from hens producing in what are called “battery cages.” Birds are stocked 6 or 7 or more to a wire battery cage, where they live their entire lives—until they are slaughtered.

The United Egg Producers is the main egg industry body that promotes egg consumption, lobbies for the egg industry, and does industry outreach and “education.” They established a set of animal husbandry guidelines, with animal welfare in mind, that is designed to promote eggs as a food. By adhering to the guidelines, producers are allowed to label their products “United Egg Producers Certified,” which includes a reassuring-looking logo, prominently featuring a check mark to denote animal husbandry guideline compliance. Even these guidelines—supposedly better than everyday production standards—are shocking for their barbarism and cruelty. According to the certified husbandry guidelines, hens should receive 67–86 square inches of usable space per hen; that may sound like a lot, but it is an exceedingly small amount of space. To get a sense of just how little space that is, lay open the book you’re reading out completely flat; opened completely, you’re looking at about 93 square inches. Now, imagine putting a three-pound bird in an area smaller than the open book in front of you, and you have a sense of just how little space egg-laying hens have—there’s not even enough room for a single bird to spread her wings, to perch, or to engage in other natural behaviors.
Before being put into these cages, however, the birds are debeaked. This happens when they are ten days old or less, in a process that uses a heated blade to cut off the beak, which also prevents it from regrowing. The procedure is, of course, done without anesthetic. Debeaking, or what the industry euphemistically calls “beak trimming,” is just one way that the bodies of these animals are mutilated to conform to the needs of capital production. Without debeaking, animals would peck one another to death because of the human-made stress created by intensive confinement. This leads to higher hen mortality and obvious declines in output for the farm owner. Debeaking is meant to counteract this by fully transforming a hen, from animal into part of the productive machinery. This, in turn, allows animals to be confined and stocked in densities that are profitable to the producer, but completely alienating, distressing, and torturous to the birds.

Stocked in battery cages in giant houses that may hold tens of thousands of birds, hens produce eggs in intense confinement. In order to increase the output of hens, producers often force or “induce” a molting of the entire flock. The molt itself is a normal aspect of bird physiology, but in the hands of producers, it is used as a method to increase productivity. The forced molt is often accompanied by starving the birds, as well as alternating the light patterns to “trick” the birds physiological mechanisms into responding to what it seems like seasonal changes. The latest animal husbandry guidelines for the United Egg Producers prohibit starvation in a forced molt, but they do allow the use of low-protein foods instead. According to the United Egg Producers, a forced molt “extends hen life” and “rejuvenates the reproductive cycle of the hen.” It is important to note that forced molting is a way of squeezing every last bit of productive capacity out of birds whose bodies have been used as machines for production for their entire lives. Even the animal husbandry guidelines from the UEP recognize this. The UEP writes “molt may result in the need to add approximately 40–50% fewer new hens each year than would be needed without induced molts. This in turn results in significantly fewer spent [sic] hens that have to be handled, transported, and slaughtered. A flock may live to 110 weeks with molting and 75–80 without.”

Thus emerges a rather bleak portrait of life—and existence—for your average egg-laying hen. Hens are, from birth, not only bred to be
part of the productive machinery of egg production, but also modified to fit the most profitable production schemes. They are debeaked, force-molted, and crammed into tiny cages to produce eggs for the prodigious American appetite. This is a life of extreme deprivation for the hens, one in which, as Noske points out, they are alien from themselves, from others, and from the environment, all to produce a product that none of us needs to live healthfully.

On top of it all, once the birds have had their productive capacity exhausted by capital, they are considered—in the terminology of the industry—“spent,” and slaughtered, usually at 75–110 weeks of age. The UEP guidelines talk about “on-farm depopulation of entire flocks,” since they are all timed to produce, molt, and—despite the euphemism of “depopulation”—die together. The guidelines also discuss ways of killing “spent” hens, including “cervical dislocation” (neck-breaking), “non-penetrating captive bolt” (essentially a pistol shot to the head), “electrocution,” and “stunning followed by maceration” (literally being ground alive). Another acceptable way of killing hens whose bodies are no longer useful to producers, is through modified atmosphere killing (MAK). In this process, hens are gassed en masse with carbon dioxide. The contraption that accomplishes this end looks like a giant square trash bin with wheels, about four-feet high, complete with a flap on the front for depositing animals into the bin. One company selling these promotes the MAK carts as “the most humane and effective means for the disposal of unwanted fowl.” A single operator using a twenty-pound bottle of carbon dioxide can kill 1200–1500 birds, and the cart itself has a capacity of 200-plus birds. Like every other aspect of production, “disposal” of “spent” birds has been rationalized, made routine, and tuned for the maximum profit. Regardless of the method of slaughter, the UEP guidelines advise that “to minimize public distress, stunning, killing, and carcass disposal should be carried out away from public view.” Of course, the producers would not want the public to know what actually goes on to produce their morning omelet.

Finally, one aspect of egg production that most of us never think about is this: if females are laying the eggs, what happens to all of the males? If (as in the egg industry) males are simply unproductive and have no use, they are “discarded.” In this case, discarding means gassing;
being ground up alive for fertilizer; or simply being thrown out and expected to die in the trash, either by suffocation under a pile of other discarded chicks, or by starvation or dehydration. While the hens are valuable as egg producers, the males are mere cast-offs, unproductive, unnecessary, and literally of no value to the entire production process.

Though battery-cage eggs are produced in conditions of unimaginable cruelty for the hens, this is not to suggest that cage-free or free-range eggs are significantly different in terms of exploitation or suffering. These other methods of production may still rely on forced molts to increase productivity; they do still rely on debeaking; the same methods of slaughter still apply; and they are still caught within a productive framework where animals are essentially unwaged laborers producing value for humans. This very relationship of human dominance over animals is the problem, and though some forms of dominance are “nicer” than others, even nice exploitation is still exploitation in the end.

As with other commodities in contemporary capitalism, these eggs stand aside other products in exchange, and their productive relationships are lost to us, by and large. Recovering these relationships can help us—as in the case of uncovering the relations behind the products of human labor power—to uncover and fight processes of injustice, unequal power, and oppression. This is just one product; there are similar narratives for most other animal products as well. Milk—also the product of female animals and related to the productive processes of these animals—has a similar history, with male calves being killed off for veal. When the milking cows themselves are “spent,”—much sooner than they would see the natural end of their lives—they’re turned into hamburger. Whatever industry you can think of that involves animals, odds are good that human dominance has allowed us a heightened power over animals driven by the profit motive, by the desire to spend the labor and bodies of animals. Though going into every single industry is beyond the scope of this book, there are more than 9 billion animals a year slaughtered in the US alone. Just during the week I was writing this chapter, 599,000 cattle were slaughtered in the US, along with 1.8 million pigs, and almost 50,000 lambs. Some of these animals produced commodities and then became the commodity of meat; others were simply raised as commodities, and ended
up that way through slaughter. None of these figures count animals killed in experiments or for testing products, marine life, “unwanted” animals euthanized in shelters, animals killed by hunters, or any of the other multitude of animals that are killed for human ends.

All of this death is big business: in 2006, the retail equivalent value of the US beef industry was some $71 billion, and total US beef consumption stood at 28 billion pounds. The US “broiler” chicken industry had a retail equivalent value of $41 billion, with 5.3 billion pounds exported, and value of $1.9 billion dollars.

Add up all of the industries involved in animal exploitation, and it is easy to see that there are significant profits being produced on the backs of animals.

In addition to this kind of production being harmful for animals, it is harmful for humans who work in the industry as well. These relations of human domination are also hidden behind the mask of the commodity form. Slaughterhouse work is routinely ranked among the most dangerous occupations, and illegal immigrants are over-represented among slaughterhouse workers. Slaughterhouse work is also common in poorer communities in the United States. Virgil Butler, a former worker for Tyson, one of the largest chicken “processors,” started catching chickens for slaughter when he was fourteen, to help support his family. Working for Tyson for ten years in various aspects of chicken slaughter, Butler saw workers treated as “disposable,” and also worked in dangerous conditions that threatened worker safety. Because of the speed of the slaughter “line,” workers were often at risk of cutting themselves, and Butler says that getting hurt wasn’t “a matter of if, it was a matter of when.” Given the hours of the job and the demands for production speed, many workers also turned to amphetamines just to keep up with the line. Taking drugs is not uncommon in the slaughterhouse—other workers involved in the slaughter of various animals report the same experience, taking speed to keep up.

Though the problems of slaughtering small animals should not be underestimated, slaughtering large animals takes on another dimension of danger, as animals weighing several hundred to several thousand pounds are chained up by their legs for what is essentially a bloody disassembly line. Again, because of the speed of production in
slaughterhouses, many animals are at least partly conscious while being slaughtered because they are incorrectly incapacitated. The results for both animals and humans are disastrous. In her book *Slaughterhouse*, Gail Eisnitz examines the problems of neglect and abuse in slaughterhouses in the United States, showing through first-person interviews how these problems are manifest in the system itself. Eisnitz interviews workers who skinned animals that were still blinking, kicking, moaning, and shrieking. While this is obviously horrific for the animals, it also clearly dangerous for the humans working near several thousand-pound cows thrashing about, reeling in pain from the process of slaughter. Occasionally, cows will fall from the chain they are hung on, and crash to the floor, or they may kick and debilitate anyone working on the line. The conditions for the slaughter of pigs are no better, and the primary concern of the slaughter operation is to keep the line moving, to keep profitability up. Eisnitz’s interview with one worker, Ed Van Winkle—infamous in local circles for working at ten different plants—reveals the depths of the problems with this profit-first mentality in hog slaughter:

“Do you think the problem is a function of the stun operators?” I asked him. “Or the equipment?”

“I think the whole problem is the attitude,” he replied. “As long as that chain is running, they don’t give a shit what you have to do to get that hog on the line. You got to get a hog on each hook or you got a foreman on your ass.”

Van Winkle sounded tired, worn down, too battle-scarred to bother with machismo.

“When I started with Morrell it was a very different company. At some point there was a dramatic switch, caused by greed, in my opinion. Production took precedence over employee welfare. If someone got hurt, you weren’t supposed to shut the chain off; you were supposed to drag him off the floor and keep the chain going. The chain became the most important thing. Everything else fell by the wayside.”

“In the last few years, conditions at Morrell’s have gotten worse and worse. Today, management doesn’t care how the hog gets up on that line. Management doesn’t care whether the hog is stunned or conscious, or whether the sticker is injured in the process. All Morrell cares about is getting those hogs killed.”
In order to move pigs through the slaughter operation as quickly as possible Van Winkle and other workers did just about whatever was necessary to move the operation along. Van Winkle describes taking prods and sticking them into the pigs' eyes to get them to move, and watching drivers using pipes to kill hogs that either refused or could not to go through chutes into the slaughterhouse. Admitting to beating eleven hogs to death in one day, Van Winkle said:

“Hogs get stressed out pretty easy,” he continued. “If you prod them too much, they have heart attacks. If you get a hog in the chute that’s had the shit prodded out of him and has a heart attack or refuses to move, you take a meat hook and hook it into his bunghole [anus]. You try to do this by clipping the hipbone. Then you drag him backwards. You're dragging these hogs alive, and a lot of times the meat hook rips out of the bunghole. I've seen hams—thighs—completely ripped open. I've also seen intestines come out. If the hog collapses near the front of the chute, you shove the meat hook into his cheek and drag him forward.”

As one of the first parts of the process of slaughtering pigs, the pigs must be “stuck,” or bled to death before they enter a scalding tank to remove their hair. The people who do the “sticking” are called “stickers,” and often because of the speed of the slaughter line, stickers fail to adequately and accurately cut the pigs, meaning they bleed to death more slowly. Instead of dying quickly, the pigs sometimes drown in the scalding tank. Van Winkle said that he wasn’t sure if the pigs burned to death or drowned first, but in either case, it was horribly cruel, and also dangerous for the workers on the line, since the inadequately “stuck” pigs thrashed around violently. In an environment where people are wielding knives and working quickly to keep up with a fast-moving line, the danger is amplified for human workers. Van Winkle complained to management, to OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), and to the USDA (United States Department of Agriculture), yet his complaints resulted in few substantive changes:

“Instead of taking care of it, they gave us mesh gloves, because a lot of us were getting cut in the hands. But when you put a mesh glove on a knife hand, you might as well grease the knife. Live hogs were kicking our knives out of our hands. Next, they gave us finger rings that were attached to the knife. When a hog kicks you, the knife
stays in your hand. So instead of a flying knife, you've got a double-edged blade flopping around in your hand."^{47}

Van Winkle himself was injured on the line, as Eisnitz writes:

"I got cut across my jugular," he said. "I was scared, scared to death. Stitches go with the territory in a packing house. I can live with stitches. I can live with getting cut once in a while. What I can't live with is cutting my own throat.

"After I cut my neck, I told the foreman, 'I'm not here to die, I'm not going to stick any more hogs for you.' I met with management and told them, 'You can't force me to stick live hogs. The law states I don't have to do something I feel puts my life in jeopardy. Well, my life's in jeopardy so I'm not sticking any more hogs.'"^{48}

In addition to the physical injuries of actually working in the job, slaughterhouse work also takes a psychological and emotional toll on workers. Van Winkle described how people working in the "stick pit" develop an "attitude that lets you kill things but doesn't let you care."

Van Winkle described the effects this had on him in his job and in his personal life:

"You may look a hog in the eye that's walking around down in the blood pit with you and think, God, that really isn't a bad-looking animal. You may want to pet it. Pigs down on the kill floor have come up and nuzzled me like a puppy. Two minutes later, I had to kill them—beat them to death with a pipe. I can't care.

"When I worked upstairs taking hogs' guts out, I could cop an attitude that I was working on a production line, helping to feed people. But down in the stick pit I wasn't feeding people. I was killing things. My attitude was, it's only an animal. Kill it.

"Sometimes I looked at people that way, too," he said. "I've had ideas of hanging my foreman upside down on the line and sticking him. I remember going into the office and telling the personnel man that I have no problem pulling the trigger on a person—if you get in my face I'll blow you away.

"Every sticker I know carries a gun, and every one of them would shoot you. Most stickers I know have been arrested for assault. A lot of them have problems with alcohol. They have to drink, they have no other way of dealing with killing live, kicking animals all day long. If you stop and think about it, you're killing several thousand beings a day."^{49}
The anger and alienation that follows these workers home often manifests itself as violence against families and against the communities where they live. It is a violence that readily leaks out beyond the boundaries of the slaughterhouse. Like Ed Van Winkle, Virgil Butler found himself becoming increasingly violent the longer he worked at Tyson, and he also noticed the same violence in others he worked with, some of whom abused their families. The logic of modern animal production demands that animals are moved through slaughter rapidly, with little regard for the side-effects on people and animals. Animals suffer as they are inadequately stunned and slaughtered while still conscious; people, who must do this slaughtering, suffer as they work to silence the parts of themselves that are innately repulsed by the violent acts demanded of them by their work.

Despite the ripple-effects throughout society, the consumption of animal products is so entrenched in our economies and cultures, that most of us eat the by-products of this exploitative system several times a day. As a result, most of us remain blissfully unaware of the violence done to people and animals in our name—for our desires. Similarly, most of us are also blissfully unaware of another aspect of animal abuse for profit, which is entrenched in our scientific and research cultures and lies at the heart of the drug approval process in the United States.

**VIVISECTION**

Though you may be ready to accept that the production of animal products represents an unnecessary imposition of power over animals and significant attendant suffering, many of you will undoubtedly balk at abolishing vivisection, or the use of animals for research and testing purposes. After all, our cultural logic dictates that animal testing provides what appears to be an unambiguous human benefit: we learn that animal testing provides medical advances that we need to continue to eradicate disease, solve medical problems, and develop surgical techniques. Yet, as we peek behind the locked laboratory doors, we can see that vivisection—much like the production of animals for food—is an unnecessary, cruel, and frivolous imposition of suffering on animals for human ends. Moreover, vivisection is big business, and
deeply entrenched in institutional cultures in the academy, medicine, military, and product development.

The number of animals killed in vivisection pales in comparison to the number of animals killed for food, yet we cannot discount the suffering that goes on for human ends. Every year, tens of millions of animals are killed for scientific and product research purposes—a conservative estimate puts the number at about 20 million animals per year in the United States alone. The problem with determining an accurate count of animals used in vivisection is that officially reported US Federal statistics do not require that vivisectors report the use of mice, rats, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and horses, and other farm animals used in agricultural research.

Though we are led to believe that these experiments are unambiguously necessary for our continued well-being, a significant proportion of vivisection is not at all connected to vital human interests. In his book Animals Like Us, Mark Rowlands breaks testing into four main areas: medical research, product testing, psychological study, and military testing. In commercial product testing, the toxicity of consumer goods and other substances are determined by injecting, force-feeding, or otherwise exposing animals to massive amounts—or doses—of the chemicals or products in question. One of the more common tests is the LD (lethal dose)-50 test, which determines how much of a substance is necessary to kill fifty percent of a population of animals. The LD-50 test is a standard way to gather data on the toxicity of particular compounds. In the test, incremental doses of the compound or product in question are administered to animals until fifty percent of the animals in the population die. Whatever dose fifty percent of the population dies at is then marked as the LD-50, and arriving at this point can take anywhere from two weeks to six months. The animals remaining after fifty percent of the population have died are force-fed with the test compound for two more weeks. Once these two weeks are up, any other surviving animals are killed, dissected, and studied to understand the effects of the accumulated toxicity on their organs.

Though we might like to imagine that the LD-50 test provides us with valuable data for understanding toxicity and its effects on humans, some estimate that the correlation between animal LD-50 stud-
ies and effects on humans are in the ballpark of 5 and 25 percent; these odds make the LD-50 more hit-and-miss than a coin toss.\textsuperscript{54} The LD-50 itself can vary not only among species, but also within different strains of the same species, and moreover, the test is influenced by factors such as “sex, age, temperature, humidity, means of dosage, time of dosage, and the density of animals in a given space.”\textsuperscript{55}

Similar problems hold for using animals as test subjects for drugs. While there is a widespread belief that medical progress would be impossible without animal models and testing, there is significant evidence that animal models for drug interactions hurt, rather than help, the drug development process.\textsuperscript{56} In their book \textit{Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Costs of Experiments on Animals}, C. Ray Greek, MD and Jean Swingle Greek, DVM detail more than thirty cases where drug testing on animals failed to yield results that were relevant to humans. In some cases, the drugs had quite adverse affects on humans that did not materialize in the required animal studies. Similarly, Greek and Greek list a variety of drugs—including the popular anti-heartburn drug Prisolec—that were withheld from the public because of inconclusive animal studies. Moreover, the Greeks point out, medical history is full of stories of “hazardous medications and human fatalities—all traceable to drug development’s dependency on the animal model.”\textsuperscript{60} The most prominent of these was the disaster with thalidomide, which proved safe in most animal studies, yet which caused birth defects in humans.\textsuperscript{60} Thalidomide, however, is just one example of how animal studies failed to point to hazardous problems for humans in drug development. Most recently, faulty animal studies have been blamed for failures to understand how COX-2 inhibitors, like the popular Vioxx (rofecoxib), resulted in double the risk for heart attack and stroke in subjects taking 25mg of the drug daily.\textsuperscript{61} Animal studies of COX-2 inhibitors were “often inconsistent, species dependent, and not useful in predicting drug safety or efficacy for humans,”\textsuperscript{62} yet the drugs remained on the market for years, as Merck used unproblematic animal studies to continue to justify the sale of Vioxx. This resulted in some 3,800 product-liability and injury lawsuits against the company.\textsuperscript{63} With the development of safer and more accurate alternatives to animal testing already on the market—or on the horizon,\textsuperscript{64} the necessity of vivisection becomes quite questionable on practical grounds,
and indefensible as a practical way of understanding drug or toxicity interactions in humans.

In addition to medical testing, animals are also routinely used in psychological testing, often in what are described as “bizarre and macabre” ways. In his book *Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?*, Gary Francione points to several incredibly cruel and unnecessary animal experiments. In many of these experiments, conducted at respectable and prestigious academic institutions around the US, animals are shocked, blinded, wounded, deprived of food and water, addicted to drugs, stressed, and otherwise mutilated in search of answers to questions that have no real or immediate impact on human health. One of the cruelest of these experiments is the “maternal deprivation” experiments of Harry Harlow. Harlow and colleagues separated infant monkeys from their mothers at birth. Some were raised in complete isolation; others were raised with a surrogate mother made of cloth and wire; some of the surrogates, however, were wired to shock the infant monkeys whenever they sought affection from them. The reaction of the infants to their electrified surrogates was then used to argue that the instinct for maternal contact was important in the development of humans. Similarly, in studying what is called “learned helplessness,” researchers headed by Martin Seligman at the University of Pennsylvania badly shocked and burned dogs, with some dogs learning that regardless of what they did, they would be unable to escape the pain. This was used to prove that animals and humans could both learn to be “helpless” if they were unable to escape their current situation, or if they saw their particular outlook as futile.

The previous two examples are prominent and well-known, but there are thousands of lesser-known examples of animals being used as research “tools” in experiments that have no direct or even minimal bearing on human well-being, not to mention the sadly quotidian use of animals in education. For example, rats and mice are routinely used in college-level psychology classes for understanding behavioral and learning patterns, with many “sacrificed” after they have served their purpose; animals are routinely dissected in college and high school classes; and veterinary students in the US routinely vivisect animals in their curriculum, even though such use by veterinary and medical students has been banned in Britain. Indeed, some 5.7 million
animals a year go to these “educational” ends that could be accomplished without this gratuitous use of animals.

All of this animal use raises a massive conundrum for the supporter of animal testing. If animals are indeed enough like us to provide models that many scientists consider necessary, then we should recognize that animals are, in fact, like us, and deserve not to suffer as we would under such circumstances. Yet, in my conversations with vivisectors or supporters of vivisection, I’ve often been told that humans and animals are significantly different in that they perceive pain differently, and have different physiological reactions. If this is the case, then—if animals are indeed so different—then we must wonder how suitable animal use is for understanding human physiology and psychology. In a way, then, the animal experimenter is caught in a logical trap: if animals are enough like us to justify using them as experimental models, then we must consider that they suffer like we do. If they’re different enough from us not to suffer, or to be mere cognitive machines as Descartes reasoned, then we must question whether or not animals provide a good enough model.

On top of all of this, animal testing is a profitable business, with ties in the pharmaceutical and scientific research industries. Companies like Charles River and Taconic provide specifically bred or modified animals for testing purposes. In addition, each company provides “animal husbandry products” designed for testing and research. Charles River sells many varieties of inbred and outbred rats and mice, including lactating rats with their litter, and mice and rats bred or modified to show particular traits like suppressed immune systems, high blood pressure, or even a higher-than-average rate of leukemia. Some of these rats—particularly older and larger ones—sell for as much as US$70 each. As Francione writes, “In addition to the revenues generated by the sale of animals who are used in laboratories, rivers of capital flow into industries that manufacture cages and other supplies necessary to house the millions of animals involved, and hundreds of millions of federal tax dollars are provided annually as grants to vivisections. Animal research is big business.”

The fact that animal research has such deep ties to industry and the academy may help to explain its institutionalization as a part of scientific and academic culture, despite the criticisms that can be jus-
tifiably leveled at vivisection. As Mark Bernstein points out in his book *Without a Tear*, this kind of use of animals allows vivisectionists to “confirm or disconfirm any theory whatsoever”73 through extrapolation. Bernstein’s argument is that because an “indefinite number of parameters can enter into a testing situation, it is almost certain that some result obtained by nonanimal modalities can be replicated by using some animal under some condition.”74 For example, Bernstein argues, we could show that humans should avoid lemon juice because it is toxic to cats; similarly, we could prove that penicillin is toxic, because it kills guinea pigs in a few days. Moreover, as Greek and Greek point out, by relying on animal tests, we could also show that some popular and useful medications should never have been released to the public, because they have negative side-effects in test animals (Bernstein cites the examples of insulin and digitalis, both useful for treating disease in humans).

While Bernstein refers to the work of vivisectionists in extrapolating from animal studies “prestidigitation” in the style of a Las Vegas magician, Francione offers an illuminating hypothetical, in his book *Introduction to Animal Rights*, for understanding whether or not research using animals is directly responsible for advances in medicine and other fields, as is often claimed by vivisectionists. Take the example of a car mechanic who always wears special gloves when she works on cars; every time she solves a particular problem, she believes her success stems from the special gloves, setting up a correlation in her mind between using the gloves and being a successful mechanic. Francione argues, that though the causal relation that the mechanic sees may, in fact, be accurate, but to know if this is truly the case, Jane would need to do the same work *without* the gloves to really know if the gloves are behind her success. In a similar way, Francione argues, researchers always use animals to test and develop procedures or drugs. Like Jane, vivisectionists cannot be sure that their use of animals is responsible for their success, since the default is to use animals.

As the mechanic comes to wear gloves as part of her engine repair ritual, animal experimentation itself may be a sort of ritual that establishes the role and importance of science in the cultural and social imagination, with the “strong smell of a secular religion.”75 Science gained prominence over religion as the explanatory framework of our
age during the Enlightenment (a topic I will return to in the following chapters), but had to compete with the church “as the main institution of human salvation.”77 In his book *An Unnatural Order*, Jim Mason argues that this hierarchy requires a sort of ritual to “prove” that science is “heroic” in its pursuit of knowledge and cures for human disease, and that in seeking out this knowledge, it will leave no stone unturned. The process of vivisection becomes not only heroic, but is also a symbolic domination of humanity over nature. Mason writes:

If animals are the most potent representatives of nature, then drastic invasions and manipulations of animals, even under the guise of science, send the strongest signals that great efforts to conquer nature are under way. Just as the bloody animal sacrifices of old impressed the masses and heightened the prestige of a god, its temple, and its priests, animals are “sacrificed” in our medical laboratories to impress us and raise the prestige of medicine, its corporations, universities, and researchers.77

Far from providing the clear and unambiguous benefit that its supporters claim, when examined closely, vivisection is a practice of unimaginable cruelty and questionable result. Instead, it is a hold-out from old institutional cultures which depend on the practice as a ritual and as a matter of tradition, often codified into laws around drug development, and institutionalized in academic and research cultures. Much like our other unnecessary uses of animals, vivisection provides yet another example of the ways that animals are exploited by humans unnecessarily. They are commodified as property, and exploited in the process with remarkably poor justifications.

Once again, if we scratch the surface of common aspects of our society, we see animals commodified, and this commodification hidden and obscured as part of the ideological machinery of capitalism. These forms of exploitation, whether they be in the form of vivisection or in the use of animals for food, are reproduced writ large across the entire animal industry. Still, how many of us think of any of these exploitative dynamics when we pick up a burger, drink a glass of milk, or even take our prescription drugs? Behind these seemingly everyday products is a vast array of hidden institutional, cultural, and economic logics that depend on the exploitation of animals to produce profit.
This is hidden from us. Few of us have seen factory farms, the insides of animal experimentation labs, or the process of slaughter. This kind of obtuseness is useful—it keeps in the dark, distanced from the real conditions that are necessary to produce what we consume.

Yet, if we are able to get behind this intentional confusion and de-mystify commodity relations, what excuses are left for us when we continue to do the same old thing over and over again? Animal exploitation is all around us, and though few of us are actually willing to do violence to animals directly, a great many of us are willing to have that violence done for us. Asking someone else to do your dirty work for you doesn't mean that it isn't dirty. And when it comes down to it, if we are serious about justice, serious about equality, and serious about our commitment to looking after the least among us, we owe something to the animals who suffer voicelessly among us. Living a life of abolition, of rejecting the abject exploitation of animals and giving up the products which they suffer to produce—including meat, dairy, eggs, and marine life—is a relatively simple project all things considered. It is easier than fighting the racist, classist, and sexist we all carry around in our heads, and if we take our commitment to justice seriously, we should also be fighting the speciesist in our heads. It is the only way forward in order to not undermine our own premises.
AS WE SAW IN the previous chapter, the commodity plays a central role in the economic and social life of capitalist societies. Indeed, capitalism would be impossible without the commodity form, and the ideological aspects of the commodity also create a necessary (for capital, at least) alienation between the producers and consumers of goods. It is in this alienation that many of us happily exist. It is also in this alienation that many forms of exploitation are allowed to fester, because we can simply ignore the exploitative social relations involved in production.

Animals are caught in this commodity production circuit in contemporary capitalism. With bodies bred to produce the most profit with the least inputs and time, the commodification process is writ large upon them physically, and it has altered domesticated animals
intrinsically. Animals are not only commodities and property themselves, they also produce commodities, and in a sense, serve as either the “raw” inputs or the productive labor power of business. They are superexploited living commodities. Take pigs, or as the industry calls them, “hogs:” piglets are purchased, inputs are added, and the final “product” is sent to slaughter. If the producer paid less for the piglet and the inputs than the price garnered at auction prior to slaughter, the animal has served to produce profit. Similarly, cows are purchased, inputs are added, and they produce milk; if the price of the milk is more than the cost of the cow and the inputs combined, the “producer” (really, in this case, the person who can afford to purchase all of the inputs) makes money. Animals are nothing more than the means to the end of profit in contemporary capitalist production. Their particularity, their interests in not suffering, their desires to be free and to live as beings in the world are all subjugated—en masse—to the productive ends of agricultural capital.

As commodities, animals are also the property of their owners. They “belong” to people, or legal entities like corporations in much the same way as any other piece of property. The farmer can sell and buy cows; the vivisector can purchase mice prone to develop certain kinds of cancers; and you and I can buy purebred designer dogs or cats if we wish. To many of us, this seems like an everyday fact of life; we are so accustomed to thinking of animals as our property that we rarely think of the impacts of this legal and social status for animals. For example, were I a fickle pet owner and were I to tire of living with the dog who is sleeping at my feet while I write this, I could sell her for whatever I felt was a fair price. Emmy (the dog sleeping at my feet) is my legal property. If someone came along and wanted to pay $500 for her, I could certainly and legally sell her for that price. Similarly, I could take her to the vet right now and have her euthanized if I wished. In either case, because she is my property, I am more or less free to dispose of her as I wish. She is, in every way, at my mercy.

As of this writing, in March and April 2007, the property status of companion animals has been drawn into sharp focus as a major pet food recall sweeps North America. Encompassing many popular brands, the recall has focused on gluten and other pet food ingredients contaminated with a form of rat poison and a product used in plastics.
Because of these problems, at this writing, a number of cats and dogs have died across North America, many suffering from kidney failure. For its part, the pet food producer, Menu Foods, has agreed to compensate the owners of the animals for their loss, but because animals are legally the mere property of their owners, compensation will likely be quite limited. Most of the people who lost a loved companion during this ordeal will see their compensation legally limited to what the animal cost, and likely also the cost of vet bills and the contaminated food. This has led to calls for changes in the status of companion animals as property, yet none of these changes have achieved any real traction.

Companion animals seem to occupy a sort of nether-world between animal and human. They take on social and cultural roles that are markedly different than the roles that we assign other animals. For many of us, our animal companions are a part of our families, and when asked, most people will readily identify their dogs and cats as family members. In response to this, a multi-billion dollar industry has taken root in North America that caters to pets as family members. Many of us share our daily lives with animals and think of them as family, yet they are technically and legally nothing more than our property, and for the law, not markedly different than most of our other property.

To be clear, I'm not arguing for a hierarchy of animals with companion animals at the top, but I do introduce this case because it is illustrative of how entrenched the notion of animals as property is, both in our law and in our culture. Even in the case of companion animals—the animals with whom most of us are intimately familiar, and with whom many of us even share our beds—they are still property, just like any other animal involved in the satisfaction of a human want. In most legal senses, your dog is like your iPod or your car or any other material effect you own. You are free to do with your material property as you please, and though there are cruelty laws in the case of animals, the majority of the legal protections afforded animals rely on the idea that as property owners, we have an interest in treating our property well. The big difference between my iPod and my dog, however, is that my dog is sentient. She has a subjective awareness,
she has needs and wants and emotional states, and she clearly feels pain and pleasure.

As our property, animals are essentially producers who are unrewarded for their production—animals are chattel. This relationship of ownership and the property status of animals is essential for extracting profit from animals, either directly through the rearing and sale of the animals themselves, or by leveraging their labor power for producing other commodities. The notion of property, however, is as central to productive capitalism as is the commodity. It is important to note that these notions work hand-in-hand to allow for the extraction of profit. Before we dig further into how animals are directly affected by these processes, it is worth considering what property actually is and how it functions in the relations of capital. After that, in the rest of the chapter, I'll explore the roots of our domination of animals, which allows us to make them property to begin with.

PROPERTY IS THEFT

The French anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon famously argued (much to the chagrin of every Ayn Rand-clutching Objectivist) that “property is theft.” Admittedly, this notion of property being theft is a curious one. After all, why would property ever be considered to be thievery? Didn’t most of us actually go to the trouble of buying what we own to make it ours? How can my shoes, my coat, or my iPod be theft?

Though we tend to think of property in this very personal sense of what we possess, Proudhon and other anarchist thinkers like Kropotkin critique private property in a different way. Rather than being opposed to your simple possessions, these thinkers were concerned with the exploitation of workers and the continued domination of the means of production by owners. Private property was seen as a tool of extending that domination, but more importantly Proudhon, and others like him, saw property as a kind of thievery—by the capitalist from the worker. Within private property there is a hidden, collective wealth that goes missing in production and consumption, and production necessarily involves the worker adding value to the process through labor. To understand how this plays out, it might help to take
up again the example of the iPod which I touched upon in Chapter Two.

Like any other product, a great many people are involved in the production of the iPod. Because of the way that production is organized, these people are likely spread out across the globe, from design facilities in California to manufacturing plants in China, and probably even places in between. In producing the iPod, each of the persons involved adds some kind of value to the final product through their labor power. In running the production process, however, Apple necessarily must pay the workers producing the iPods less money than they gain from the labor of that particular worker. In this, we see the basic profit motive of capital. Most of us understand, know, and accept this as just about the only way to organize the satisfaction of the wants and needs of a society, even though it is just one way among many (it, however, happens to be the predominant way today). Nevertheless, there are a few things to bear in mind when it comes to this form of organizing production. First, without workers on that iPod assembly line, there would be no iPods and thus no profit for Apple. The workers on the assembly lines are producing value for Apple, yet they see only a tiny proportion of that value in the long run; Apple takes the rest. Moreover, by outsourcing production to the developing world, Apple is able to pay the workers even less of this value than it would have to in the global North. Apple obviously relies upon the workers to produce the iPods—and thus the value—and in leveraging their real labor to produce the iPod, they're getting back more value than they're expending. This difference between expenditure on production and the sale price is created only through the labor power of the workers. In this sense, then, labor is producing value for which it is not being rewarded. Instead, that extra value produced by labor is being claimed by the firm or investor running production. In our society, this is considered the reward for investment. Looking at it from another angle, however, Proudhon's notion gets drawn into focus: workers are clearly producing some measure of value which they are not receiving. The value goes to the owner of the means of production, but he has not created that value himself—he only could have created it through the strategic leveraging of labor. Instead of value being the collective good of the laborers, it becomes the private good of the
investor through a process that looks a great deal like appropriation or, to put it more simply, thievery.

Proudhon thought that this relationship of property (among others) led to the overall impoverishment of society. It perpetuated cycles of misery whereby workers produced but did not receive the full products of their labor, forcing them to work even harder for someone else to obtain what they needed. Indeed, for many workers, even purchasing the products of their labor is impossible or difficult—to return to the iPod, the average Chinese worker who assembles the iPod likely cannot afford to actually purchase one.

In *The Conquest of Bread*, the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin also wrote passionately and lucidly about this great usurpation of what he viewed as the collective legacy of all of humanity. “By what right then can any one whatever appropriate the least morsel of this immense whole and say—this is mine, not yours?” Kropotkin asked. Looking at the world around him, Kropotkin saw the efforts of humanity, a patrimony developed over the years of human history by collective and individual effort, seized by the few, in the interests of the few, with little returned to workers. Instead of all of this scientific and rational progress ensuring the collective well-being of all, it was being squandered, under-utilized, and dedicated to the interests of the ownership classes for their own profit. Though Kropotkin was clearly a product of his time—*The Conquest of Bread* was written in 1913—and wildly optimistic about the potential impact that rational production methods and science could have on the possibility of well-being for everyone, his basic point resonates today, and fits in squarely with what Proudhon was arguing: namely, that labor produces value, yet sees little of the value that comes from production in the long run.

Of course, Kropotkin and Proudhon were not alone in these observations. Marx and Engels made similar observations before Kropotkin did, and leveraged their critique of bourgeois private property most famously in the *Communist Manifesto*. Each of these thinkers had different solutions—from Proudhon’s desire to re-create a sort of monied, mutual system of production (a notion for which he is endlessly and justifiably critiqued by anarchists and Marxists, alike) to Kropotkin’s call for Anarchist Communism to Marx and Engels’ call for Communism. Underneath each of these lies a desire for what Kropotkin calls
“expropriation,” or the desire to re-communalize property in a way that roots production in community needs. Kropotkin writes:

What we do want is so to arrange things that every human being born into the world shall be ensured the opportunity, in the first instance of learning some useful occupation, and of becoming skilled in it; and next, that he shall be free to work at his trade without asking leave of master or owner, and without handing over to landlord or capitalist the lion's share of what he produces.... The day when the labourer may till the ground without paying away half of what he produces, the day when the machines necessary to prepare the soil for rich harvests are at the free disposal of the cultivators, the day when the worker in the factory produces for the community and not the monopolist—that day will see the workers clothed and fed, and there will be no more Rothschilds or other exploiters.

No one will then have to sell his working power for a wage that only represents a fraction of what he produces.9

Expropriation would solve the problem of the few dominating the many through recourse to private property. And, it is important to note, this explains how property is a form of thievery. Because you and I use our personal property in largely non-productive ways,10 it may be difficult to understand how private property can be used to further exploitation, but think for a second about how Apple uses its private property to produce new products, like iPods. Without its private property, it would not have the ability to impel people to labor for a wage; without private property, it would not have money to invest; without the ability to accrue private property, Apple would have no way of storing up the value that labor produced and later leveraging it to produce again. Expropriation, as Kropotkin sees it, would fight against this ability of a firm, an individual, or a family to control production. The private property of those who own the means of production—what Marx and Engels call “bourgeois private property”—is a central part of capitalism. Moreover, their private property is an expression of value created by workers and stored up, rather than returned to them. Instead of all of the value building for the workers as a collective, social whole, a significant portion of it accrues to the
owner of the means of production instead. This is the kind of thievery that Proudhon is talking about.

**PROPERTY AND ANIMALS**

Given this excursus on property being theft and the thinking of Kropotkin *et al* on regaining our collectivity, it is now necessary to relate this back to the question of animals and how their property status necessarily leads to their exploitation.

As I mentioned earlier, animals exist in a somewhat different status than non-slave human laborers, for animals are the direct property of their owners. Where the human laborer may receive a wage, the animal who is involved in production cannot meaningfully receive any wage beyond its means of subsistence. Instead, the animal is owned outright, and treated as another part of the machinery of production. Animals essentially become sensate, living machines, used for the production of commodities, and thus, for the production of profit. They are one part of a system of production in which private property is leveraged to produce—just another input in a complex process designed to deliver goods to humans and profits to producers.

This entire system—at least in its current breadth—could not exist without private property. In looking at contemporary agricultural production, private property is used to exploit animals in much the same way that private property is used to exploit human labor. Animals, however, have it far worse than the average human member of the working class. Animals cannot retire to their homes at the end of the day, and they essentially never leave the place where they are producing. As nothing more than the outright property of their owners, animals are slaves to human production—private property that is used to create more private property.

In the case of humans under the wage production system, some percentage of what they produce is taken by the owner of the means of production, which leads to Proudhon’s idea of property being thievery. With animals, however, the *entirety* of their production is oriented toward the needs of their owner, and the goal is maximal profit. The individuality, sentience, and biological needs of animals involved in this process are entirely and fully subjugated to production and profit.
In many ways, the processes of capital are actually inscribed on the bodies of animals themselves. Broiler chickens—birds who are only about four months old when they are slaughtered—have been bred to grow fast and gain weight quickly so they can be slaughtered sooner, which leads to a quicker turnover for the producer. This leads to problems for the chickens themselves: including skeletal disorders, sudden heart attacks, and, often, the inability to stand upright because of imbalance in the body. Similarly, turkeys are bred to grow much faster than their wild counterparts, and to have more “white” meat on their bodies, since this is what consumers desire. These same patterns are repeated across the spectrum of animals domesticated for human ends: we see the bodies of the animals changed to fit the needs of productivity and profit, with little concern for the viability of the animals beyond their ability to produce rapid profit for the investor or producer.¹¹

As a student in the agricultural sciences, I learned that modern agriculture was a cut-throat business, and that to survive one had to “get big or get out,” adopt the newest technologies for production, and maximize expenditures on inputs. For example, in working with feedstuffs, we were encouraged to source the cheapest possible inputs, for they would have a clear impact on the bottom line. This drive to reduce the costs of what is already a business with very slim margins has led to practices which most people would find shocking. To illustrate: mad cow disease came about because cows—ruminant herbivores—were fed the viscera of cows and other animals, including spine and brain tissue as a source of raw protein.¹² Cows were essentially turned into cannibals because cow spinal tissue and other slaughterhouse waste products were inexpensive feed inputs. It did not occur to producers that feeding cows back to cows was necessarily problematic: after all, it was just another source of protein. There are other examples of researchers working to turn animals into cannibals by feeding them the waste products of their own species. Researchers at North Carolina State University have developed and marketed an enzyme called Valkerase that breaks down the keratin in feathers.¹³ One of the applications of this is to feed the feathers left over from slaughter back to chickens. By reducing the price of inputs, the farmer or producer can then reduce the costs of raising the animal—and as
long as the animal stays alive and continues to be productive, it makes economic sense for the producer to be as economically cut-throat as possible. Doing otherwise is a waste of capital and a potential risk for the investor.

Much like the production of any other commodity, the production of animal commodities relies on investing the very least in production and selling for the highest possible price. This is obvious economic logic, but contained within this is a logic of exploitation that often goes unnoticed. As I argued earlier, private property leveraged to create capital contains within it the stored up exploitation of those workers from whom value has been stolen. As a manifestation of an exploitative social order, private property is built upon the dominance of the weak by the strong. In the case of human labor, it is evidence of the fact that some have only their labor to sell, and nothing more. Moreover, accruing private property allows the capitalist to perpetuate this social order. If the worker can gain little more than they need to live, they will need to continue working. Considering this, private property then also helps to perpetuate the social order from which it springs.

Private property involved in the production of animals for human ends has similar characteristics, and similarly helps to extend domination. Animals labor to produce commodities or to be commodities, and they do this as the mere property of humans. We generally talk of this relationship in magnanimous terms, describing our “care” of animals as “husbandry,” or as us being guardians of their “welfare,” yet, underneath these comfortable and bucolic notions of animal-human relations, there is a system of exploitation that yields value for the producer while denying the animal her right to live fully. Much as the private property involved in human labor represents the exploitation of humans, the private property involved in animal production represents the systematic exploitation of animals over time. Extending this notion outward, the property itself, built upon the cyclical investment in animal production, could be seen as a form of stored-up animal suffering and misery. Leveraging capital to exploit animals has the goal of producing more capital, which in turn is invested in more exploitation. Just as the cycle of investment in human labor perpetuates human misery by forcing laborers to sell their labor, animal produc-
tion perpetuates animal misery by compelling animals to produce for humans, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for their entire lives, often in conditions of extreme deprivation. The accumulated private property of the animal producer, then, becomes bloody with the lives of animals who are forced to produce and die in the pursuit of profit and human wants. The subjectivity of the animal, the fact that animals feel pain and experience acute suffering, the denial of most natural habits—all of this becomes secondary to the motives of leveraging animal labor and bodies for profit. Private property perpetuates this, and the desire to gain more necessitates it.

Along with commodification, the relations of private property impose needless violence and suffering on animals, all for the sake of profit and our taste for animal products. The centrality of classifying animals as property should not be underestimated when it comes to considering the depths of animal exploitation woven into our society and economy. Having animals categorized as property gives us the ability to exploit them as a resource for even minor human wants. Because our wants as property owners will necessarily win out over any conflict with the interests of our property, we can basically do as we wish with animals, especially since welfare laws provide very shallow protections for animals, and farm animals are typically excluded.

"We choose the human interest over the animal interest even in situations where the human interest is trivial and the animal interest is fundamental—a matter, literally, of life and death. What we are really choosing between, however, is the interest of a property owner and the interest of a piece of property. The outcome of this 'conflict of interests' is predetermined."

This property relationship is one that is woven into our economy, our society, and our laws. To return to the example I used earlier of my dog, Emmy, the law grants me the right to own her exclusively. I can then use that ownership to do with her almost as I please, including making a profit from her, selling her, using her as collateral on a loan, or forcing her to labor for me. If I wanted to, I could even donate her to science or sell her to a lab for experiments. Under the law, any of these activities are completely legal, and are my absolute right as the owner of this particular piece of animal property. The property rela-
tion, when applied to animals, is a form of violent domination over them, constantly subjugating them to human whims.

VIOLENCE

In his book *Endgame*, Derrick Jensen argues that modern industrial civilization is, in and of itself, violent. It requires violence to function, and without violence, it would quickly collapse on itself. Civilization is violent towards people, towards the earth, towards non-humans, towards just about everything that stands in its path. We are, Jensen argues, consumed with a “death urge,” a desire to “destroy life,” a “culture of occupation.” Further, we are acculturated to “hate life, hate the natural world, hate the wild, hate wild animals, hate and fear our emotions, hate ourselves.”

Jensen paints a dire portrait of human civilization as irredeemable, violent, and rapacious. The constant growth that capitalism demands has deepened this, driving the destruction of the natural world in pursuit of profit, and exploiting or killing humans and non-humans along the way. Jensen’s analysis is based on twenty premises which he lays out at the very start of his book. Among the premises in Jensen’s book is this important one:

The property of those higher on the hierarchy is more valuable than the lives of those below. It is acceptable for those above to increase the amount of property they control—in everyday language, to make money—by destroying or taking the lives of those below. This is called production. (p. ix)

What is interesting about Jensen’s point is that it stops looking at production and property as neutral topics. By placing these ideas squarely in a system that is violent and maintained by violence, Jensen directs our attention to one of the salient features of industrial civilization: namely, that for profit, we will do just about anything. We will destroy the natural world to the point of no return; we will force people to labor for us; we will kill and consume animals in the billions. Despite the problems and flaws with anarcho-primitivist thinking like Jensen’s—among them, that the violent collapse of civilization called for would likely mean death for scores of innocent people—his basic
analysis of civilization as a violent force is compelling in its scope (even if I disagree with a great number of his conclusions).

Animals, like other oppressed groups, are caught in these violent dynamics. The exploitation of certain groups of humans and non-humans alike is woven into our society and economy. Animals will, as a matter of the everyday operation of our world, be at the mercy of human wants, including incredibly trivial ones. The system not only unleashes violence on animals in slaughterhouses, factory farms, and vivisection labs; it is itself structured such that simply being an animal means perpetual inequality, always under threat of violence or exploitation. As a practical and legal matter, the interests of animals are already predetermined legally, economically, and socially to have less import—this is part and parcel of our everyday institutions. For the majority of us, we live and recreate this condition of dominance every time we consume an animal product. Though few of us have any direct hand in the exploitation of animals, we nonetheless allow exploitation to take place for us, as we continue to demand and purchase the products of animal suffering and exploitation. Commodifying animals as private property and using them to produce for us is leveraging this condition of structural inequality, and exposing animals to direct and indirect forms of violence.

We tend mostly to think of violence as an interpersonal issue, but I want to take the notion further here, and explore how our society is structured in particular forms of privilege that benefit the few, and harm the many. This is difficult because we're used to examining all social questions as individual ones—we believe, mostly, that we can attribute one's life circumstances to their choices, when, in fact, these are often a question of the accident of one's birth. Still, it is worth considering some examples to understand the nature of violence. If, for example, I punch you in the face, there is little doubt that I'm being violent towards you, even if I can argue that punching you benefited me. Similarly, if you're an Iraqi, and a US bomb has fallen on your home, it is clear that you've been the target of violence. But what if you are injured by the everyday processes of the society you live in? What if you are one of the 900 million people around the world who is either hungry now or unsure of where your next meal will come from? What if you starve because you cannot afford to buy food, or
to rent land to grow food on? In these cases, our usual instinct is to individualize by blaming the victim: the poor are clearly poor because they’re lazy; the food insecure would not be so were they more enterprising; the people of the developing world need to “throw out the corrupt bums” running their countries, then we would probably see some real progress. Unlike the person who is punched in the face, many of us would say that these people are not victims of violence.

Yet, the question remains: how much can the hungry do to change their condition if processes that are significantly larger than them are preventing their gaining access to food? If their currency was recently devalued and is now next to worthless, if there is little economic opportunity where they live, or if they are the targets of racial or class injustice, the individual is often at a loss to radically alter their situation. They are, in every way, “stuck” in a situation that produces at least some measure of inequality for them, and that inequality can radically damage their lives, even killing them.

The injurious outcomes that people experience are, in many ways, direct effects of the perpetuation of the current unjust economic order. If we stop blaming the victim and instead look at what the victim must deal with, we begin to gain a great deal more insight into the situation. Instead of seeing the global South hungry because of government corruption or laziness or whatever excuse they’ve invented this week in Washington, we begin to see that the hungry are, instead, hungry because of free trade policies—instigated by the global North, for the benefit of the global North—that have decimated local production with cheaper, subsidized crops from the US or Canada, or which have warped local land markets, making it difficult to gain access to arable land. Underneath this, we see an institutional structure made up of the IMF, the World Bank, and other international governing bodies that make this kind of global order possible, all backed by the military might of the United States, whose motto might as well be “making the world safe for capitalism.”

Though it is easy for us to see and consider violence on an interpersonal level, we need to also understand violence that comes about in the maintenance and construction of social and economic hierarchies, such as those discussed in the previous examples. This concept of “structural” or “social” violence, forces us to think about inequality
and violence as part and parcel of the economic and social processes of a society. These concepts provide useful and proactive ways to understand persistent inequality in society, and in so doing, they turn the tables on the idea that society is fair and just. Instead, these approaches implore us to think about how social orders can be exploitative and damaging in their everyday operation.

Structural violence shows how the economic order can be literally stacked against certain groups from the start; it also shows that our everyday notion of the world as a “level playing field” is deeply flawed. Much as the economy is structured to favor the North in trade—all for the production of profit and the maintenance of political power—the economy is similarly structured to maintain and extend the exploitation of animals. As hapless victims to human wants, caught in the cycle of commodification and exploitation, animals are at our every mercy. Though the concept of structural violence has only been applied to oppressed groups of people, these insights can also be extended to understand the inequality and hierarchy between species, and to shed light on the constant oppression of animals in our society.

In his discussion of speciesism, David Nibert points out a fundamental flaw in the writing of most theorists, including the so-called “father” of the animal rights movement, Peter Singer. Nibert argues that when we individualize the notion of speciesism and understand it as merely an individual prejudice, we lose the notion that certain social, economic, and legal logics are set in place that perpetuate animal exploitation at a deeper level within the social order. Nibert’s analysis draws into focus the idea that society is violent towards animals because it has structured in the dominance of species privilege at economic and ideological levels. The individuated notion of speciesism, however, misses this deeper, institutional form of violence towards animals. Interestingly, we generally make a similar mistake with racism: we assume that if we can stop all interpersonal racism—if we can stop racial epithets or unequal treatment—that we can end racism altogether. Though ending this kind of interpersonal racism is valuable, it does little to abrogate the institutional aspects of racism, woven into the US economy, that lead to outcomes as diverse as unequal lending practices to high infant mortality rates for non-whites. Much like racism, speciesism is built into the very logic of our society:
from our assumptions about animals as “stupid” or “tasty” creatures, up to the laws that guarantee animals as our property. These logics are protected for the sake, not only of our widely-supported desires to consume animal products, but also to guarantee profit for property holders. Recall Jensen’s point that, “it is acceptable for those above to increase the amount of property they control—in everyday language to make money—by destroying or taking the lives of those below.” Nibert rightly argues that we must analyze these dynamics structurally and historically if we’re to properly understand them.

These logics of accumulation are guaranteed and protected by the capitalist state, all for the express purpose of protecting the interests of wealth. This fact, combined with the ideological mechanisms that lead us to imagine animals as “less than” us, “stupid,” or “here for us to consume” perpetuates cycles of violent, structural inequality for animals. As nothing more than property, animals will always be in a subordinate position to us. In this position, violence can be visited on them simply because of their “non-human” status, and because—for lack of a better way of phrasing it—we simply feel like it. Animals stand on unequal footing in the social order, subject to structural violence as the social order is already stacked against their interests. This happens simply because we think of animals as “other,” and because we have constructed the social and economic apparatus to institutionalize exploitation and violence against animals. Because this violence and exploitation is bound up in the acquisition of profit and the extension of private property, the capitalist state clearly has every interest in maintaining this arrangement, and stridently fights any threat to it.

The capitalist state works actively to protect the interests of property holders, and those who use animal property desire the least regulation of their property as possible. Though I will return to this point in more depth later when I discuss the problems with the current tactics of the animal rights movement, it is also interesting to note how the animal exploitation industries have recently championed laws in the United States that seek to limit opposition to their actions. In particular, two US laws, the Animal Enterprises Protection Act (AEPA) and the Animal Enterprises Terrorism Act (AETA) are telling indicators of the way the capitalist state will support the interests of property holders exploiting their animal property unjustly. They also help
to illustrate how the dynamics of exploitation are institutionalized in society.

The AEPA and the AETA were passed more than a decade apart. The Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 was passed to protect animal industries from economic damage and physical disruption, and to stiffen penalties for those who cause harm to those involved in animal exploitation. Under the rubric of "animal enterprise terrorism," the AEPA was a direct response to actions of groups like the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). Nevertheless, some within the animal industries saw the AEPA as too weak.

The National Animal Interest Alliance (NAIA) was one of these groups. A visit to their web site is an exercise in incredulity. Prominently featuring photos of puppies, kittens, rabbits, and other animals in what appear to be peaceful and happy settings, the site describes NAIA as "an association of business, agricultural, scientific, and recreational interests dedicated to promoting animal welfare, supporting responsible animal use and strengthening the bond between humans and animals." The pictures, of course, belie the kinds of activities that NAIA members engage in. A quick look at the board members reveals furriers, cattlemen, vivisectionists, breeders, and others who make a living on animals, often by killing them. By any estimation, this is a curious way to "strengthen the bond" between humans and animals.

Writing in 2000, a board member of NAIA, Dr. Edward J. Walsh, described the AEPA as remarkable in its timidity. Criticizing the sentencing power of the AEPA, Walsh argued for a clearer and less ambiguous message to be sent through legislation that clearly identifies animal enterprise terrorism as a different kind of crime that requires particular legal consideration and stiffer penalties. Though Walsh discusses animal enterprises terrorism as the murder of people involved in animal exploitation (something which, to be clear, has never happened), he also views "theatrics and petty criminal acts"—including pies in the face—as "terrorism," which needs to be roundly rejected by the state with harsh penalties clearly written into law.

The problem with Walsh's logic is that almost no law will deter underground activists, like the Animal Liberation Front, from doing their actions. As the journalist Will Potter points out, those who participate in ALF actions know that what they do is illegal, and they continue to
show that they will not stop, despite the law." Thus, the law's ability
to deter the kinds of crimes it intends to punish becomes very ques­tion­able. Instead, the law becomes a convenient way of protecting the
interests of property owners, by further criminalizing activity that is
already protected by other laws (for example, trespass, harassment, and
assault). What Potter argues is that laws like the AEPA, and its stronger
cousin, the Animal Enterprises Terrorism act of 2006, actually have
the broadest impacts for "legal, above-ground activists." One can even
hear echoes of this in Walsh's piece on the AEPA, where he claims that
our "culture itself is under siege" with "animal rights-inspired terror­
ism." He also says that he is not concerned with the "reasonable and
compassionate people" interested in animal protection, but with peo­
ple who would redefine "what it means to be an animal," and those
who have "committed barbarous acts in their advocacy of an extreme
philosophy that seeks ethical equality among all animals and harbors
disdain for human beings as its organizing principle." Walsh's comfort­
able elision of people, who commit violent acts in the interests of ani­
mals, and non-violent activists, who share at least some of their philo­sophical perspective, is clearly not accidental. Painting all those who
support animal rights as "terrorists" who have disdain for humanity,
Walsh effectively marginalizes a diverse movement in one fell swoop.
The efficacy of that marginalization should not be underestimated, for
it can be used to chill even legal, protected speech.

Though Walsh uses the term "terrorist" throughout his work, it
is interesting to note that he was writing prior to the events of Sep­
tember 11, 2001. In the mass hysteria of the post-9-11 climate in the
US and the "War on Terror," the category "terrorist" took on a much
more politically charged feeling. Seizing on this sense was the stron­
ger cousin of the AEPA, the 2006 Animal Enterprises Terrorism Act.
Promoted by industry groups and corporations, the bill was sponsored
by ultra-conservative Republican Senators including Sam Brownback,
James Inhofe, and Rick Santorum. It should also be noted that the bill
was not the mere province of the conservative: California liberal Di­
ane Feinstein also co-sponsored the bill, because of threats to animal
researchers in her home state.26

The AETA is, like the AEPA, meant to identify offenses in the
law for animal enterprises "terrorism." What is concerning, however,
is what qualifies as “terrorism.” As Will Potter points out in his commentary on the bill, the AETA includes “interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise” as a terrorist offense. This, coupled with intentionally causing damages or loss of property, is enough to merit prosecution under this law. The definition of “damages,” however, can be quite wide. The offense section speaks only of damages in a broad sense, yet the penalty section of the bill uses the phrase “economic damage,” and specifically mentions the loss of profits, including increased costs resulting from “threats, acts of vandalism, property damage, trespass, harassment, or intimidation.”

The problem here, Potter emphasizes, is the clause “loss of profits.”

That clause, “loss of profits,” would sweep in not only property crimes, but other activity like undercover investigations and whistleblowing. It would also include campaigns of non-violent civil disobedience, like blocking entrances to a laboratory where controversial animal testing takes place. Those aren’t acts of terrorism. They are effective activism. Businesses exist to make money, and if activists want to change a business practice, they must make that practice unprofitable. That principle guided the lunch-counter civil disobedience of civil rights activists and the divestment campaigns of anti-apartheid groups. Those tactics all hurt profits. And those tactics, if directed at an animal enterprise, would all be considered “terrorism” under this bill.

Though the bill does contain a section to protect First Amendment rights to “expressive conduct” like “peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration,” Potter rightfully points out that this section of the law exists because lawmakers “realize that the law is vague and overly broad.”

What matters, however, in this discussion of the AEPA and the AETA is that the state will use whatever means at its disposal to protect the interests of animal exploiters as property holders. These laws are not necessarily about the crimes themselves, but about the political stance behind the crimes. There are already a variety of legal mechanisms to deal with the illegal acts of people who trespass, commit arson, engage in property destruction, and the like. What these laws seek to do is to enhance existing laws by considering the thought behind
the crime. In this case, the thought is so dangerous to the regime of property accumulation, which is based on animal exploitation, that the state sees that promoting a law like this is in its own interest. Though there is still a great deal of debate within the animal rights movement about the appropriateness of actions like those undertaken by the ALF, the AETA is a law that could pose a threat even to completely non-violent kinds of civil disobedience, including sit-ins and blockades. For this reason, it should be clear that the law isn’t just about punishing “animal rights terrorism,” but that it also creates an environment where the very thought of animal equality and the abolition of animal exploitation is comparable to revolutionary ideology. This is, at least partly, how “eco- and pro-animal radicals” are able to be labelled the “number one domestic terrorist threat” in the United States—surpassing even white supremacist groups in the FBI’s threat assessment for domestic terror.

The AETA and AEPA represent only two recent examples of how the state works to protect the paradigm of animals as property. Yet, none of this would be possible without the notion that it is acceptable—either directly or through the mechanisms of social institutions—to visit violence upon humans and non-humans and to extract from the natural world in pursuit of more growth and more profit. Though some would argue that an exploitative relationship with the ecosystem is a natural and possibly even desirable aspect of human development, it is worth considering how we’ve come to live in such abject hierarchy, not only over animals, but over other humans and even the rest of the natural world. In the following section, I explore the ideas of social ecologist Murray Bookchin, who provides a compelling narrative for how humanity has grown in the shadow of hierarchy and domination. What is compelling about Bookchin is that he also sees a way of overcoming this domination.

“Capitalism not only validates precapitalist notions of the domination of nature by man; it turns the plunder of nature into society’s law of life. To quibble with this kind of system about its values, to try to frighten it with visions about the consequences of growth is to quarrel with its very metabolism. One might more easily persuade a green plant to desist from photosynthesis than to ask the bourgeois economy to desist from capital accumulation. There is no one to talk to. Accumulation is determined
not by the good or bad intentions of the individual bourgeois, but by the commodity relationship itself, by what Marx so aptly called the cellular unit of bourgeois economy."

—Murray Bookchin

This quotation brilliantly outlines the problems of reforming the violent and rapacious capitalism that defines our modern economic and social systems. As Bookchin points out, trying to reform such a system is impossible, for the system itself lives and breathes only by growth, a growth achieved through domination. Indeed, domination is such a part of it—it is the air that capitalism breathes, at least through the imposition of the commodity form—that it cannot be meaningfully divorced from the regular function of the system itself.

How did we end up in a society that lives and breathes domination? As humans, we not only oppress other humans, but we also dominate, abuse, and destroy nature, including the animals within it. How is it that we've stopped living in any kind of cooperative relationship with the natural world, and instead have moved into one of abject exploitation and domination? Though many of us learn that nature is red in tooth and claw, there is certainly a question to be raised about whether this is, in fact, accurate. As thinkers like Peter Kropotkin have argued, cooperation and mutual aid seem to be more the norm within nature and the history of all of human society, and that this mutuality has, in fact, enabled a shared well-being.

If we look to the Marxist tradition for answers on this change, we find nothing but justification for our domination of nature—it's a sort of prerequisite for eventual human freedom after the revolution. For Marx, the modification of nature in the process of our development is a central concept. As humans, we interact with our natural environment and shape it—we could even potentially use it to realize our species being. This is what separates us from animals, who, according to Marx, lived in a more immediate sense with their environments. Marx saw that we create and mediate our world through our interaction with the natural environment. Given this perspective, the domination of our environment and the non-human elements of it seems like an unavoidable issue for the development of humanity. Certainly, if we follow the notions inherited from the Enlightenment, it seems
that our dominating nature is a positive force in the world, a taming of a wild and unruly natural sphere for the betterment of it and of humanity. Marx integrated some of these concepts in his own thinking, which ends up leading to something of an impoverished view of humanity as actors within a natural and historical context. As Bookchin argues, the idea that nature is an “object” to be used by humanity, “leads not only to the despiritization of nature but the total despiritization of man[sic].” Instead of realizing the full potential of humanity, under Marxist theory, we become merely a part of production, a “force” like other economic forces, with the main difference that we can “conceptualize productive operations that animals perform instinctively.” Considering Marxist theory, labor is “both the medium whereby humanity forges its own self-formation and the object of social manipulation.”

Limited as Marx was by the blinders of the Enlightenment period when he wrote, he incorporates some of the period’s baggage in his theories. Bookchin points to these limitations in a variety of incisive writings, and he ultimately dismisses Marx’s notions of class domination as too limiting and myopic for understanding the contemporary problems of social organization and ecological destruction. Bookchin instead turns his focus towards an analysis of hierarchy and domination, looking at the history of humankind to understand the complex interplay between human societies and the natural world in which they live. By examining this past, Bookchin shows us how the human domination of nature evolved from problems of hierarchy and domination among humans; thus, we see that ecological problems are problems of social organization and particular kinds of social arrangements, not a “natural” part of the development humanity, per se. Too often committed to a logic of history that is imprinted with the “economic and technical inexorability that we have imposed on the present,” we can fail to think critically about a liberatory future. For this reason, Bookchin is committed to an examination of the history of humanity, looking at both our pitfalls and our possibilities.

In this glance back, we can see that human domination of nature is linked with the domination of human by human. In this section, I examine the social ecology of Murray Bookchin as an alternative theoretical front for understanding how humans relate to nature. I also
explore how the theoretical frame Bookchin puts forth can be used to consider human-animal relations, and how it may offer us a different way of understanding human domination of animals.

THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL ECOLOGY

No doubt many of us are familiar with the April consumerfest called "Earth Day," in which people pack themselves into parks, listen to music, consume drinks in plastic disposable cups, and eat food with plastic forks and knives. At such events, there are often stands that advertise ways of reducing one's ecological footprint by, variously, switching to fluorescent light bulbs, driving a hybrid car, or turning down one's thermostat. While these are all important steps, they are, nevertheless, symptomatic of an environmental movement that retains a focus on piecemeal interventions in our exploit of the earth and its inhabitants. Driven by corporate greenwash campaigns, we're supposed to recycle and make positive changes ourselves—just so long as we don't ask too many questions of the corporate entities that foist the stuff on us to recycle in the first place. Though the intent of people who wish to pursue reforms is laudable, the notion of a sort of ecologically-friendly green commerce does nothing to examine or fully challenge the roots of our domination of nature—to get us asking the hard questions of ourselves and our relationship with the ecosystem and its other inhabitants. Instead, as Bookchin points out, "environmentalism" of this sort helps us to continue to plunder, but to plunder just a bit more gently. Instead of an incipient environmentalism made up of a variety of footprint-reduction measures intended to leave in place the rapacious and environmentally-destructive system we're accustomed to, Bookchin urges the total reconstitution of society along what he calls "ecological lines." Only by devoting ourselves to this project of reconstruction can we hope to solve the problems that plague, not only our relations to the natural world, but our relations with one another.

In Bookchin's vast project for the restructuring of society along ecological lines, the distinction between ecology and environmentalism is important. Where environmentalism fails to understand the genealogy of our social relationship with nature, ecology "advances a broader conception of nature and humanity's relationship with the
Ecology poses questions that urge us to think not about piecemeal solutions, but about how we might restructure the entirety of society along ecological lines. An ecological analysis also requires that one reject the hierarchies that we impose on the natural world. As one begins to think about these hierarchies, they emerge mostly as a by-product of our own, human-centered thinking. Thus, if we can step outside of the hierarchy that we impose on the natural world, we begin to see a complementary system that works in concert, each piece of the ecosystem playing a part in maintaining the whole.

The notion that we impose our hierarchical visions on the natural world is vital, for Bookchin argues that the domination of nature by humanity stems directly from the domination of human by human. This brand of domination, however, is not inevitable in Bookchin’s view. In looking at the history of humanity, we can see that hierarchy is not an inevitable part of our development; instead, it is the direct by-product of societies that became increasingly differentiated along arbitrary lines. Considered in this way, hierarchy is a broader notion than class, or than even the ever-present enemy of the anarchist, the State. Bookchin writes:

By hierarchy, I mean the cultural, traditional, and psychological systems of obedience and command, not merely the economic and political systems to which the terms class and state most appropriately refer. Accordingly, hierarchy and domination could easily continue to exist in a “classless” or “Stateless” society. I refer to the domination of the young by the old, of women by men, of one ethnic group by another, of “masses” by bureaucrats who profess to speak in their “higher social interests,” of countryside by town, and in a more subtle psychological sense, of body by mind, of spirit by a shallow instrumental rationality, and of nature by society and technology.

Hierarchy is a toxic inheritance from previous eras that we keep reproducing as a matter of our social reproduction, but that does not mean it is an essential, necessary, or unavoidable aspect of our humanity. Bookchin’s project is a historical one, with a contemporary aim: by digging up and understanding the development of hierarchy in human society, we can begin to understand how it is contingent, and thus reconstruct society without dominations. And, Bookchin claims, only by
reconstructing our relationship with one another along non-hierarchical lines, can we begin to reconstruct our relationship with the natural world in a complementary way. This is the strength of Bookchin’s social ecology approach: it “offers no case whatsoever for hierarchy in nature and society; it decisively challenges the very function of hierarchy as a stabilizing or ordering principle in both realms.”

In some senses, this idea that human domination by human leads to the human domination of nature may seem curious, yet the way that we relate to the ecosystem is, in itself, mediated by our culture and our history. We use our social systems to organize and understand our relationship with the natural world. Thus, environmental problems, for Bookchin, are problems of social relations. This understanding—a central insight of Bookchin’s social ecology approach—encourages a thorough examination of the roots of our ecological problems as part of human society. We cannot hope to achieve anything like a more balanced and reciprocal relationship with the natural world without simultaneously creating a more balanced relationship with one another.

Only by reorganizing society along radically anti-hierarchical lines, might we live in nature rather than above nature. The point here is that if we live in hierarchy and domination over one another, we translate that into our understanding of, and relations with, nature. This is easily seen in the hierarchy of species that we’ve created, placing ourselves at the top.

Bookchin outlines the way that humanity gradually moved away from mutually-sustaining, egalitarian relations to hierarchical relations based on domination. He sees in this transition a gradual disintegration of unity that pervaded what he calls “organic” societies. Marked by an absence of “coercive and domineering values,” organic societies generally enjoyed a deep sense of unity and oneness, an egalitarian outlook that included access to the goods of the community for all, an epistemological outlook that tended to unify rather than to divide, and an “equality of unequals.” The equality of unequals recognizes inherent differences and inequality, yet provides social practices that mitigate and compensate practically for these differences, transcending lines of age-group and sex, making them equal. Combined with the “irreducible minimum,” or the “inalienable right” of anyone in a community to access the goods needed to live, regardless of what
they contribute, organic societies were remarkably tight-knit, unified, and complementary. Moreover, these communities generally also viewed themselves as part of the natural world—in it and of it, rather than above it. Organic societies thus represented a mutually-beneficial whole where humans lived in cooperation with one another, and, as a result, in cooperation with nature. An organic society, then, often functioned as an *ecocommunity*, “peculiar to its ecosystem, with an active sense of participation in the overall environment and cycles of nature.”\(^9\) Thus, human freedom and complementarity in organic communities was matched by a complementarity with the natural world, which unfortunately would not last.

It was marred by a gradual movement into orders of hierarchy and obedience, a process whereby various forms of rule became cemented into cultural and social structures over time, in fits and starts. These embryonic and latent structures that led to the dissolution of organic society were hierarchies rooted in “age, sex, and quasi-religious and quasi-political needs that created the power and the material relationships from which classes were formed.”\(^9\) The transformations that move organic society into hierarchical society are found within the society itself, and result from social tensions that expand into outright fractures and finally into hierarchical divisions. The first of these that Bookchin points to are based upon age; as a gerontocracy becomes institutionally rooted in primordial society with the development of the shamanic figure who professionalizes power and solidifies the privileges of elders,\(^9\) other forms of domination begin to emerge. The gendered division of labor and the onset of a warrior class also presaged the beginning of the end of complementarity. Though organic communities often worked to integrate these divisions with their sense of unity, this became increasingly difficult as tribes broke apart and warred with one another, cementing the role of the male as warrior, and driving a conflict between the domestic and civil roles of each gender.

These divisions were matched by what Bookchin calls “epistemologies of rule” that come about not only to naturalize the new divisions within society, but also to promote new ones that are rooted in morality and new customs meant to cover up the previous organic past. Society, then, turned itself inward in a sense, penetrating the very
psihe of the individual. By using guilt and self-blame, the individual becomes essentially self-controlling, which is even more coercive than the control of any outside power. Bookchin traces this out as a process whereby:

Cooperative nature is turned into predatory nature, riddled by egoism, rivalry, cruelty, and the pursuit of immediate gratification. But "civilization," formed by rationality, labor, and an epistemology of self-repression, produces a "reality principle" that holds unruly nature under its sovereignty and provides humanity with the matrix for culture, cooperation, and creativity ... The natural home of humanity ... which promotes usufruct, complementarity, and sharing, is degraded into a Hobbesian world of all against all, while the "civilized" home of humanity, which fosters rivalry, egotism, and possessiveness, is viewed as a Judeo-Hellenic world of morality, intellect, and creativity.

Turned inward, the psyche is ruled by repression and guilt. The organic past is covered with this change, and our notions of complementarity are replaced by mental and structural systems of command and obedience. This, in turn, influences our relations not only with one another, but with the natural world. Once complementary, our focus is now completely ruled by domination, and we turn this domination towards nature. Modern capitalism represents the near-total vanishing of complementary and mutual relations; united and equal only as buyers and sellers, as "sovereign egos on the free market place." the ties that bound us collectively as humans are now almost totally dissolved. Competition replaces cooperation, and practically every aspect of our lives is reduced to some form of exchange.

Still, even within our modern system premised on exchange and competition, Bookchin sees the promise of an emergent freedom. Bookchin is not an anarcho-primitivist; he does not want a return to a society in which we replicate the material existence of organic societies. Instead, in *Ecology of Freedom*, Bookchin offers up a utopian vision of what humanity could become were it to value freedom over domination, creativity over control and custom, and cooperation over competition. Eschewing the authoritarian politics of Marxist revolutions, Bookchin urges a decentralized, directly-democratic society that recognizes a shared *humanitas*, and which creates institutions that en-
able participation in the everyday life of the society by everyone. We cannot accept as given that we exist as aggregate individuals in a world of compartmentalization. Instead, we must turn outward, to a world where we can radically re-empower people to take on responsibility for not only their own lives, but also the life of the public sphere writ large. This would require replacing capitalism with libertarian institutions, peopled institutions, that are “structured around direct, face-to-face, protoplasmic relationships, not around representative, anonymous, and mechanical relationships.”

Libertarian institutions would be guided by the principle that individuals can not only manage their own affairs, but that they can also have an active role in managing social affairs. This is not a representative democracy of quorums, it is, instead, a direct democracy in which everyone can participate, a democracy free of hierarchy and domination, particularly those forms of oppression rooted in sexism and racism. As such, Bookchin argues, we must work every day to create a new culture, not just a new movement. We must live and think and work in ways that “extirpate the hierarchical orientation of our psyches.” We must change not only our societies, but ourselves, as changing the two go hand-in-hand. Such a society would recognize the positive aspects of organic society such as complementarity and the irreducible minimum, while also recognizing the vitality of individuality. Bookchin urges us to ignore “neither the personal nor the social, neither the domestic nor the public, in our project to achieve harmony in society and harmony with nature.”

In *An Unnatural Order: The Roots of Our Destruction of Nature*, Jim Mason advances a similar analysis that looks at how humanity has gradually come to a vision that entails a “conquest” of nature. Though Mason’s analysis is different than Bookchin’s in a number of ways, Mason also identifies a strain of what he calls “dominionism” over the natural world that is rooted in the vast traditions of our contemporary society—including Christianity, the conquest of the New World, and the Enlightenment. Considering animals a part of nature, Mason coins the term “misothery” to convey the vast hatred of the animal “other” that is contained within the vast dominionist movement of human history. Asserting our dominion over animals—the most direct representatives of nature—is understood as a way of asserting our dominion
PROPERTY, VIOLENCE, AND THE ROOTS OF OPPRESSION

and mastery over nature as a whole. At the root of misothery lies the same kinds of dynamics that Bookchin discusses. Mason writes:

since animals are so representative of nature in general, it can mean hatred and contempt for nature—especially its animal-like aspects. One writer, for example, has described nature as “red in tooth and claw”—that is, bloodthirsty like a predatory animal. In another version of the same idea, we say “it is a dog-eat-dog world.” These are misotherous ideas, for they see animals and nature as vicious, cruel, base, and contemptible. 47

What both Bookchin and Mason are pointing to is a vast impulse for domination at the heart of our contemporary society. It is an impulse that not only extends to nature, but also to human “others” who happen to be outside of a dominant class or social group, as well as to animals, who are, as Mason argues, a part of nature and a strong symbolic representation of it.

Clearly, our domination of animals is entwined in our domination of other humans, as well as the natural world that Bookchin points to. And though Bookchin never discusses animals in any real depth in his work, his theory can be used to think critically about the human domination of animals and nature. Bookchin provides us with the tools to understand and analyze animal exploitation as part of the orders of hierarchy and dominance that have been handed down to us, and which plague us and our relations with the natural world to this day. If social problems are inseparable from larger-scale ecological problems, Bookchin’s approach encourages an integrative perspective that draws into focus the necessity to overcome all forms of hierarchy and domination if we’re to solve any. Moreover, Bookchin’s notion of an “equality of unequals” could easily be applied to non-humans with whom we share our world in a society reconstructed in complementarity; anyone who seriously talks about respecting the interests of animals, not wanting them to suffer at our hand is, in fact, drawing on this vast history of the “equality of unequals.”

In asking us to think about hierarchy and domination, Bookchin encourages us to uproot and reconsider our everyday ideals that justify exploitation and oppression. Similarly, we can use this theory to uncover the relations of abject hierarchy that define the relations that humans have over animals. As part of learning to distrust nature through
the dissolution of the cultural and social ways of organic society, we came to despise it, thinking of it as a threatening force. As Mason points out, we see aspects of this in how we compare ourselves to animals; using mostly unfavorable terms, we see the sloppy as "pigs," the dangerous as "predators," and the basest humans are described as "animals." These symbolic and cultural meanings are reinforced by cultural and economic practices which subjugate animals to our wants, even though they feel pain and suffer much like us. We do this simply because we can, and because it is profitable—it certainly is not a matter of necessity. What is most troubling, however, is that there is no real sense among most people as to why this level of subjugation and domination is unacceptable. Having internalized hierarchy, most people simply argue that the fact of our "humanity" is enough to justify the continued domination of animals, yet, this is an incredibly flimsy way to justify any kind of moral action.

An example of this kind of thinking can be found in the work of Tibor R. Machan, author of the book *Putting Humans First: Why We Are Nature's Favorite.* Machan writes that he is an unrepentant speciesist, which he views as a "fact" of human nature. He believes that speciesism is "morally mandatory—if happiness and success in life are worthwhile human pursuits." Drawing on what he calls a "hierarchy within the class of living beings," Machan writes that some living things "are of lower quality, others of higher," and he goes on to justify the domination of animals by arguing that they lack rationality, and because of that, they are "less" than humans. On top of this, Machan argues that it is "natural" for humans to exploit the natural world (including animals), for creatures great and small do the same to those "below" them in the hierarchy of nature.

As Bookchin aptly shows, this kind of hierarchical thought about the original state of nature as red in tooth and claw is a residual of the dissolution of organic society and the introduction of coercive relations into our social order. Similarly, arguments about domination and the "natural order of things" have been used over time to justify the domination of groups of *humans,* including, most notably, women and people of color. The sexist assumes that the simple fact of gender makes him better than a woman; the racist assumes that the simple fact of race makes him better than the person of color; the speciesist as-
sumes that the simple fact of species makes him better than the animal. In all of these cases, othering as a process of domination and hierarchical thinking creates categories that work against complementarity, and which serve to justify exploitation, not only on an interpersonal level, but also on the level of social orders. In short, hierarchical thinking creates prejudices which are reinforced and reproduced by economic and ideological structures.

What Bookchin and other anarchist thinkers offer, however, is a broad-based critique of hierarchy at all levels of the social order, and a recognition of the systemic nature of domination and exploitation. More than that, Bookchin also promotes a radical social program that seeks to reconstitute society in a new way that recognizes complementarity, that rewards mutuality, and that seeks to provide all members of the society with the possibility of contributing to, and living vitally in it. This kind of society, harmonized in human relations, is the only one that will be harmonized with the ecosystem, and subsequently, with animals as part of nature. Though what Bookchin offers is largely a utopian vision of a libertarian municipalism governed by direct democracy, he does emphasize that we need to actively conduct our daily lives in a way that will generate a new culture. We need to challenge the hierarchy in our own lives, and begin living in a way that promotes mutuality. If we take this point seriously, it only makes sense that we begin systematically examining and extirpating hierarchical thinking and actions from our lives. Only in this way, will we begin to reconceptualize our relations with each other and with the natural world as complementary rather than dominant and conquering. These kinds of approaches can be used to foster social action and social change that integrates a variety of struggles against oppression and for freedom and liberation.

Only with an integrative, holistic, and thoughtful approach to all oppression and hierarchy can we hope to build a different society. Fighting capitalism itself isn't enough. We need to fight the rationale of hierarchy that goes back even further than the advent of modern capitalism.
MOVING FORWARD

We live over animals in a condition of abject hierarchy and domination; as our property, we exploit animals as commodities and for the production of commodities. Though this dynamic has its roots further back in our history than the advent of modern capitalism, it is clear that the overall thrust and intensity of capital relations have promoted the deepening and extensification of this exploitative system. Considering this, fighting against animal exploitation means simultaneously struggling against the dominant and oppressive dynamics of our culture and economy at all levels of the social order. Only then can we begin to overcome the commodification and property status of animals and the exploitation of humans that lies at the core of our society. In the coming chapters, I explore what some of these ideas mean for reinvigorating the animal rights movement as a movement thoroughly opposed to all hierarchy and domination.
IV

ANIMAL RIGHTS AND WRONGS

If the problem of human dominance is so deeply entrenched, so much a part of us and our interactions with each other and the rest of the ecosystem, how will we effectively challenge it? How will we build a movement that begins to break down not only human domination over humans, but also human domination over animals? As our commodities and property, animals live under us in a strict hierarchy, in a state of might-makes-right in which even our most minor interest justifies their death or suffering. This relation is emblematic of how we relate to the rest of the ecosystem; we not only dominate animals, we dominate nature. And, if we're to take Bookchin seriously, we dominate nature because our own relations with one another are rooted in exploitative dynamics that go back to the dissolution of organic society.

Though Bookchin's theory contains within it the analysis of organic society broken down by emergent hierarchy, it also contains the hope for change. His theory also encourages us to begin thinking about how we might overcome the exploitative dynamics handed to us by our historical forebearers, despite the deep structural problems gnawing away at the heart of our social order. And while Bookchin's
work does not contain many explicit references to animals, there is no reason that the orders of hierarchy identified by Bookchin cannot be understood as also applying to our contemporary relations with animals—especially considering the mechanized efficiency with which we kill and consume billions of them every year in the United States alone. If nothing else, the way we dominate animals illustrates our vast desire to dominate, in a larger sense, as human societies.

If we are going to struggle against this domination and hierarchy, we need movements of people who take these points seriously, who are committed to structuring their relations with one another along more cooperative lines, and who are willing to begin thinking seriously about activism that looks like the world we’re envisioning. It cannot be enough to simply hope that any means are acceptable and justifiable if we believe that the ends matter—this is precisely the kind of thinking that got Marxist states and movements into trouble to begin with. Any movement for justice must itself be just. Any movement that challenges hierarchy must, itself, refuse to participate in the pointless hierarchies that have plagued our social order for so long. Moreover, our movements must be integrative; no longer can we suffer the divisions that have defined our activism for so long. We need a single and effective movement for justice at all levels of the social order. We cannot afford to be “activismists,” simply deriving our righteousness from activism for the sake of activism itself. Instead, we need effective and in-depth analysis to drive our activism so that we can enact real and meaningful changes in the world—changes that do more than simply make us feel better about being active.

In this chapter, I examine the ideology and praxis of the animal rights movement as it is currently constructed, with an eye toward finding the basis upon which we can build a broad-scale, anti-authoritarian and anti-hierarchical movement that provides social justice for all. As a movement attuned to the suffering of animals, the animal rights movement might seem like a potential reservoir for integrative activism. Sadly, however, the animal rights movement at this juncture represents little more than squandered promise and a set of ossified activist bureaucracies that are actually entrenching the commodity and property system in animal production, rather than fighting against it writ large. In many regards, the animal rights movement itself is impo-
tent to the point of meaninglessness, and on top of all this, it has managed to alienate activists in other communities with poorly thought out campaigns, weird, publicity-grabbing activism that values attention above all else, and questionable political alliances. After examining the current issues with the animal rights movement, I turn the focus to the wider Left, and encourage more reflexivity on the status of animals within Left activism. In particular, I urge leftists and progressives to reconsider the nature of oppression and its ties to speciesism, which I then develop in Chapter 5 to examine the potential for a new movement—one that is radically anti-hierarchical in both theory and praxis, and which challenges human dominance over other humans, and over the ecosystem and animals, as well.

REFLECTIONS ON THE ANIMAL RIGHTS INDUSTRY

Giving a lecture at the 2006 conference for the Canadian Coalition for Farm Animals, Temple Grandin is as animated as any other professional who is enthralled by their work. Moving around the room excitedly, Grandin seems to convey an infectious energy about the topics she is passionate about, and this energy—in addition to her books—has earned her something of a cult following among people who are interested in so-called “humane” food production. Grandin’s excitement, however, covers some topics that most of us would consider to be fairly morbid: from detailing how to properly stun animals to induce a grand mal seizure, to the effective simultaneous electrification of the head and heart in sheep. She seems enmeshed in the logics of slaughter: from the first sense animals have entering a slaughterhouse to their very last minutes of life at the hands of a so-called “sticker” or “bleeder.” As an autistic woman, Grandin has written that her autism has helped her to understand the reactions of animals in situations of extreme stress and fear, such as they experience on the way to slaughter. Some of her “innovations” are used extensively in slaughterhouses around the world to decrease that stress, and thereby increase profit by preventing damage to the animals that are shortly to become disassembled into “meat.”
It is unsurprising that the animal exploitation industries would extol a figure like Grandin. She not only provides the patina of concern that the industry wants to cultivate for its meat-eating publics, she also makes handling and killing animals for human consumption significantly more effective and profitable. On her own webpage, she writes that the site was established to “educate people throughout the world about modern methods of livestock handling which will improve animal welfare and productivity.” Thus, the reaction to Grandin of some within industry can be rationally understood. What defies rational comprehension is how a group that supports animal rights would see Grandin as a “visionary.” This, however, is the title that the supposedly “radical” group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) applied to Grandin in their annual Progress awards, which are intended to highlight people that are “contributing to a more humane way of life for our entire society.” PETA gave Grandin the award for her help in changing the slaughter process at AgriProcessors, the world’s largest glatt kosher slaughterhouse, and said that her improvements in slaughterhouses decrease the amount of suffering that animals experience in their final hours.

Considering this, a stunning conflict of interests that defies logic emerges. If PETA is genuinely interested in abolishing all animal exploitation, and if they see the slaughter of animals as a moral wrong, it is seriously worth wondering why they would give an award to a slaughterhouse systems designer who delights in instructing people how to induce grand mal seizures in the very animals PETA have pledged to care about. In short, why is a group like PETA giving awards to people who design slaughterhouses to be more efficient engines of mass killing? Analogously, imagine a group opposed to the death penalty as a moral and ethical matter giving an award to someone who designed a more efficient form of capital punishment, and you can begin to understand why PETA’s actions are, at the very least, contradictory. At worst, they are traitorous to the cause they claim to promote.

To understand how this logic could emerge where a supposedly radical “animal rights” group applauds a slaughterhouse designer, one needs to dig underneath the layers of ideology and economics that drive the animal rights movement and the organizations that primar...
illy make up the movement in the contemporary United States. Dominated by a series of large organizations that rely on constant donations to stay alive, animal “protection” organizations are actually complex, cyclical rackets that have long since abandoned any real commitment to animal concerns. Instead, have turned their attention towards their own bureaucratic and business maintenance, gradually slipping into cooption and profiteering on the backs of animals. Writing more than a decade ago, Francione observed the same kinds of dynamics at play, and called into question the very ideological foundations of the animal rights movement. He showed that many of the claims that activists make directly conflict with their activism.

Citing the ties that many mainstream organizations and activists have forged with the industries that exploit animals, Francione argues that we need a genuine movement that focuses on the abolition of animal exploitation and which draws on veganism as a basis for the movement itself. The problem, however, is that the mainstream animal rights movement has never really tried such activism earnestly. Instead, it relies on a weak system of reforms, with the hope that these gradual changes will someday, in some way, in some distant and far-off future, lead to the complete abolition of animal exploitation. This brand of activism, as Francione points out in *Rain Without Thunder*, is using unclear means and ends calculations. Working through means that reify animals as property and commodities cannot possibly challenge the foundations of animal exploitation in our society. Most contemporary animal activism, however, seems to miss this point entirely, and in place of the clarity of reason, mainstream organizations like the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals make Faustian bargains with industry that condemn animals to maintain their status as property and commodities of a bloody capitalist machine. Sending the message that exploiting more nicely is acceptable only serves to maintain human dominance over animals, for it does not directly call into question the foundational notion of the use of animals. It simply says that the way we treat animals matters, but obviates the need to stop abusing them altogether if we just abuse them more nicely. This is everything like an anti-slavery organization suggesting that owning slaves is acceptable, provided they’re treated well. Given that animals are nothing more
than mere tools for the production of capital, the only way to abolish their exploitation is to challenge their status as properties and commodities. Anything short of that misses the point entirely, and could actually doom even more animals in the long run.

Sadly, the notion that we can improve the lot of animals in the future by leveraging less-than-full recognition of their interests today is the modus operandi of a movement that has lost sight of itself and its long-term goals. To understand the logic of this kind of activism, it is worthwhile to examine the writings of one of its chief contemporary proponents, Erik Marcus. In his book *Meat Market: Animals, Ethics and Money*, Marcus begins with an analysis of each of the facets of animal agriculture, including a detailed look at how animals are commodified and “produced” within this system. Marcus paints a bleak portrait of animal suffering, one which compels him to think critically about existing efforts for the interests of animals. Looking at three different arms of the movement—the vegetarian movement, the animal rights movement, and the animal welfare movement—Marcus encourages activists to take on a fourth, different movement, which he calls the “dismantlement” movement. Though Marcus believes that each of these movements have made some progress and play an “indispensable role in farmed animal protection,” he urges activists to shift to an offensive posture to “identify and strip away the primary assets of animal agriculture.” This movement, Marcus reasons, could actually be complementary to the other three, and someday, it could bring down animal agriculture altogether. Though Marcus has a broad and compelling agenda, what he comes up with is a set of prescriptions for activism that essentially mirrors tens (if not hundreds) of years of ineffective and limited action. These would constitute Marcus’ movement to “dismantle” animal agriculture.

Specifically, though, what would this look like? First, Marcus argues that the movement has clear comparisons to the abolition movement of the nineteenth century, with both wishing to address a social inequality rooted in the institutional dynamics of society. While Marcus argues that latter-day abolitionists “often lacked the means to strike at the roots of slavery,” he believes animal protectionists are people with the means to challenge animal agriculture at its core, able to force powerful industries to lose their stranglehold on government
policy makers. Though he says animal protectionists have the means to challenge this system, he argues that, like the abolitionists of yesteryear, they should not demand perfect equality. A similar line of argument is followed by Steven M. Wise in his book *Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights.* Wise’s primary goal in his book is to further elaborate a metric he developed for ranking the “practical autonomy” of animals, based on how like humans they are. Leaving aside the speciesism in this endeavor—it is rather like asking a white supremacist to rank non-whites based on how close to being white they are—the practical aspect of what Wise argues is strikingly similar to what Marcus and countless other activists, such as Henry Spira, have advocated over the years: namely, that we should not go too far in advocating for the rights and status of non-humans, because if we ask for too much, we may get nothing. Wise draws on the same analogy as Marcus (though in this case, extended to the Lincoln-Douglas debates in which Douglas worked to paint Lincoln as a radical “abolitionist”), and pushes for a “realizable minimum,” which would consist of a slow and gradual fight for the status of animals. Given Wise’s position and his metric to rank animals, it should come as no surprise that he would advocate first for animals most like us. Wise’s point, though, is that at this juncture in history, the “realizable minimum . . . means that advocating for too many rights for too many non-human animals will lead to no non-human animals attaining rights.”

Marcus takes his argument in exactly the same direction as Wise, arguing that abolitionists could not do something as radical as demanding perfect racial equality; the very idea would have been difficult or impossible for most people to believe, and would have initiated a loss of support for the abolitionist movement. Instead, Marcus writes, the abolitionists made the practice of slavery itself an abject moral wrong, and made it such that supporting slavery was an “abomination,” regardless of whatever racism one might have espoused. Continuing, Marcus further argues that many of the people who championed abolitionism were actually racists. Does this mean that we should have speciesists promoting the cause of animal rights?

Applying this analogy to animal activism, Marcus’ point is that advocating for animals today is like promoting racial equality in the past; the idea is so foreign, so challenging, and so contrary to our cultural
knowledge that we're likely to lose people before we've even begun to make our argument. Marcus' argument is strikingly similar to Wise's. What Marcus pushes for is activism that would be more limited in scope, lest activists marginalize people who are uncomfortable with an agenda promoting full recognition of the interests of animals. In terms of strategy, Marcus writes that we should use this knowledge of the abolitionist movement to convince the public that “animal agriculture is a vicious industry, and that regardless of one's feelings about other forms of animal use, the situation regarding farmed animals is intolerable.” From the view of the dismantlement frame that Marcus presents, this approach will not only focus on the place where the most animal suffering occurs, but it will also be more appealing than the so-called vegetarian option (which often begins with an approach that tells people that they must change their diet—something which people are very much resistant to, according to Marcus). Moreover, people who think of animal oppression through his dismantlement approach are more likely to be swayed to do activism than people who are simply vegetarians—at least by Marcus' reasoning. Thus, what we end up with, in Marcus' formulation (if it works as he predicts), is a dismantlement movement that would highlight the abject problems with animal agriculture and turn the public off the consumption of this industry's products. Marcus then lays a programmatic framework for the emergence of his dismantlement movement that includes a reliance on powerful organizations that use reasonable public relations campaigns, outreach to young people, an overhaul of the school lunch program in the US, and putting the National Institutes of Health in charge of Nutrition advice.

Though what Marcus proposes may seem reasonable in a hasty reading of his ideas, his thinking has several deep flaws, and I detail Marcus' framework here because I think it is telling of the dearth of imagination, creativity, and possibility that characterizes the animal rights movement today. Moreover, Marcus' thinking is emblematic of theory and praxis in most animal activism today; though he claims to be charting a new path for activism, what he proposes is essentially the clichéd same old wine in new bottles (though to be frank, not even the bottles are that new). In practical, ideological, and philosophical terms, Marcus' framework of "dismantlement," and the kind
of activism that he generally would put underneath this banner, represents nothing more than what the mainstream organizations in the animal rights movement have been doing for decades now, and what I would join Francione in calling “new welfarism.” While traditional welfarists—like those that are fans of Temple Grandin—are generally opposed to gratuitous cruelty and suffering, they ultimately have no intrinsic problems with “humane” animal use, and will readily accept human hierarchy over animals. New welfarists—like Marcus—often speak of seeking the ultimate abolition of animal exploitation, yet they pursue measures which are shockingly similar to the measures of traditional welfarists, and which reify the notion that animals are property and commodities. In this regard, though many new welfarists will call themselves “abolitionist” when it comes to animal use, they most often advance activism that is utterly, strikingly, and totally inimical to this end.

Francione points to five essential characteristics that define new welfarists. First, new welfarists reject the instrumentalism of non-humans as mere means to human ends; some new welfarists espouse the complete abolition of animal exploitation as an end, while others will tolerate exploitation if it is not based on arbitrary characteristics, such as species. Second, new welfarists generally believe that animal rights theory cannot provide a practical and pragmatic framework for sustained activism and the long-term goal of the abolition of animal exploitation. By arguing that we must scale back our demands in the “dismantlement” movement, Marcus argues this point, and Wise also argues the same with his “realizable minimum.” Third, because new welfarists reject the notion that animal rights theory can sustain activism, they pursue campaigns and strategies that end up being identical or nearly identical to the campaigns and strategies of traditional welfarist organizations. Fourth, welfarists view regulatory measures as necessary and desirable steps on the way to a full recognition of animal rights, even if these reforms reinforce human dominance over animals. Moreover, most supporters see a causal relation between the means of these reforms and the end of the abolition of animal exploitation, despite any clear path between the two. Fifth, new welfarists see no inconsistency in their supporting measures that reify human dominance over animals, while calling for the end of that dominance. The
roots of this confusion within the animal protection movement stem from the movement's reliance on the philosophy of Peter Singer, a utilitarian who explicitly rejects rights for animals (and rights more generally), and who also does not explicitly reject animal exploitation in all cases. Indeed, Singer has even justified animal experimentation at Oxford, and while he has since back-tracked, there is little denying that the fundamental philosophical position of utilitarianism does not explicitly prohibit a justification for vivisection or other forms of exploitation.13

Moreover, new welfarism emerges out of the political–economic considerations of a movement that is dominated by large organizations staffed by professional activists with high salaries. The Humane Society of the United States, for example, paid its president and CEO, Wayne Pacelle, just over US$203,000 in 2005, and held total net assets of over US$200 million.14 Generating income to sustain salaries such as these requires substantial public donations, and the draw for these donations can be found in clearly articulated, winnable campaigns that garner the organization attention. As a result, Marcus and his new welfarist allies end up supporting measures that do little to either challenge the status of animals as property and commodities, or explicitly call into question human hierarchy over animals. If we are serious about challenging the exploitation of animals, our activism must strike at these roots, eliminating the property status of animals, and their subsequent commodification. Their status as property is not a trivial, abstract, or minor point, as some new welfarists like to claim. As I argued in the previous chapter, property as leveraged in animal industries represents stored up suffering, as well as stored up capital; at an economic level, the relations of property are systemically essential for the continuation of animal agriculture and other exploitative industries. Moreover, as Francione argues, our holding animals as property means that our interests will always outweigh theirs, even in the most minor of conflicts. For these reasons, the status of animals as property and commodities must be challenged if we are going to overcome the systematic abuses of animals by human hands. Any other activism that trades against a challenge to the property status of animals essentially accepts that condition and does nothing to attack what is the lifeblood of the animal exploitation industry. It is important to note that the industry will
fight but can tolerate regulation if it must; it can always find newer ways (that have more appeal to consumers) to produce, slaughter, and market meat and other animal products, or to produce profit with thinner and thinner margins and more regulations. Capitalism itself is almost infinitely flexible, and has historically proven itself quite adept at adapting to changes in the productive landscape, including challenges for reform (many of which have been successfully undermined by capital interests). Commodity production agriculture is similarly flexible, and has wintered many social, economic, and technological changes in the productive landscape, particularly over the last half-century. There is no doubt that it will continue to weather those challenges and changes by adapting its business model appropriately. However, if animal exploitative industries lose the ability to commodify animals and treat them as property, the very lifeblood of the industry will have been drained. There is no adapting, no changing, and no continuing if production agriculture is unable to treat animals as property—period. Most mainstream activists who take up the banner of new welfarism (even if they call it something else) seem to ignore this fundamental issue in their activism. They trade off a real recognition of animal interests for campaigns that bring in money to maintain the organizations themselves.

Most activism that falls under the rubric of “animal rights” misses this point about property entirely, while it allows or even encourages the instrumental use of animals for human ends. Thus, while it makes a great deal of sense for Marcus to highlight the problems with animal agriculture as a moral and ethical matter, what is needed is a genuine rights movement that does more than effectively repeating the activism that the animal rights movement has already been doing for years. By failing to attack the commodification of animals, Marcus and his new welfarist allies essentially take on the role of industry consultants. By not adequately challenging the roots of animal agriculture and calling into question the very commodity and property relations themselves, at the very least, this brand of activism actually provides the industry with free, yet valuable market research. While industry will fight reform most generally, it will also not pass up what it sees as a clear opportunity to cater to a market niche of consumers who have no problem consuming animals or using them instrumentally for
human ends, but who do have a problem with what they see as ab­
ject and “excessive” suffering. This is a position the industry can work
with, even if it is hesitant to right now. Though some producers will
be slow to come along, the industry operates on thin enough margins
that it will recognize a market opportunity when it sees it, and happily
provide alternatives for people of conscience, provided it can reason­
ably profit from those alternatives.

It is simple to see how new welfarism plays out in reality by look­
ing at some examples of this kind of activism. Because some new wel­
farists imagine that talking about human hierarchy over animals and
the moral wrong of all animal exploitation is too onerously radical and
difficult for the average person to understand, let alone accept, we end
up with campaigns, strategies, and tactics that do little more than re­
focus the efforts of industry to produce products that “caring, ethical”
consumers find pleasing. We also end up with so-called “reforms” that
even animal rights organizations argue make animal exploitation more
profitable. Some activists refer to these reforms as “victories,” and they
are victories, in a sense: they are victories for the industry.

One such “victory” was Arizona Proposition 204, a law that goes
into effect in 2013 that would make it a class 1 misdemeanor to
“tether or confine a pig during pregnancy or a calf raised for veal
on a farm for all of the majority of a day in a manner that prevents
the animals from lying down and fully extending its limbs or turning
around freely.” This measure is, in part, aimed at eliminating gestation
crates, which are essentially small stalls that pregnant sows are kept in.
The HSUS was one of the largest backers of this measure, pouring
money into campaigns for this legislation in the months running up
to the vote. While less suffering is always preferable to more, this leg­
islation is not the victory that some animal advocates imagine and it
does nothing to challenge the property status of animals or to prevent
the use of animals for human ends. First, Proposition 204 prohibits
the confinement of animals only for the “majority of a day,” which,
legally, could mean that it would be acceptable to confine animals
for 11 hours and 59 minutes a day. Second, the way that the HSUS
waged their campaign to win the vote on this initiative is revealing. In
their materials promoting the gestation crate ban, HSUS argues that
moving to group housing “marginally reduces production costs and
increases productivity." The HSUS economic analysis continues on to argue for a variety of benefits for producers, including the notion that "producers who adopt group housing .... could increase demand for their products or earn a market premium" (emphasis added). What is most curious about this statement is that a group that is ostensibly opposed to the exploitation of animals is actually encouraging the primary industry that exploits them for profit to reform their methods, with the logic that such reform will increase demand and fetch higher prices at market. If the HSUS is serious about their mission to "seek to forge a lasting and comprehensive change in human consciousness of and behavior toward all animals in order to prevent animal cruelty, exploitation, and neglect," it would seem that should preclude encouraging increased profits on the backs of animals and acting as economic advisors to industry. The "victory" of this proposition is lacking, because it fails to adequately talk about, challenge, or consider the roots of human domination over animals. In this regard, this brand of activism, which relies on reform, has reified the condition of animals as property and commodities, and actually helped segments of the animal exploitation industry profit and grow. This is nowhere more obvious than in the love affair that animal protection organizations have with Whole Foods Markets.

In early 2006, Peter Singer, the so-called "father" of the modern animal rights movement sent a "Dear John" letter. No, Singer was not breaking up with his significant other, he was instead securing a relationship, this time with John Mackey, libertarian CEO of the upscale supermarket chain Whole Foods, whose anti-labor, pro-capital utterings include the insightful quip that "The union is like having herpes. It doesn't kill you, but it's unpleasant and inconvenient and it stops a lot of people from becoming your lover." Not afraid of contracting any metaphorical diseases from Mackey, Singer, his group Animal Rights International, and seventeen other animal rights and welfare organizations cozied up with Mackey and Whole Foods. Together, the groups expressed their "appreciation and support" for the "pioneering initiative being taken by Whole Foods Markets in setting Farm Animal Compassionate Standards."

If you are unfamiliar with these initiatives, it is worth a trip to the web to read up on them. There you will find the web site of the Ani-
mal Compassion Foundation, a Whole Foods-sponsored foundation that “serves as a dynamic hub for ranchers, meat producers and researchers to learn and share practices and methodologies that support the animals’ physical needs, behaviors and well-being by incorporating wisdom from the past, enhanced by present and future innovations.” Following links through to Whole Foods’ corporate web site, the company writes that compassionate standards “improve the quality and the safety of the meat we sell, but also support humane living conditions for the animals.”

This is all part of CEO Mackey’s larger “progressive” stance based on his greater philosophy about capitalism benefiting the business’ shareholders and stakeholders. Stakeholders include the customers, employees, suppliers, and local community with whom Whole Foods has interactions. Also included is the environment, and as a seeming afterthought, animals (it is unclear whether animals are seen as stakeholders or just steak). If we take it at face value, the “Animal Compassion” program is part of this greater commitment to recognize animals as stakeholders by demanding that suppliers meet more stringent animal welfare requirements. The program also includes a logo for labeling animal products that come from suppliers committed to this program. Moreover, after 2008, Whole Foods will begin to educate its customers about the differences between its “Animal Compassion” labeled products and the products from factory farms.

Whole Foods is undoubtedly pioneering in one sense, at least: they’ve been able to convince people that are supposedly opposed to animal exploitation to sign on to a business and marketing model that relies on the exploitation of animals, albeit in kinder, gentler ways. In any other universe where logic ruled the day, these organizations—at least the ones that are serious in their mission—would be opposed to working with any company that profited so extensively from animal exploitation. However, it can be difficult to see this when it is part of a longer process of movement cooptation by industry; something that has played itself out over and over again in all forms of left and progressive movements. The entire “Animal Compassion” program itself had its initial roots in the animal rights group Viva! USA, who picketed the Whole Foods annual meeting and called for a boycott of the business. Mackey began a conversation with the director of
Viva!, which—according to Singer and Mason—eventually resulted in Mackey understanding how animals are treated and becoming vegan. Mackey’s latter-day conversion to veganism supposedly drove his desire to ensure that Whole Foods would only sell meat and products from animals that “have been treated with a measure of dignity before being slaughtered.” After that, he began to create the Animal Compassion standards, even inviting the director of Viva! to become involved. Other animal rights groups were asked to join in, and in that, we see the gradual process by which “activist” organizations become pawns and willing dupes for an industry that works against the causes they claim to promote.

Perhaps I am a pessimist or a cynic—or maybe just a realist. Regardless, it is difficult to ignore the fact that Whole Foods is a corporation, and corporations are of one mindset: to deliver value to shareholders. Corporations are not in the business of promoting ethical reforms, equality, justice, or anything else, unless it meshes very neatly with their bottom line calculations. Whatever the rhetoric, as a CEO, Mackey’s only real job is to see that Whole Foods remains profitable enough to continue to deliver that value. If he consistently fails to deliver to shareholders, he will lose his job—and under the rules of corporate accountability to shareholders, the board would be right to oust him. Considering this, it is important to note that Whole Foods’ commitment to animal rights likely extends only so far as it is coterminous with its commitment to delivering value to shareholders. While it may feel warm and fuzzy for the animal rights industry to imagine that there is a great corporate overlord looking out for the interests of animals, workers, the local community, and the environment—and hey, the corporate overlord was nice enough to ask for their opinion!—it is also incredibly naïve to imagine that a company that benefits from animal exploitation has a significant interest in ending that profitable part of its business. Whole Foods is not lacking in market savvy; having seen an opportunity to colonize a market niche, they’ve seized it, and in the process, they not only get to sell meat, dairy, eggs, and other products of animal exploitation, but they also get to appear as the “ethical” choice for consumers who care, but who don’t care enough to give up foods that exploit. This is deeply curious behavior from a company
that professes its concern for the well-being of animals, but less curious when one begins to think about the bottom-line.

For Whole Foods as an organization, the well-being of farm animals is likely an incidental issue—even if they do want to educate people about the workings of the average factory farm. Looking at this realistically, it is not hard to see that advertising the conditions under which “average” factory-farmed food is raised is an effective and powerful way of differentiating and marketing the “Animal Compassion” product when cheaper alternatives exist. Though I, of course, have no real way of knowing whether Whole Foods or John Mackey really cares about animals exploited for their continued corporate profits (Mackey has said that selling animal products is necessary for Whole Foods' business model, despite being a vegan himself’). I can be certain that if nothing else, the Farm Animal Compassionate Standards represent a fairly effective and comparably inexpensive form of targeted marketing and public relations. While Whole Foods does discuss animal welfare in promoting their products, they are also keen to note that the reforms will make for happier consumers since they are protecting the “quality and safety” of the meat they sell.

Of capitalism, Bookchin wrote that persuading a green plant to stop photosynthesizing was probably an easier task than to get capitalism to desist from accumulation. We could say the same of animal industries and the commodification of animals. While we may be able to make that commodification “nicer” through “compassionate” or “happy” meat, or measures like eliminating gestation crates, commodification will never simply fade away on its own, as it is the foundational logic of the system itself. Provided it can continue to commodify animals as property, the system will adapt, even to the most stringent regulations. What's more, if those regulations become too onerous domestically, it seems likely that the industry will simply increase the already substantial offshore production taking place to skirt around these domestic regulations. For these reasons, our activism must fight the system at its roots, targeting property and the imposition of the commodity form on animals, rather than hoping that an ethically bankrupt system will do the impossible task of reforming itself given demands to do so. Indeed, “reforms” help the exploiters of animals to exploit more effi-
ciently, or more profitably, without seriously impacting the commodity relation that undergirds the system itself.

Pursing reform at the expense of challenging the roots of the system leads to a troubling relationship between means and ends. As Gary Francione points out in *Rain Without Thunder*, many groups see no moral or logical inconsistency in promoting measures that explicitly endorse and reinforce an instrumental view of animals and at the same time articulating a long-term philosophy of animal rights. Instrumentalism denies that animals have any inherent value or that they can themselves be holders of rights—notions that are at the center of animal rights theory. The new welfarists believe that it is both coherent and morally acceptable to disregard the rights of animals today (by pursuing welfarist reform that reinforces the property status of animals) in the hope that some other animals will have rights tomorrow.28

As the movement is structured today, there is a deep and abiding disconnect between means and ends. By pursuing the means of reform, animal protection organizations assume that somehow, at some point, in some way in the future we will reach an end where animals are no longer exploited. It is almost reminiscent of all of the talk on the Left about life after the revolution. The problem is that the primary means of activism today simply supports the basic relations which commodify animals and damn them to bloody exploitation. As long as animal rights activists are stuck on pursuing an agenda to reform the worst practices of animal agriculture, they will remain little more than consultants. It is an industry that will likely accept their demands in some measure, provided they either make for a good marketing opportunity or stall the actual abolition of animal property and animal exploitation. Worse still, organizations that engage in this kind of activism are profiting from it, and maintaining their bureaucracies on the backs of the “humanely raised” animals they care so much for. This makes them a party to the animal suffering they are supposedly against.

THE FETISH ON ANIMAL SUFFERING

If these were the only problems plaguing the animal rights industry, they would be sufficient to damn it, however, the bulk of the mod-
ern-day animal rights movement is also plagued with a myopic focus, a lack of political acumen, and a set of strategies that marginalize the importance of human suffering, while fetishizing animal suffering. Though it is understandable for organizations that have a particular focus on animals to highlight it, that emphasis should not be at the expense of a particular kind of animal called “human.”

If we are to challenge hierarchy and domination across the spectrum of society, we must question all hierarchy, including the hierarchy of humans over other humans. The bulk of the animal rights movement, in its contemporary incarnations at least, seems not to understand how human suffering is linked with animal suffering, ideologically and systemically. In my few years in animal activist circles, I have met genuine misanthropes in “the movement,” who either think that humans “get what they deserve,” who naively assume that all humans possess the agency to overcome the problems they face, or who think that animal suffering is qualitatively more important than human suffering. As well as activists who see opportunity in doing outreach to other groups, the current movement is stocked with people who place a singular importance on the suffering of animals and ignore the human consequences. Many of these activists fail to understand the ways in which animal and human suffering are linked through a singular exploitative system, and though animal exploitation is broadly entrenched in our society, it should never be forgotten that human exploitation is also the norm.

As a result of this animal suffering fetish, many are willing to abandon commitment to broad-scale principles of liberation for all, more interested in securing what they think of as a better place for animals and for the political appearance and status of the pro-animal movement. This is the case even if potential pro-animal allegiances have disastrous implications for promoting human equality. In the wake of the ascendency of neoconservativism in post-9-11 America, the desire to reach out to fundamentalists and conservatives, more generally seemed to gain a strange momentum. Many activists argued that we as a movement needed to reach outward and rightward to draw in Christian conservatives, neoconservatives, and others from the Right who would be receptive to our message. I was personally chastised by a fellow activist for talking about my atheism publicly; he reasoned...
that my atheist views might turn off “converts” to the cause, and convince the God-fearing and church-going that the movement itself was godless. This argument was backed up by others who maintained that we, in the movement, must not close off opportunities with evangelicals—the people that Chris Hedges calls “American fascists,” not without reason—because they were the predominant political force in our country and thus best able to bring about the most hasty movement to a vegan world. Others have mentioned to me that we should not distance ourselves from right-wing folks who took up pieces of the cause, because this benefitted the overall movement and brought in new blood. The hope was that the “new blood” would invigorate the movement and help to make it mainstream, yet no one seemed to consider the fact that this new blood was often happy to uphold exploitative and oppressive ideological positions on a variety of other issues.

Though conservatives are less reserved in touting their ideological inclinations, it bears mentioning that many so-called “liberals” are also complicit in promoting many of the same oppressive postures, particularly when it comes to the power of the free market, the glories of capitalism, and the rule of law, American-style. On any of a variety of issues, the total gap between most liberals and conservatives is so small that it is almost meaningless, despite the great volume of hot air expended on AM radio touting the differences. When it comes down to it, most liberals are unwilling to support anti-capitalist struggles or to affirm the rights of workers unilaterally, and many more are afraid of appearing “too radical.” In this sense, while liberals may be more open-minded about animal rights issues—though this too is questionable—there is no reason to believe that they will be useful allies in any struggle against the oppressive forces of capital—since they’re often touting those forces as desirable.

Of course, arguments within the animal rights movement never happen in a political vacuum; they are part of a context that is dominated by the professional activism of large-scale organizations like PETA and HSUS. As an organization that seeks attention above almost all else save money, outside the movement PETA is routinely seen as the organization that speaks for the entire animal rights movement. For reasons both philosophical and practical, this is tragic for animals
and for people that care about them, as PETA has shown a remarkable insensitivity to other causes for social justice. Raw political opportunists, PETA will join up with just about any cause—exploitative or not—that gains them attention and thus donations from people who believe that donating money to wealthy organizations counts as “activism.” PETA has helped to perpetuate the fetishization of animal suffering with an incredibly narrow political focus that alienates many concerned with broader struggles. One of the richest critiques of PETA comes from their blatant and frequent commodification of women for the sole purpose of raising attention for the “cause.” PETA’s sexism is well-documented, but a most recent example can be found in their “State of the Union Undress,” timed to coincide with George W. Bush’s 2007 State of the Union address. In this online video, a female model strips completely naked while explicit, gory shots of animal suffering are occasionally flashed on the screen. PETA’s use of female nudity is like the use of female nudity to sell any particular commodity. In this case, the commodity is PETA and their attendant drives for donations, which are, in a very real sense, their lifeblood.

PETA also apparently has no problem with the raw political opportunism of aligning itself with problematic ideologies and movements in order to gain attention and money. As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, PETA gave an award to a slaughterhouse designer who ostensibly works against the causes that an “animal rights” group should promote. Thus, it should be unsurprising that PETA is also happy to give awards to fundamentalist conservatives who have promoted policies that marginalize, exploit, and denigrate humans. With conservatism and a jingoistic patriotism ascendant in Bush II America, PETA awarded right-of-Bush conservative Pat Buchanan a “Progress Award” for having the “strongest backbone.” According to PETA, Buchanan stood up for animals, and promoted the notion put forth by former George W. Bush speech writer, Matthew Scully, that “compassionate conservatism” should extend to animals. What is most troubling about this is that Buchanan is, by all accounts, someone who has had maybe too much backbone when it comes to arguing for the exploitation of another kind of animal—the one we call “human.” For those of you that are not versed in Buchanan’s illustrious right-wing career, here are a few stunning highlights: Buchanan promoted build-
ing a wall at the US-Mexico border to keep out immigrants. He also called for US-born children of illegal immigrants to be stripped of their citizenship birth right. On top of all of this, Buchanan has been an outspoken opponent of equal rights for lesbians and gays, he has tried to minimize the horrors of the holocaust, and he has frequently spoken against feminism. Buchanan was also opposed to economic sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s, during apartheid, and he is against prohibitions on flying the Confederate flag.\textsuperscript{33}

Together, Buchanan and Scully promote a disastrous agenda for equality, regardless of what they think about animals. Buchanan stands in noxious opposition to anything that looks even remotely like justice. Scully, by enabling and promoting an administration that has killed hundreds of thousands of people in Iraq,\textsuperscript{34} also shows himself to be potently against any real notion of justice. In promoting these thinkers and politicians, PETA shows that it values media ascendency above the promotion of social justice for everyone. By ignoring the fact that Buchanan endorses measures that are bad for people, PETA shows it is blind to the morality and ethics of ending suffering for everyone—animals and people alike. In short, PETA is interested exclusively in the suffering of non-human animals. All of the critiques about animal liberation—that it is single-focus and ignores social justice issues—are brought into stark relief when a group with PETA’s power and influence promote the values of Pat Buchanan, a man who is, by every imaginable measure, against justice for the oppressed of the world. Inviting people into the movement or embracing political figures who favor or facilitate the exploitation or oppression of humans shows the animal rights movement has a fetish for animal suffering above all else. If we are against animal suffering on moral and ethical grounds, we should be opposed to all suffering, whether human or animal. In trying to bring people from the Christian right into the movement, how can we ignore that this political bloc has made second class citizens of gays and lesbians? If, as a movement, we claim to care about suffering, shouldn’t we also condemn these policies?

In the end, if activists push for a world which respects the interests of animals, but is otherwise wrapped in exploitative dynamics, they may end up getting what they ask for. It is not impossible to imagine a society that is structured with other kinds of dominance and hierar-
chies, but which also recognizes the status of animals. One could cer-
tainly envision a purely vegan capitalism, just as one could see a purely
vegan fascism or other totalitarian regime (indeed, some punk bands
like Vegan Reich even promoted an authoritarian vision of a vegan
society). Similarly, there is no reason to think that widespread recog-
nition of the interests of animals would be impossible in a radically
authoritarian Christian theocracy, just as a classless society could still
be structured in other forms of dominance, as Bookchin points out in
his many critiques of Marxism. If the animal rights movement insists
on maintaining a narrow focus and championing only the rights of
non-humans, while promoting people, organizations, and movements
that do not stand up for humans, they risk validating, promoting, and
maintaining an unjust society, which happens to watch out for the
interests of animals. Instead of falling into traps presented by political
opportunity and short-term gain, the movement for the recognition
of animal rights should become part of a broader-scale movement to
challenge all hierarchy, domination, and exploitation, including not
only the obvious categories of race, class, gender, and age, but also
other forms of domination, including heterosexism and speciesism.
As long as the animal rights movement fails to become part of such
a movement, it will be doomed to partial advances, political missteps,
and, most likely, utter irrelevance in the long-term.

RUDDERLESS ACTIVISM, RELENTLESS PRAGMATISM,
RELIGIOUS DOGMATISM

Considering all of this, a stark portrait of a confused, rudderless, and
ruthlessly pragmatic animal rights movement emerges. Francione
painted this portrait in great detail in his 1996 book Rain Without
Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement, and things have
not improved since then in the animal rights industry. On the one
hand, a variety of groups actively promote measures which reify the
status of animals as commodities and property, essentially implying
that consuming and using animals is acceptable—provided that use is
gentle enough. As a result of this, mainstream animal activists end up
promoting the work of slaughterhouse designers, libertarian CEOs
who directly profit from the sale of “happy meat,” and cage-free egg
producers under an “animal rights” banner. On the other hand, the movement is plagued by an inconsistent political, theoretical, and ideological focus. Additionally, many “activismists” within the movement are blatantly hostile to even discussing theory “while so many billions are dying,” which feeds the relentless pragmatism of the movement, and also rewards actions, allegiances, and strategies that may not be as well-thought-out as they could be. Not only does a praxis divorced from theory emerge, but so does a macho attitude that the “real men” in the movement are out “doing stuff,” rather than sitting around pontificating while animals are dying. Though the reaction is in some ways understandable, as billions of animals do die in conditions of unimaginable cruelty, it is short-sighted, as action without theory is often absolutely counterproductive, and at the worst, can be self-defeating.

Finally, the movement is dangerously cult-like in its adherence to certain organizations, thinkers, and strategies. Critiquing PETA is seen as a special form of heresy to many who cut their vegan teeth on that group’s propaganda. It was them that introduced these activists to the horrors of animal exploitation and they feel an allegiance. As the co-host of a long-running Internet radio show with thousands of listeners around the world, I have also been a vocal and frequent critic of Peter Singer, the so-called “father” of the animal rights movement. Singer has not only joined up with organizations that kill animals for profit, but has also maintained an adherence to the ethical principles of veganism that are not necessary in absolute terms. Every time I critique Singer on our show, I get angry email from listeners. What is curious about the emails is that they generally take issue, not with the substance of my critique—that is left aside in almost every case—but that I critique Singer at all. It is as though I have somehow violated a sacred principle, or uttered a blasphemous comment, for which I should be hauled in front of the Grand Inquisitor. In most instances, the point is that I should, apparently, have reverence for our great and glorious “father,” even if he promotes philosophical and practical positions that result in furthering injustice for both animals and humans. This perspective is dangerous for reasons of idol-worship, and for his ideas themselves. If discussing some topics is taboo, the movement has become nothing more than a religious dogma without a god. On top of all of this, I and others, with whom I work, have been accused
of being “divisive” and “fundamentalist” for arguing that we ought not work with industry to find better ways to market and commodify animals, and that our activism should target the property status of animals. Because this notion challenges the main position of the animal industry, it is seen as dangerous to the bottom-line of animal organizations and the big businesses that have co-opted them.

In the end, the animal rights movement is the absolute wrong place to anchor a meaningful movement for the abolition of animal and human exploitation. Plagued by consistent political and practical problems, it lacks the ethical consistency which could make it a logical home for a broader-based struggle against all hierarchy and domination. Sadly, as I discuss in the next section, the broader progressive Left similarly lacks a meaningful stance that could be used to challenge all domination.

THE PROGRESSIVE LEFT AND ANIMAL RIGHTS

“How will a group of anarchists ever figure out a time to meet?” a colleague asked, half-jokingly, when I mentioned to him that I was teaching a class on anarchist theory. Of course, my colleague was confusing anarchism with chaos—a common problem—but once we got beyond his misconceptions about anarchism, he actually agreed that the class looked vital and interesting. Indeed, the class was vital and interesting, but it also had its challenges, and getting beyond the misunderstandings of my colleagues were the least of them. More immediately, we had to deal with issues of power. Anarchism questions the origins of power and hierarchy, and I wanted to put theory into praxis and have the class question my power and position as professor. This is a harder line to walk than my idealistic, younger-self thought it would be: because school in a capitalist society is a training ground for the workforce, 29 obedience, politeness, and adherence to authority are highly prized. By the time most students arrive on my doorstep, they know the system and their place in it, and far too many of them at the liberal arts University where I work, are lulled into a sense of passive tolerance of school as a means to an end of material comfort: a house in the burbs, a sweet job with an investment company, 2.5 wee-ones,
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND WRONGS

an SUV, weekends on the cape, and, if they're lucky, possibly a compatible mate from similar material circumstances.

Fighting this passivity is tough. A significant number of students want to know exactly how to jump through the hoops to get the grades they “need.” Few students want to—or know how to—do the difficult work of creative reasoning, and even fewer have a real and potent desire to exercise their own agency in their education. I was facing students who had been educated over most of their lifetimes in a broken educational system that is designed to sap their creativity and desire. Getting beyond that took time for me and the class.

Nevertheless, we did break out of the old molds in time, and developed a new dynamic. We couldn’t completely break out of our lifetimes of socialization, of course, but we did begin to make some headway. Over a few weeks, we came to an understanding about how to run things, and soon enough the majority of the class evolved into what I thought was a fairly responsible, thoughtful, and hard-working collective of students, who clearly were motivated by a desire to understand oppression, liberation, justice, and the anarchist take on these issues. Part of our changing dynamic involved me decentralizing my own power in the class, and students planned and ran most class sessions usually using readings that I’d chosen. I’m not naive enough to imagine that I was seen as just another member of the class, but the environment was such that students were free to speak their minds, to challenge me or any other member of the class, and to creatively and thoughtfully engage with the material at hand. In our evolving dynamic power was not taken for granted, which was part of what I’d been hoping for.

As the class went on, we talked about a variety of approaches to understanding human oppression and how anarchist theory informs struggles for human liberation and freedom. We discussed the overlapping dynamics of anarchism and feminism, of anarchism and ecological thinking, and of anarchism and liberation movements in the developing world. Given that many of the students had experience with movements and struggles here or abroad, our conversations drew from a variety of perspectives. At times, I found the class simultaneously engaging and amazing, and at other times, I found it frustrating (for example, when the group either could not or refused to establish
consensus in decision-making, or when they got hung up on grades). Nevertheless, I began to look forward to class sessions because I'd have the chance to discuss powerful ideas with students who (on the whole) agreed that these ideas were powerful, meaningful, and potentially transformative. This was what I'd gotten into higher education to do, and though at times I wanted to just grab the reins and take over, I usually fought the urge, recognizing that what was evolving, independent of my overt leadership, was better than what I could have produced by forcing my will on the class.

Given the wide-ranging discussions that we had and the sensitivity of the more serious members of the class towards issues of human oppression, I raised a point about halfway through our semester that proved more contentious than just about any other conversation we had. While discussing the ideology of oppression and how the creation of broad out-groups of social “others” takes place, I argued that we humans participated in the othering, not only of other humans, but also of animals, and much of the rest of the natural world. Our ideological blinders, I argued, let us treat animals like mere things based on their species membership, much the same way that the blinders of a racist allowed her to dehumanize non-whites based on their membership in what we socially perceived as a “race.” This prejudice, I went on to argue, was based upon the exact same systemic oppression that drove racism, sexism, and other “isms,” and that we had to see it as such if we were to get anywhere. My argument that we should think about animals more seriously touched off an impassioned debate in the class. Some people outright laughed at me for suggesting this; some people dismissed it and refused to participate, sulking and looking forlorn; and others argued vehemently that we needn’t be concerned with the problems of animals.

One student in particular described his ongoing work with a human rights group, and argued passionately that human suffering was so acute, so entrenched, and so intolerably miserable that we needed to attend to the problems of human suffering around the world before we could even begin to think about animals. Plus, he argued, animals aren’t even really aware of their suffering. “Why bother liberating animals when humans need liberation, and when humans can better know the liberation they’re feeling?” he asked. A few others shared
this view, and despite the broad range of topics that we’d previously
touched on in the class, this particular session was one of our most
contentious and heated. It was one of the few sessions where people
got close to yelling at each other, which is all the more surprising in
the confines of a university like ours where bourgeois norms of civili-
ity usually rule the day. Many students were prepared to accept the
injustice of racial hierarchy, so I was curious that they were largely
unwilling to question the injustice of species hierarchy.

After this day in class, I felt a subtle shift in the attitudes of a few
students towards me. They’d just gotten used to the idea of having a
social anarchist for a professor, but now, he was not only an anarchist,
but also an anarchist who—unbelievably!—advocated for the rights
of animals and refused to eat or wear them. Social anarchism? Sure,
they could swallow that. They liked danceable revolutions, personal
freedom, and they could even tolerate the notion of a larger collective
good. But _veganism_?! Some of them told me I didn’t look like a vegan,
and on top of that, veganism was “hippie crap” lifestyle-politicking so
far out there that it didn’t even merit consideration. And here I was,
not only a living, breathing anarchist, but a living, breathing anarchist
_vegan_. The reaction was such that I wondered if I’d sprouted a third eye
in the middle of my forehead.

I relate this story because I think it is emblematic of the way that
many on the progressive and broader political Left see ethical vegan-
ism—or even the notion that animals matter in bigger battles against
oppression. My students who insisted that we needed to solve the
problems of humans first are not, in my experience, atypical. Though
some people are hostile to the idea of giving animals a place in strug-
gles against oppression, what I’ve experienced is not so much hos-
tility... It is morc of a built-in defensiveness, a knee-jerk reaction, a
grumbling that is usually accompanied by a dismissive roll of the eyes,
or a flick of the wrist as if shooing away a fly. This comes along with
an ingrained uncertainty about this “stuff” that seems to imply that
anyone raising the question has gone just a bit too far, or has had a
break with conventional reality. One would expect that people in oth-
er liberatory movements—that are supposedly open to struggling for
the least among us—would be able to accept some of this ideological
difference, but it seems to have an almost disease-like quality to it. A
good number of folks want to dismiss you before they’ve even heard the argument about animals, lest they end up with your animal rights cooties. In reality, this hesitant reaction probably stems from the “I’m-not-as-crazy-as-you” gut feeling, probably because the person doesn’t want their movement or cause polluted by association with animal rights crazies from PETA, who like to dress up in chicken costumes to draw attention to themselves.

As I argued in the previous chapter, a significant part of this reaction also stems from the fact that we live in a society that understands human society and human nature—what Bookchin calls second nature—as “over” and “above” the natural world and its non-human inhabitants in a happy hierarchy. Much as we live in a society structured in the privilege of white power and capital, we also live in a world that has systemic species privilege. Much as each of us has to fight the racism in our heads that comes from our acculturation, each of us—including those of us that have decided to devote our activism to the abolition of animal exploitation—has to fight the machine of species privilege in our heads. The average person in society eats and enjoys animal foods, and probably understands their place as one that is atop the food chain. Those who are involved in progressive or Left causes, though, have at least implicitly decided to question these other kinds of privilege in meaningful ways, to one degree or another. Despite years of talking about human oppression, I’ve never—not even once—heard anyone even remotely of the left say that we should solve the problems of whites before we solve the problems of non-whites, or that we should solve the problems of men before we solve the problems of women. Anyone who would argue that we should solve the problems of white folks before getting to the problems of non-whites would, in a most generous assessment, be a white supremacist. Most of us would consider such an utterance to be crass, base, and not really worthy of serious attention. Yet, as I described above, I have heard committed leftists, people who are working for incredible causes and movements, make the same argument about species membership with a completely straight (and often frustrated) face. Many (though not all) on the wider political Left, from Democratic progressives all the way over to Marxists, seem ready to embrace what they view as a hierarchy
of species, while simultaneously working to reject other hierarchies (of, say, class, race, gender, or even national origin).

The problem is particularly entrenched with so-called “progressives,” many of whom also happen to be drawn to local organic meats, dairy, and eggs as a “political statement” about their rejection of the problems with industrialized food. That great bastion of “progressive” thinking, *The Nation*, ran a review of Tristram Stuart’s history of vegetarianism, *The Bloodless Revolution*, which shows the magazine is as progressive, on animal issues, as your average hunter, and which demonstrates just how deeply the problems of human domination are rooted in the progressive imagination. After the typical review verbiage, the article concludes with this direct riposte to the calls for greater compassion towards animals in *The Bloodless Revolution*:

> Although vegetarians may think that surrendering human supremacy will reduce the harm that people do to the environment, any such effort is invariably counterproductive. Denying humans their supreme power means denying them their supreme responsibility to improve society, to safeguard the environment on which it depends and even—dare we say it—to improve nature as well.44

This simple statement of human supremacy upholds as relatively unproblematic, the human hierarchy over the natural world and its inhabitants. We humans have “improved” upon nature, often with disastrous results; the hubris bubbling under the surface of this argument is the same hubris that has produced the very ecological crises we face today. Though the author of the review claims that almost anyone would reject factory-farmed meat, the human supremacy he advocates in his dismissal of vegetarianism and any consideration of speciesism is exactly like that of any more powerful group exerting itself over a weaker one. While the “white man’s burden” has been replaced with the terminology of the so-called neoliberal “Washington Consensus” for development, all too many are ready to take up the reins of a kind of “species burden,” if only because it is what we see as the “natural” way of the world, and because it gives us juicy steaks and cool leather jackets.

The problem here is a deep one. Though the “human first” reaction is understandable—as we are socialized to accept of our species
privilege—it is also wrong, and it must be overcome by a thorough analysis of hierarchy and domination across the whole of the social structure. The difficulty, however, is that we can often be slow to recognize what oppression is and how it operates outside of the normal confines that we are accustomed to. In an interview with Barry Pate-
man in the excellent volume *Chomsky on Anarchism*, Noam Chomsky raises this very point:

Actually, another problem which I think must be faced, is that at any particular point in human history people have not understood what oppression is. It's something you learn. If I go back to, say, my parents or grandmother, she didn't think she was oppressed by being in a super patriarchal family where the father would walk down the street and not recognize his daughter when she came because—not because he didn't know who she was, but because you don't nod to your daughter. It didn't feel like oppression. It just felt like the way life works. But, as anyone involved in any kind of activism knows—say the women's movement—one of the first tasks is to get people to understand that they are living under conditions of oppression and domination. It isn't obvious, and who knows what forms of oppression and domination we are just accepting without even noticing them.

Noticing oppression that is invisible to us can be difficult, particularly when we're used to it and enjoy the side effects of it in our daily lives. Most of us, every day, take part in our species privilege at each meal, or every time we put on our shoes that are made of the skin of another creature. While that may sound moralizing and a little morbid, it is no more moralizing than suggesting that white people benefit from the structural and institutional aspects of white privilege in our society. As a university professor for the better part of six years now, the hardest subject I teach is racial privilege and inequality. This isn't because the theory is particularly difficult, but rather, because it is hard for people coming to this notion for the first time to understand, recognize, and accept their own privileges. It is like trying to explain water to fish, and when confronted with overwhelming evidence that American society is in every way structured in the dominance of white privilege, students resist. They look for alternate explanations, often attributing racial disparities to “laziness,” “culture,” or even the
old *Bell Curve* argument about intelligence. Alternately, they challenge the statistics or the ethnographies or the autobiographies that show how racial inequality operates, arguing that they’re the worst and most marginal cases. Similarly, when I discuss the issue of animal rights and species dominance—even with people who are deeply committed to challenging other forms of dominance—I am again in the situation where a group refuses to recognize its privilege, and wraps itself in comfortable terms that justify dominance like “this is the way it has always been,” or “this is our nature,” or “animals are not intelligent and sensate like we are,” or “wow, they’re tasty,” or “I shop at Whole Foods and buy Animal Compassionate meat.” Alternately, you become the “vegan freak” for even mentioning the notion, and are immediately marginalized and laughed off by a good number of people who otherwise will act with great concern about the problems of human dominance.

Of course, some of this hesitation and misunderstanding by progressives and the wider Left can be laid at the doorstep of the animal rights movement, which, as I wrote earlier in this chapter, has generally done an extraordinarily poor job of making linkages and allegiances leftward, and which has been plagued by years of structural racism in its ranks. Many also dismissively look at veganism as lifestyle politics for bourgeois white kids (yes, “kids”) that takes emphasis away from other more “serious” and “important” causes. While the animal rights movement organizations themselves could alleviate some of these problems by actively thinking about their relations with the working class, people of color, and other movements on the political Left, at least some of this thinking stems from a form of human supremacy that needs to be seriously questioned within the Left, if Leftists and progressives are serious about overcoming domination and exploitation. Some of this thinking is apparent even in figures that are held in high regard on the left, like Michael Albert, the co-founder of the left periodical *Z* magazine and long time political activist. He wrote in his memoir, *Remembering Tomorrow*, that he and his partner ate animals, and wondered whether or not “veggies and vegans” are “like the abolitionists once were, or like feminists now are, urging on us a stance that will in the future be second-nature and morally utterly undeniable?” He further wondered whether there would come a day when
people who fought for other kinds of justice would be seen as lazy and "subhuman," for not fighting for justice for cows and chickens. In answering his own question, Albert writes:

Don't misread the above. I see no comparison in importance between seeking to eliminate the roots and branches of sexism, and seeking to eliminate the roots and branches of violence against animals. I see no comparison in importance between how chickens are treated and how women or any humans are treated. In fact, for me the animal rights agenda resonates barely at all, and the antisexism agenda is part of my life. The message of the little story is, instead, that life is not always easy or optimal. We have to pick and choose our battles, sometimes even setting aside parts of a whole that are worth affecting, but, at least for a time, are beyond our means. It is better to be somewhat sloppy while otherwise respecting women's full and equal rights and responsibilities than it is to focus on a minimal personal lifestyle innovation while violating women's larger rights.\textsuperscript{13}

There are at least two problems with what Albert argues. First, he presumes that the roots and branches of sexism are significantly different from those of speciesism. The problem, rather, is dominance and hierarchy writ large, and it is that which needs to be fought against and reconsidered. Authors such as Carol Adams have also extensively documented the ways that the domination of animals and women mirror one another, drawing upon critiques of pornography, and also of patriarchy's desire to dominate.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, while these kinds of dominance may be separated by the practical notions of movement politics, there is a great deal of theory that links them, and a compelling argument to be made that the branches and roots are, in fact, shared.

Second, Albert assumes that we cannot simultaneously work on two causes, or that we cannot simultaneously fight the injustice of sexism, while fighting the injustice of speciesism. Interestingly, Albert does not argue that we cannot fight the racism because we're too tied up with sexism, but he does make this argument with regard to speciesism with stunning ease. Granted, it is easy to concede that we live in a world of limited time, energy, and money where we must pick and choose the causes for which we actively struggle; Albert's point here is practically a truism. However, if we take Albert's argument at
face value, this is no justification for taking part in one form of dominance because one is too busy actively fighting against another. Take for example a committed anti-sexist who decides that sexism is (to use Albert's bellicose metaphor) her chosen battle. The anti-sexist may devote all of her free time, money, and energy to doing feminist actions, outreach, and education, and at the end of the day, exhausted, she has nothing left for activism of any kind. When the feminist activist goes out with her friends, however, do you think she would tolerate racist jokes around the table? My guess is that for most feminists, racist jokes are seen for what they are: a form of injustice and dominance that seeks to marginalize an other, and which continues a problematic form of exploitation. Thus, the feminist may object to racist jokes and refuse to take part in behavior that maintains racial dominance, despite the fact that struggling against racism is not her "chosen battle."

Though the struggle for animal rights may "barely resonate" with Albert, much like the struggle for feminism may have "barely resonated" fifty years ago for your average white male leftist, a significant number of us engage in speciesism at every single meal we eat, often consuming the by-products of animals or their actual flesh, killed explicitly for us. Even if one does not actively work as an animal rights activist—even if one's chosen battle is elsewhere—there is no need to actively participate in species privilege at every meal. Consuming animal products is by no means a necessity, and giving them up is remarkably easy; it is certainly easier than overcoming the other internalized systems. The problem, however, is cutting through the self-interested fog of species privilege, tradition, and tastebuds that inevitably color these arguments. More often than not, people prefer animal products, enjoy their taste, and have deep connections to them mentally and culturally. While many are ready to expose other forms of historical dominance that are justified by "tradition" and "culture," it seems that remarkably few people are honest enough with themselves to think about how these same kind of paper-thin justifications are used to continue exploiting animals for human ends and human tastes. Albert sees this systematic thought about domination and one form of its resultant praxis as a mere "personal lifestyle innovation," a critique that has been hurled at veganism for decades now, probably since the word was coined in the mid-1940s. What other challenges to domi-
nance and oppression are also called "personal lifestyle innovations?" Is it a mere "personal lifestyle innovation" be an active anti-racist or a feminist?

In short, none of us can change the world single-handedly, and few of us are naïve or self-centered enough to imagine that, in isolation, our own individual choices and ways of living will change vast social structures of inequality. Despite this fact, many of us live in ways that mirror the kind of world we think we would like to see, even if we are realistic about lasting and long-term change being difficult and requiring social struggle. Because we recognize that racism and sexism are lasting cultural institutions that will likely require decades of social action to defeat, do we suddenly give up and start telling racist jokes and discriminating against women in our daily lives, because living otherwise is a mere "personal lifestyle innovation?"

Why is this cause not taken up by people who are otherwise concerned about, and struggling against, other forms of oppression? The reason is that we have yet to understand that speciesism is a form of oppression; as Chomsky pointed out earlier, we can be slow to recognize oppressions. Structured as any other form of oppression, speciesism is more than a mere form of discrimination or prejudice; instead, as I pointed out earlier, David Nibert argues that it has structural causes that are rooted in mutually constitutive economic, ideological, and sociocultural practices. While an anti-speciesist necessarily does not consume animals, that is not enough action to overcome the deeply-rooted processes that produce the vast inequality. Instead, what is needed is a movement that radically challenges meaningless hierarchy and domination at all levels of the social order and recognizes the mutual life that we all share. Social anarchism offers just the foundation for such a movement in both theory and praxis.
YOU CANNOT BUY THE REVOLUTION

“You cannot buy the Revolution. You cannot make the Revolution. You can only be the Revolution. It is in your spirit, or it is nowhere.”
—Shevck, in The Dispossessed by Ursula LeGuin

URSULA LEGUIN’S SCI-FI NOVEL The Dispossessed follows the story of Shevck, a physicist who hails from a breakaway colony, Anarres, that settled on a moon around the planet Urras. The moon is a society organized with collective anarchist principles, including propertyless relationships, complete gender equality, and communal work and living arrangements. Shevck, however, wants to visit Urras—a capitalist society—to dialogue with other scientists and advance his ideas on a particular kind of theoretical physics, partly because he feels that the intellectual life on his world has become staid and unwelcoming to his ideas. While on Urras, Shevck finds himself alienated by a repressive social structure that promotes competition, induces alienation, and leaves many on the planet in abject poverty. While Shevck finds a world rich in material comforts, he also sees a society shot-through with radical inequality, which result from its economics and ideology.
Shevek speaks the words above at a rally on Urras, which is ultimately violently and forcibly put down. The words are meant to vivify a revolutionary movement that has come out to protest not only the long-standing actions of a repressive state, but also its entry into a war. Though I don't want to give away too much or do the entire story an injustice in such an abbreviated telling, there is an important aspect of Shevek as a character that's relevant to the principles that anarchism stands for most proudly. In crafting this character and his story as she did, it is clear that LeGuin constructed him as the embodiment of anarchist principles, not just to demonstrate why those principles are important, but to show why actually living them in one's everyday life is essential. By rebelling against the habits, placidity, and nascent bureaucracy emerging in his own anarchist society, Shevek shows that continual innovation and a commitment to the principles of anarchism are necessary to prevent society itself from ossifying into a staid and tired bureaucracy. When Shevek finds himself on Urras, however, he is reminded that the anarchist society against which he originally rebelled contains within it the basic social agreements that respect human life, dignity, and freedom—all aspects of social relations missing in the social organization of Urras, and aspects which he finds himself missing, wishing for, and thinking carefully about.

The Dispossessed is the best kind of science fiction, because it uses the expanded possibilities of the genre to deal with human problems and issues, rather than as just a backdrop for spaceships and violent action plots that are meant to be turned into box-office-busting action movies. This is the brand of sci-fi that can teach us something, and in this case, Shevek taught me a great deal about what being a social anarchist must mean if it is to mean anything at all. To be an anarchist is not to be tied to a set of principles that will be instituted at some point in the distant future, after the revolution happens—whenever that may be. Instead, being an anarchist means that one lives—in their daily life—a commitment to working through the principles that one finds vital and wants to see put into practice in the world. To be an anarchist also means thinking critically about domination, about rule, about order, and about how society is organized. It also means not blindly accepting hierarchy and leadership, even if it is put under the anarchist banner.
I relate this example about LeGuin’s Shevek because it reveals a central aspect of the character of social anarchism: namely, that living principles matter today, right now, in the present. We cannot sacrifice what we believe is right in a principled trade-off for a better world in some distant tomorrow that may never come. Or, to put it another way, the means of revolution are absolutely and inextricably connected to its ends. To put this basic idea of anarchism in concrete terms, this recognition means that we cannot hope to grow an egalitarian, just, and equitable society out of the authoritarian statism that almost inevitably coalesces out of Marxist revolutions and movements (cf. Mao, Stalin, Lenin, et al.). Thus, social anarchist awareness of means and ends denies the Enlightenment mythos and teleology of Marxist thinking, eschews the statist vanguard of authoritarian leftism, and denies that we can achieve equality in either the long-term or short-term by force or outright domination of any kind. Similarly, awareness that accompanies social anarchism also means not wavering, not watering down principles to accommodate popular political positions for the sake of expediency and acceptance by a wider movement of progressives, Democrats, or whomever. Instead, social anarchism requires a unity of ideals and practice as both a practical and epistemological matter. Looking at the wider Left, Bookchin writes:

There is a major difference, in my view, between the way social democrats, liberals, and other well-meaning people engage in everyday struggles and the way social anarchists and other revolutionary leftists do. Social anarchists do not divorce their ideals from their practice. They bring to these struggles a dimension that is usually lacking among reformists: they work to spread popular awareness of the roots of the social affliction—patiently educating, mobilizing, and building a movement that shows the connections between the abuses that exist in modern society and the broader social order from which they stem. They are profoundly concerned with showing people the sources of their afflictions and how to consciously act to remove them completely by seeking to fundamentally change society. Disseminating this understanding, which in the past went under the name of class consciousness (an expression that is still very relevant today) or, more broadly, social consciousness, is one of the major functions of a revolutionary organization or movement. Unless social anarchists take the occasion of a protest to point to the
broader social issues involved, unless they place their opposition in this context and use it to advance the transition to a rational social order like libertarian communism, their opposition is adventitious, piecemeal, and essentially reformist.²

This kind of thinking advocates for a unified view of exploitation and oppression, in which we must understand social relations and processes to understand the roots of any problem.³ A necessary by-product of this theoretical line of reasoning is that society must be changed at its most basic levels if we are to change the problems we face today. Rather than individualized battles, the view of social anarchism encourages us to see struggles as interconnected, and to act appropriately by building alliances and solidarity between them. One important way to change society is to educate people about the processes that create social ills, and to work to change those problems. This is the kind of change that cannot possibly come at the end of a gun, through sustained violence, or through a state system. There are times when violent resistance is necessary, but, though I am not a pacifist, I believe that too many of us are too often ready to look to violence as a solution, not as a last resort.

Anarchist thinkers since the mid-19th century have denied that we could ever produce a just or free society out of a state-oriented system, since the state itself is layered with orders of domination and subjugation—many of which are rooted in the dynamics of capitalism and other forms of domination such as age, class, and gender. While the state may seem like an abstraction in some ways, it is a unique and historically important form of domination and power, often intertwined with both capitalism and religion. Moreover, the state is the lone possessor of what is often called "legitimate violence." In confronting the state and its systematic subjugation of both the individual and society, anarchism opens the door to challenges of other forms of hierarchy, domination, and oppression. Emma Goldman sums this up in her famous essay, "Anarchism: What it Really Stands For," in the following way:

Anarchism is the only philosophy which brings to man [sic] the consciousness of himself; which maintains that God, the State, and society are non-existent, that their promises are null and void, since they can be fulfilled only through man's subordination. Anarchism
is therefore the teacher of the unity of life; not merely in nature, but in man. There is no conflict between the individual and the social instincts, any more than there is between the heart and the lungs: the one the receptacle of a precious life essence, the other the repository of the element that keeps the essence pure and strong. The individual is the heart of society, conserving the essence of social life; society is the lungs which are distributing the element to keep the life essence—that is, the individual—pure and strong.4

Goldman points to a central tenet of social anarchism: namely, that the individual and society are inextricably linked to one another. This is echoed in the sentiments of Bookchin, who points out repeatedly in his work that the problems of our world are problems of social relations, and that only by changing these social relations will we necessarily change the world itself. We must change individuals to change the social, and simultaneously, we must also guard the individual against the social. In a similar vein, the authors of the aptly-named pamphlet You Can't Blow Up A Social Relationship write:

The job for revolutionaries is not to take up the gun but to engage in the long, hard work of publicizing an understanding of this society. We must build a movement which links the many problems and issues people face with the need for revolutionary change, which attacks all the pseudo-solutions—both individual and social—offered within this society, which seeks to demystify those solutions offered by the authoritarian left and instead to place the total emphasis on the need for self-activity and self-organization on the part of those people willing to take up issues. We need to present ideas about a socialism based on equality and freedom.5

Working from these perspectives, we see that social anarchism seeks to challenge domination at all levels of the social order. Yet, while social anarchism has often been at the forefront of challenging many oppressions, most social anarchists have not been very active—either historically or presently—in challenging the human domination of animals. We can, however, turn the analytic tools of anarchism back on itself as a historical movement to understand this failure, and to rectify it by encouraging social anarchists to identify human domination of animals as yet another form of needless domination. Like other forms of oppression, the problem of our domination over animals and other
humans is social relations rooted in the emergence of hierarchy and extended and deepened through modern capitalism. There can be no real challenge to this system of domination without a simultaneous challenge to relations of domination that come to us through capitalism, in the form of the commodity relation and of property.

Thus, as a coherent and cohesive critique of capitalism, social anarchism offers us a great deal, but it must take on a truly social focus—it must contain a commitment to understanding how individuals are innately products of the social realm, as well as the drive to work for collective betterment and freedom of all. This recognition of the human community within the anarchist project stands in contrast to the individualist anarchism that is preoccupied with the ego and self, and which is “steadily eroding the socialistic character of the libertarian tradition.” In more crude terms, this means that the empty sloganizing of the individualist, “fuck you,” pop-punk, shopping-mall anarchism must be left at the curb, if we are to affect any real cultural or social change. While it is easy to take up anarchism as a cause based solely on individual liberty and a broad challenge to authority at all levels, this ignores the roots of anarchism, clear in work by thinkers like Kropotkin and others, who powerfully called for a return to a grand human sociality, rather than a individuality. We must reject what Bookchin calls “lifestyle anarchism,” or an anarchism merely premised on “culturally defiant behavior,” which slides easily into “ad hoc adventurism, personal bravura,” and a “basically apolitical and anti-organizational commitment to imagination, desire, and ecstasy.” This kind of resistance (can it even be called that) is readily transformed into “constellations of self-indulgence, incoherence and incoherence” within a bourgeois reality “whose economic harshness grows starker and crasser with every passing day.” While this may seem harmless, Bookchin writes that this self-centered, individualist lifestyle anarchism can, erode the socialist core of a left-libertarian ideology that once could claim social relevance and weight precisely for its uncompromising commitment to emancipation—not outside of history, in the realm of the subjective, but within history, in the realm of the objective. The great cry of the First International—which anarchosyndicalism and anarchocommunism retained after Marx and his
supporters abandoned it—was the demand: “No rights without duties, no duties without rights.” For generations, this slogan adorned the mastheads of what we must now retrospectively call social anarchist periodicals. Today, it stands radically at odds with the basically egocentric demand for “desire armed,” and with Taoist contemplation and Buddhist nirvanas. Where social anarchism called upon people to rise in revolution and seek the reconstruction of society, the irate petty bourgeois who populate the subcultural world of lifestyle anarchism call for episodic rebellion and the satisfaction of their “desiring machines,” to use the phraseology of Deleuze and Guattari.⁹

This does not mean that individual freedom is unimportant, or that it cannot form a part of effective liberatory struggles—indeed, social anarchists should be deeply concerned with the individual and the place of the individual in society. What we need is a society in which people are able to maximize their individuality, uniqueness, and creativity because society’s structure actually encourages it and creates the social space for it. The point of the critique of lifestyle anarchism isn’t to dismiss individuality or the concerns with individual freedom completely, it is to note that it is disconnected from a sense of the social that would be the cornerstone of a healthy, complementary, and open society. Individual freedom without an understanding of history and of the social, as a basis for a movement, would not be able to affect any broad-scale change. The movement must recognize that all problems are essentially social problems, and that they have social solutions that extend beyond the politics of individuality and ego.

So while individualist, lifestyle anarchism and a sort of pop-punk anarchism are ascendant in today’s postmodern ego-orgy, more important, is the seemingly old-fashioned and possibly passé work of social connection-building, and exposing, uprooting, and challenging the processes of domination. Considering this, social anarchism provides what is clearly the most fertile ground for rooting a broad-based struggle against domination at all levels of the social spectrum. Driven by a collectivist perspective that also respects the rights of the individual, social anarchism is anti-authoritarian, and puts anti-hierarchical theory into practice. Only a perspective such as this can be truly effective at rooting out and eliminating domination and hierar-
archy throughout the social order, whatever grounds that domination is built upon. Though social anarchism has been slow to take up animals' cause, this does not mean that the tools for analyzing, understanding, and overcoming this particular form of domination are not present within its repertoire. It may simply be that social anarchists need to be encouraged to think critically about these relations in the terms of their anarchism.

On top of all of this, social anarchism recognizes that the processes of capital accumulation limit human potential, alter the ecosystem, and transform our relations with each other and the natural world. As a truly radical approach to domination and the problems of society's organization, social anarchism can provide the theoretical and practical tools for attacking human and animals oppressions the world over. This perspective eschews reforming a system that is ultimately incapable of reform, requires that we have means that look like our ends, and recognizes human potential as a potentially positive and transformative force in the social. Moreover, as the example of LeGuin's character Shevek rightly illustrates, anarchism even provides the tools for analyzing itself critically and reflexively, which is key if it is going to remain true to its own principles.

For all of these reasons, I believe that social anarchism can not only form the backbone of a more integrative movement for a broad social justice, but that some of its analytical and practical tools can help to invigorate the non-human justice movement. In the following sections, I discuss how that can work, but I begin, however, with the simplest and most direct way to advocate for the justice of non-humans: veganism.

THE IMPORTANCE OF VEGANISM

As a needless and unnecessary form of hierarchy, anarchists should reject the consumption, enslavement, and subjugation of animals for human ends, and identify it as yet another oppressive aspect of the relations of capital and a needless form of domination. Anarchist or not, anyone concerned about the cruelty animals experience at human hands should take the first and most immediate step to stem that suffering by going vegan. Veganism is premised upon the idea that
we humans can live without using the products that animals produce under great suffering and duress. For many of us, we perpetuate the subjugation that animals experience at our three daily meals, by consuming either the flesh of animals or their reproductive excretions, in the form of milk or eggs. Because of our desires, which are based on little more than tradition and taste, billions of animals are slaughtered in the United States each year. In challenging this bloodbath, done in the name of our palates, veganism says that animals have interests and lives quite apart from human concerns, and it respects that by avoiding all animal products to the greatest extent possible—this includes dairy, leather, eggs, and wool. Because no one needs animal products to live healthfully, there is no compelling reason to make animals suffer for our wants. Refusing to consume animal products is refusing to participate personally in the most common way animals are subjugated—as food and for our clothing. This perspective is the only one that makes sense if one takes the challenge to overcome needless domination, hierarchy, and oppression seriously—particularly given how acutely animals suffer to produce the everyday goods and foods that we take for granted. If animals are going to be considered in our struggle for social justice, veganism is the first place where that struggle must start. As a direct protest against the commodity form and property relations that animals are subject to, it is a great refusal of the system itself, a no-compromise position that does not seek reform, but which seeks abolition. For anyone who wants to end animal exploitation, living as a vegan is living the end that we wish to see—no one will exploit animals for mere choices of taste and convenience.

Veganism is also important because it works at a level we are typically familiar with: the everyday terrain of consumption. Most of us are intimately familiar with the domination of animals, because most of us engage in it several times daily when we eat. Though we may not be individually present at the farm or the slaughterhouse, the violence done to animals is violence done in our name, and for our plates. Sitting down to a meal, even the most socially attuned of us is often able to tune out the suffering on the plate: there are a million miles between the chicken or steak or other animal flesh on our plates and the animal who produced them, and for most of us, this is a happy psychological distance. Vegans refuse to accept this psychological dis-
tance. In my own experience, people are often curious about veganism and readily ask me why I'm vegan. Almost inevitably, this happens over meals when non-vegans notice that I'm not eating the prime rib, chicken, or whatever other animal-based "delicacy" is on offer. Because I don't think talking about these issues over food is the best strategy in the long run, when I'm asked about my veganism at a meal, I'll often pause and take a breath. In that time, the person senses my hesitation, looks at me warily, and almost inevitably says "Wait. I don't want to know. Don't tell me. I'd rather enjoy my food."

We're able to compartmentalize, to wall off our conscience, to isolate those parts of ourselves that know and understand that someone suffered to produce what we're consuming. Though we are accustomed to viewing veganism or vegetarianism as an ideological practice, we infrequently stop to think about the flip side of this ideology, or the ideology of what Melanie Joy has called "carnism."¹⁰ For Joy, carnism describes the set of ideological and psychological practices that allow us to consume meat and other animal products without giving much thought to the violence that is done to produce the products in the first place (despite the fact that most of us are quite aware that we cannot produce meat and other animal products without cruelty and violence). Carnism explains how we distance ourselves from the production of animal products, how we justify our connections to the violence done in our name and for our wants, and how we repress our knowledge of this process every time we eat. Backed by a series of defense mechanisms including speciesist and euphemistic language ("meat" instead of "flesh," for example), ridiculous and fictitious stories about the happy and bucolic lives of animals that are slaughtered for our food, and an overall obfuscation of the violence done to produce animal products, carnism operates both at a social and individual level to produce a sort of cultural ignorance about animal exploitation.

What is most compelling about understanding carnism as an ideological practice is that it props up speciesism by justifying or obscuring our current practices with regard to animals. Throughout history, similar ideologies and processes of obfuscation have been used to justify the marginalization of other groups, including the domination of whites over blacks, men over women. When people suggest that "this is the way it has always been," or "it is the natural order of things," or
"it is right for us to dominate," alarm bells go off in my head, whether the person is justifying racism, sexism, heterosexism, or speciesism. In every case, this kind of othering, the creation of what sociologists call an “out-group,” can only mean the justification of an “in-group’s” domination.

For these reasons, veganism is an important intervention against the psychological and ideological machinery of carnism—and therefore, an important intervention against the needless suffering, domination, and exploitation of animals that comes through the speciesist structure of our social relations. Living as a vegan is an important act of not participating in domination over animals, and challenging this needless hierarchy. As one of the first anarchists to write about the domination of animals, Élisée Reclus wrote in 1901:

...for them [vegetarians] the important point is the recognition of the bond of affection and goodwill that links man to the so-called lower animals, and the extension to these our brothers of the sentiment which has already put a stop to cannibalism among men. The reasons which might be pleaded by anthropophagists against the disuse of human flesh in their customary diet would be as well-founded as those urged by ordinary flesh-eaters today. The arguments that were opposed to that monstrous habit are precisely those we vegetarians now employ. The horse and the cow, the rabbit and the cat, the deer and the hare, the pheasant and the lark, please us better as friends than as meat.  

Like Reclus, most ethical vegans wish only to apply standards of equality to interactions with animals, and to live that to the greatest extent possible. One way this takes place is symbolically. A wrench in the mental machinery of carnism, veganism has perhaps its greatest impact as a form of inducing cognitive dissonance. As I pointed out earlier, many people don’t want to know about the origins of their food; veganism gets people to think. Carol Adams has referred to this function of veganism as the “absent referent” namely, that vegans effectively “stand in” for the animal at a table where people are eating animal flesh. It reminds people that they are consuming a someone rather than a something, and it roots the violence done for the dinner plate in a very real and personal context. Because food is more than simple sustenance, because food cuts across our cultures, our emotions,
and our lives in complex ways, the symbolic import of being the “ab­
sent referent” should not be underestimated—that presence can cut
deeper than we initially imagine. By being that referent, by taking a
stand, and by denying the products of violence and exploitation that
others are engaging in, the vegan asks others to consider their choices,
even if the vegan does not actually say anything. Veganism rejects the
speciesist idea that animals are ours to use for food, clothing, and other
ends.

Veganism, then, is a daily, lived expression of ethical commitment
and of protest. In this sense, if one is a committed anti-speciesist, one is
living the revolution one wants to see. While it may be easy to dismiss
veganism as unnecessary because an individual vegan may not make
much of an economic impact on the massive animal exploitation
industries, to do so marginalizes other kinds of changes that people
make in their lives to match their ethical and emotional commitments.
When the topic comes up, students and friends of mine often insist
that they are sympathetic to veganism and the concerns of animals, but
them changing won’t make much of a difference, and so they won’t
bother. Few of these people would apply this logic to other issues...

Though it is sad to say so, we will likely not eradicate racism or sexism
in my lifetime. They are entrenched in our cultures and economies,
and very much a part of capitalism—and always have been. Yet, many
of us who are concerned about these forms of domination do not live
actively as racists or sexists just because racism or sexism are too deeply
entrenched in our cultures and are otherwise intractably difficult to
challenge. I may not be able to make racism or sexism disappear to­
morrow, but that does not mean that, say, furthering racist stereotypes,
or living to recreate patriarchy makes sense. In both cases, though I
recognize the problems as intractable, difficult, and entrenched, I also
believe that, in my everyday life, I have to begin to live the kind of
world I want to see. Though it won’t be enough to change the world,
it is necessary, or else we’re contradicting our own objections. While a
single vegan (or even a group of them) may not make much of a dent
in animal agriculture today, living as a vegan is important—it is a real
and potent objection to speciesism and the processes of domination
that enslave animals to our wants. It shows that living life as an anti-
speciesist is possible, and it reminds people of our needless exploitation of others.

As an everyday practice, veganism educates, it illustrates problems with the social processes that exploit animals, and it promotes a world that is not wrapped in the dominance of speciesism. Becoming vegan is the first and most vital step that someone can take to live their life as an ethically and logically consistent anti-speciesist—it is living the abolition of animal slavery in your everyday life. Vegetarianism that includes the consumption of animal products such as milk or eggs, however, is insufficient to these ends. While some lacto-ovo vegetarians (as they are called) may believe these products do not involve the death of animals, this logic is misguided and shows a complete misunderstanding of how animal agriculture operates as a commodity-based business with extremely thin margins. For milk, cows must constantly be kept pregnant. Their calves are often sold for veal production, slaughtered for pet food, or put back into dairy production. Dairy cows themselves are sent to slaughter when they become “underproductive,” often many years before the end of their natural lives. The demand for milk drives this process that would be largely economically impossible on a large scale without the death of animals. Similarly, as I discussed in Chapter 2, egg production—even in the houses that are “animal-care” certified by the industry—is a horribly exploitative business that makes animals suffer cruelly. For these reasons, vegetarianism for ethical reasons makes little sense, is contradictory, and relies on an outdated and antiquated notion of animal agriculture. Any vegetarian that truly cares to live as an anti-speciesist should simply become vegan.

Along similar lines, no animal products can be produced cruelty-free, including those promoted by prominent chains that have won awards from animal rights organizations. Even if the suffering involved is lessened, the very process of subjugating animals for human wants continues, and animals are nothing more than the property of a system that exploits them tirelessly for mere profit. As I argued in Chapter 3, as long as animals are property, their interest will always be considered to be less than ours, and this state of affairs is unacceptable. One of the first ways to challenge this system is to refuse to participate in it. Moreover, we cannot hope to produce a world that is free of animal suffering and exploitation by promoting gentler forms of suffering.
Veganism is the only way forward that does not trade off the interests of animals today in the vast hope of some bright future right down the road.

All of this is not to say, however, that veganism as a social practice is not without its problems. As I pointed out earlier in the book, many vegans within the animal rights movement are white and upper middle-class, too focused on animals as the sole area of their concern, and too ready to purchase things that are vegan, but which may be otherwise caught up in other negative production practices that exploit people or harm the ecosystem. In this sense, the freegan\textsuperscript{12} critique of veganism has a point: too many vegans will purchase anything if it is vegan without thinking about the other elements of its production. While some freegans use this to argue against what they see as vegan “purity” in avoiding animal products, it is more useful to urge vegans to move beyond the bourgeois lifestyle politics and the upper-class “ecosexualism” some vegans promote through consumption. Magazines like \textit{VegNews} are veritable porn for this lifestyle, and they take it to the extreme, detailing twenty-thousand dollar vegan weddings; vegan vacations in Tahiti and other exotic locales; and above almost all else, promoting a brand of vegan consumerism which would make one believe that the magazine editors really feel like we can buy our way to redemption, if only we can find the perfect pleather handbag and take delivery on this year’s new, more efficient Toyota Prius in Seaside Pearl with the Bisque interior.\textsuperscript{13} The kind of lifestyle consumerism that \textit{VegNews} promotes is nothing new in an environmental movement that sees “green capitalism” as the way forward, and which exalts Al Gore as the next superstar of environmentalism—despite his tenuous track record on the environment as a powerful governmental administrator. Though \textit{VegNews} surely has its largely upscale market and audience in mind, the magazine does little to effectively counter the prevailing notion of veganism as the exclusive practice of upper-class, new agey “bourgies,” and it does little to promote solidarity or affinity based anything beyond buying cool “green” stuff.

To be clear, \textit{VegNews} itself is not the problem; the problem is the lifestyle upon which \textit{VegNews}, and magazines like it, are premised. The kind of veganism that comes from this school of thought is nothing more than lifestyle politicking based on an obsession with personal
purity and spiritual cleanliness more than anything else. Because of the
often exclusive focus of some of its practitioners, this brand of vegan­
ism will never be able to make real connections with other move­
ments or forms of oppression. It must first slough off its latent desires
to normalize classist and racist domination through the promotion of
a lifestyle and matching consumer goods that are impossible or diffi­
cult for most people to accrue. Much like the rest of the animal rights
movement from which veganism has come, this brand of veganism is
also fraught with a latent, reformist liberalism. For veganism to mean
anything at all, it must be more than lifestyle politics and expensive
consumer trinkets produced without animal-cruelty; it must be part of
an integrative movement that seeks affinity with other causes promot­
ing justice, and it must reach out to communities that would not nor­
mally consider veganism. In this way, then, the critique that veganism
is a mere lifestyle intervention that appeals to upper-class white folks
is often correct; however, it is not a limitation of veganism itself, but
with a strand of its current consumerist practice.

Veganism can be deeply political and meaningful, but as an his­
torical and social practice, it has often failed to live up to the political
possibilities it offers. While veganism is clearly a lifestyle choice, its
political import cannot be readily or easily dismissed as mere lifestyle
politicking, for it can be a more meaningful cultural, symbolic, and
economic protest if cultivated openly and thoughtfully. The problem
is encouraging this openness and thoughtfulness. Veganism hits at the
heart of our relationship with animal exploitation by rejecting it and
urging others to think critically about their choices. Though many
reject veganism as the province of know-it-all food police, it must be
not only the foundation and baseline of any movement to end the
domination of animals, but also the daily practice of anyone who seeks
to live their life free of all domination and hierarchy.

Unfortunately, the current groups making up the mainstream ani­
mal rights movement have a rather spotty record promoting veganism
as a viable alternative, and very few groups have made it a primary
focus of their outreach and activism. Instead of promoting veganism,
many have instead focused on reforming laws around animal use, or
promoting more humane exploitation of animals, without really ques­
tioning the underlying dynamics of exploitation. While their activism
may provide some short-term victories for the organizations promoting them, it ultimately fails to adequately attack the exploitative dynamics that are at the heart of the system itself. To take an example from earlier, the Arizona ban on gestation crates does not intrinsically challenge the status of animals as property, nor does it call into question the commodification and systematic exploitation of animals for profit. Instead, it reforms what is essentially a morally and ethically bankrupt system, which is ultimately incapable of any meaningful reform. Recall that activists who promoted the Arizona ban justified that campaigning by arguing that it would result in less suffering for animals, while being more profitable for industry. However, the claim about decreased suffering is a dubious one, particularly if one takes a long-term view of the situation. While the ban may outlaw a certain practice, it essentially keeps the exploitative relationship that is the heart of animal agriculture intact, and it helps the system continue exploiting, only in ways that are more palatable to consumers. Such activism may also allow people to feel better about consuming animals; someone who has pangs of conscience about the violence done to produce animal flesh may find those pangs quelled by the notion that the animal they are consuming didn’t suffer as much as it might have previously. I know this happens because I, myself, thought this way before I became vegan. Perhaps I am a lone example of this, but given that food chains like Whole Foods are basing a part of their business on this, I doubt it.

When it comes down to it, reforming industrialized animal agriculture in any meaningful way is truly impossible. Animal agriculture requires the commodity relation and animals’ property status to profit. They are its lifeblood; without them, the industry could not exist. For this reason, activism needs to target these relations and educate people about them. Though promoting veganism has become less of a priority for mainstream groups, it is the first and most essential practice that denies the legitimacy of these relationships, and takes a stand against them. To be vegan is to refuse to participate in these relations as much as possible. Unlike other forms of activism that keep intact the exploitative commodity relationship that defines animal agriculture, veganism is a means to the abolition of animal exploitation that is consistent with the ends of that movement.
Considering all of this, we must grow and nurture a genuine vegan movement of people who are interested in abolishing—not reforming—animal agriculture and other forms of animal exploitation. Such a movement is beginning to slowly coalesce, and it is a movement of people who reject reformism, who understand the centrality of veganism, and who also see connections between the struggles for justice for non-humans and other groups. Many of the people who make up this emerging movement also recognize that existing animal protection organizations are falling woefully short as they promote agendas that advance their own institutional and bureaucratic life, but do relatively little to deter the exploitation of animals on a daily basis. As more and more people emerge from the shadow of the large, wealthy, and powerful activist organizations, they are beginning to realize that new ways of organizing and acting are possible. As the numbers grow, I believe we will begin to see genuine change and real social impacts, but only if people begin to recognize that they are empowered to make change, and that their own creativity, talents, and work can be applied to the cause.

EMPOWERMENT

Though there is certainly some vibrant, inventive, and creative grassroots activism going on in the animal rights community, after several years of working with people in this movement, I get the feeling that there is a pervasive notion that we should leave the most important activism to the “professionals.” This idea is horribly pernicious. As the large, multi-million dollar animal advocacy organizations are gradually co-opted in a familiar process of give and take with industry, they become less and less able to effectively combat the animal exploitation at its foundation. Because these organizations must rely on “winnable” campaigns and donations to stay alive, they are limited in the scope of actions they can take, and in the kinds of action they can support. As their co-optation heightens, the movement organizations become increasingly conservative—even if still masquerade around in radical masks as PETA is prone to do. A more conservative outlook is a pragmatic matter and will help to insure the institution’s survival—keeping it alive, maintaining its bureaucracies—but it has ripple effects for the
broader animal rights movement. As the giants of the movement, these organizations have the power to define agendas, garner media attention, and influence the terms upon which debate will be carried out. Most people who care about animals, but are otherwise not involved in the animal rights movement, end up seeing their concern channeled and focused by these larger organizations, usually in ways that do little to combat animal exploitation. At the same time, the kinds of participation that larger organizations encourage also leads to a more widespread disempowerment throughout the movement.

These dynamics are most apparent in the reliance on money and memberships. If you're unlucky enough to be on some of the mailing lists that I am, you will receive a deluge of junk mail from animal rights organizations—every single piece of which begs for money in some way or another. Borrowing from the worst marketing practices of corporations, some of these pieces of junk mail even request my participation in a “survey,” which is merely a psychological marketing ploy, designed to remind people of the horrors of animal exploitation before the pitch for cash at the end of the letter. Almost all of the appeals for “memberships” promise me that I can do something for animals—if only I’ll give the organization in question just $25, $50, $100, or even $500.

It should come as no surprise that PETA is one of the prime offenders begging for money. While browsing their web site, doing research for this book, I mistyped a URL and ended up stumbling across their “page not found” notice. Apart from the standard messages about mistyping and moved pages, the site also says that “You can do something right now to help the animals who are suffering on factory farms, on fur farms, in circuses, and in laboratories: You can join PETA.” Following the “join PETA” link takes you to a page where you can fork over your credit card details and become a “member” in less than five minutes. In this regard, “doing something right now to help the animals” becomes synonymous with handing over your credit card details—your hard-earned cash—to PETA.

In either case, be it the junk mail or a web plea from PETA, your “activism” is reduced to a mere financial transaction, and doing something to combat animal exploitation becomes a question of joining the right organization, attaching the right signifiers to your particu-
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lar little identity kit so that you can proudly tell the world that you support PETA, while blithely going about your life as you otherwise would have without the trouble of actually doing any activism on your own. For many, this is an obvious transaction: people who donate to PETA obviously care about animals, but they're not sure what to do, and they know that PETA is doing something. Clearly, these folks feel that handing over their money to PETA (or any other large organization) is an effective way to support the interests of animals. If donating money and becoming a "member" of some organization is the only kind of "activism" that people see as viable, meaningful activism, in turn, becomes nothing more than a consumer activity. In order to be an "activist," one need only give money to organizations like PETA, and—if you're feeling really daring and radical—buy the right stickers, t-shirts, and leaflets from their online shop over at petacatalog.org.

This inclination to purchase one's activism is certainly larger than the animal rights movement (in truth, the environmental movement pioneered its use several decades ago), but it has impacts within the movement that cannot be ignored. First and foremost, leaving activism to the "professionals" creates an environment where most people assume that the only way to be effective is by following the lead of the big organizations, the ideas and thinkers they promote, and the campaigns they head up. With the broad feeling that activism is being handled by responsible and capable professionals, many people do not feel the need to do activism in their own communities, in their lives, or in other places where it might count the most. This donor-member model of activism is radically disempowering at an individual level. People who want to give money to organizations like PETA are people who are frustrated, angered, upset, or saddened by the way animals are treated. As long as PETA (or any other large organization) encourages them to donate money, rather than doing their own activism, they are producing a centralized economy of activism that further disempowers people; if people are just handing over money, they're liable to continue to feeling isolated, angry, and frustrated.

While some activists are disempowered by the organization-based activism that is so prevalent today, others have decided to seek empowerment by different means: through violence and property destruc-
tion done in the name of animal liberation. As I’ve said, I am not a pacifist—there are times when violence in self-defense or for emancipation may be necessary—the use of violence within the animal rights movement is not only contradictory from a moral and ethical standpoint, it is also ineffective at changing society’s attitude about animals in the long run. Despite this, there are a significant number of people in the movement who glorify violence, and who also seem to reflexively crave the opportunity to exert power and dominance over others, either out of abject anger, misanthropy, or some combination of the two. Though there are genuine political prisoners in our movement who suffer under the repression of a state anxious to protect property, there are also people within the animal liberation movement for whom the desire for violent action seems to stem from an individualistic need for catharsis, and/or genuinely anti-social tendencies. While I understand that people feel a visceral and immediate reaction to the acute and horrible animal suffering that is going on around us all the time, we must be wary of slipping back into the same exploitative dynamics that we’re fighting against in the first place. We cannot force people to make moral and ethical choices while they’re staring down the barrel of a gun—metaphorical or otherwise. Instead, as Lee Hall writes, we must do the hard work of “cultivating an alternative viewpoint” about how animals are treated in our society, with the ultimate goal of creating a societal paradigm shift.

This is the hard and inglorious work of revolution that the authors of You Can’t Blow Up a Social Relationship point to, but this is the only kind of change that has any chance of ultimately lasting. Today, most people see the violence and torture done for their palates as absolutely acceptable; animal exploitation is the norm, despite the contradictions inherent in it. Given how overwhelmingly strong the societal currents run against treating animals as anything more than commodities and property, the kind of change we need will require more than violence, more than property destruction, and certainly more than a re-creation of the exploitative dynamics that got us here to begin with. If we are to ever win or advance, we must do so by changing the social relations that are at the heart of the problems we face. If we re-create those damaging social relations by relying on the dominance and oppression of violence, we are essentially doing nothing but deepening
the problem we are, more often than not, claiming to fight. When it comes down to it, if we truly believe our own rhetoric about domination, exploitation, oppression, and suffering, it makes no sense for us to undermine our own best conclusions and our own principles by participating in those structures ourselves.

It also makes no sense for us to glorify the violent and ultimately antisocial acts of individuals in the name of the “movement” or in the name of “animals.” Concerning a similar problem in 1917—this time in relation to violence within the anarchist movement that made it vulnerable to distortion by non-adherents and young recruits, alike—Luigi Fabbri wrote that “anarchy is the ideal of abolishing the violent and coercive authority of human being over human being in every sphere, be it economic, religious, or political.” In glorifying violence, Fabbri argued, we see a few “great men” and their actions as important, while ignoring the social as a whole, as the site of contestation, struggle, and ultimately, social change. Anarchists, Fabbri wrote, needed to consider each revolutionary action “in relation to the desired end, without confusing its special character, function, and effects.” Put succinctly, Fabbri’s point is that means and ends matter, and that we cannot stop domination by being domineering. Though he was not a pacifist, Fabbri was keen to avoid having the anarchism of his day work against itself in a self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecy. Defined as violent by the bourgeois media of his time, Fabbri argued that the anarchist movement only played into the hands of its detractors when it engaged in ill-considered violence. Moreover, as the movement became known as violent, it attracted people for whom violence was more appealing than the principles of anarchism itself. Instead, Fabbri argued, the movement needed to regain itself through consistency and a commitment to the principles that defined anarchism.

Without a doubt, Fabbri’s comments provide the framework for an apt comparison to the contemporary animal rights movement.

Besides this, it is not clear that violence or property destruction are actually effective in achieving the long-term goals of animal liberation. Without societal change, any animal that is freed will simply be replaced by another animal, and any facilities that are destroyed will usually be replaced by insurance. The long-term structural implications of violent property destruction are so negligible as to be meaningless
as well; violent property destruction has not significantly altered the
landscape of production agriculture, which is where the vast majority
of animal suffering takes place today. While some property destruction
has forced vivisectors to be more security-minded and secretive gen-
erally, it has not stopped animal experimentation in any appreciable
way. Also, violence in the name of animal liberation may actually pre-
vent people from empathizing with the torture and oppression that
animals face, and ultimately stop them from doing something about
it. Because of the old news mantra “if it bleeds, it leads,” it is natural
that commentators like Dr. Jerry Vlasak will end up part of sensation-
ist stories on news shows like 60 Minutes arguing for liberation by
“whatever means necessary.” In a world where animal exploitation is
so normal and entrenched, very few people will hear Vlasak’s message
with anything but disdain for him and other animal rights activists.
Though I do not believe that we must always cater our message to the
widest possible audience, promoting violence in the name of animals
can be repulsive to so many people that it risks immediately turning
them off of the cause, possibly making them unreachable for life. If we
are to be publicly effective, we will have to work with most humans’
natural empathy for other living beings and illustrate to them how
qualitatively like the suffering of animals is their own. It will not be by
broadcasting what amounts to nothing more than thinly-veiled death
threats to vivisectors on national TV, that we will reach them.

If we want to remain true to our principles and to create a world
that is not wrapped up in the same old systems of domination, we
must leave behind violence and threats of violence. To do otherwise
risks damning ourselves to the same old dynamics that got us here in
the first place.

MOVING FORWARD

We’re not apt to find the most creative, interesting, and vital activism
in a world where activism equals giving people money, where we rely
on violence, or where organizations must rely on “winnable” cam-
paigns to keep the money rolling in. As Francione points out in Rain
Without Thunder, the organization-based model has been the norm in
the animal rights movement for decades, with relatively little to show
for its persistence. Instead, what is needed is an empowering movement that reminds people that everyone has something to give when it comes to advancing the cause of abolitionism. Though this kind of perspective isn’t one that you can take to the bank, pay staff salaries with, or probably even use to purchase red paint to smear on fur coats, it is the way that movements are built from the ground-up, and it is one of the only ways that the animal rights movement will be able to move beyond its narrow efficacy and myopic focus. Drawing broadly on some of the tactics and ideology of social anarchism, I have several ideas which could be applied to better the animal rights movement in the long run, and help it seek affinity with other movements for justice. Many of these ideas draw upon the notion that we must model a movement that looks like the world we want to live in. This is important, for we will never overcome the current domination of animals and the ecosystem unless we are able to overcome the domination that we exercise over one another.

* **VEGANISM MUST BE A BASELINE** *

For all of the reasons I discussed earlier, veganism must be a baseline for the animal rights movement. It is the daily, lived expression of abolition in one’s life, and a rejection of the logic of speciesism. While we should do work to help animals through a variety of rescue and other programs, vegan education should form the basis of our outreach and activism; in our interactions with people outside the movement, we should discuss why veganism is a viable option. This works in direct contrast to the current animal rights discourse, which promotes “happy meat,” “humanely” raised eggs, and organic milk. All of these products rely on exploitation and maintain the relations that will continue to exploit. If we want to eradicate exploitation, we must begin by ending it in our own lives, and encouraging others to do the same.

* **ANYONE CAN BE AN ACTIVIST** *

Let’s not leave activism to the professionals! Don’t let PETA, HSUS, and other movement organizations define the terrain and dominate the debate—use your knowledge and your skills to chal-
lenge the commodification and exploitation of animals in your local area and in your life. It is vital that we reach out across difference, bring people into the struggle, and make connections between the exploitation of animals, people, and the ecosystem. Only by doing this will we ever remind people of the centrality of capitalist exploitation and move beyond the myopia that is the hallmark of the animal rights movement today.

Anarchists always say that there's no one better able to decide how to run your life than you. Similarly, there's no one better able to decide how to run your activism than you. This doesn't mean that anything goes; if we're serious about ending domination, we must not dominate. If we want to end commodification and exploitation, we can't pursue activism that use those same tactics. Our principles matter, and they must always drive us in our actions. Considering this, we need to be more than mere activists for the sake of activism: we must be effective. We must consciously target institutions and practices which maintain and extend human and non-human suffering, and the goal of overcoming domination and hierarchy must remain within our sights at all times. Guided by our own creativity, innovation, and interests, we can challenge the social relations that create social problems.

Practically speaking, the easiest way to do this is to run with your own strengths. Though I may sound like a kindergarten teacher, each of us has unique and special talents. Some of us are excellent organizers, some of us can cook, some of us can make fantastic art, and some of us are complete computer geeks. There are as many talents as people. Instead of your sole form of activism being money donations, you should leverage, explore, and use your talents to support the causes of abolition, vegan education, and the end of hierarchy and domination. This prescription for activism sounds remarkably simple, yet in my years of doing online radio, speaking, writing, and other kinds of outreach, I have had many, many people tell me that it never occurred to them that they could be activists themselves. Activists, they thought, dressed up in chicken costumes and protested at KFC, or were otherwise employed by big organizations. To be an activist, however, you don't need a chicken costume or the blessing of PETA; you only need to decide that you're going to make a change consistent with your principles. What's more, if you find yourself frustrated, angry, or upset
about animal exploitation, you can channel this energy effectively by actually going out and doing something to promote abolition. There is no better tonic to hopelessness than action.

As for what to do, look around. There are a multitude of ways that you can be involved to support and grow the movement against hierarchy and the exploitation of humans and non-humans. Because this expression is creative and dependent on your local context and skills, I cannot tell you exactly what to do, but I can tell you this: there are literally thousands of possibilities, and thousands of places where exploitation needs to be challenged. You should use your skills, talents, and abilities to help promote the cause as best you can—don’t rely on others to do it for you. Your experience, knowledge, ideas, and hard work are desperately needed. You are more than a bank from which the mainstream movement can make occasional withdrawals to help meet the organization’s director’s BMW payment.

* Work in consensus-based affinity groups *

Though it is important to invigorate activism with creativity, it is also important to work with like-minded individuals to achieve goals. Get together with some friends or people you know and form an activist affinity group, that is a “group of people who have an affinity for each other, know each other’s strengths and weaknesses, support each other, and do (or intend to do) political/campaign work together.” As Starhawk points out in her writing on affinity groups, they have a long and successful history, notably in their organizational use in the early-20th century Spanish anarchist movement, up to contemporary applications in the environmental, anti-capitalist globalization, and feminist movements. An affinity group provides a way for like-minded activists to join together, leverage each other’s knowledge and strengths, and accomplish some goal collectively. Relying on trust, cooperation, consensus, and a shared notion of the activism’s goal, affinity groups operate on consensus-based decision-making, and delegate different roles to different individuals within the group. Most importantly, however, the group operates non-hierarchically and non-exploitatively, eschewing voting and embracing the logic of consensus and mutual aid. The goals of an affinity group could be narrow, time-
focused, and extremely specific (for example, protesting a particular event) or long-term and ongoing (starting a Food Not Bombs). The real potential of affinity groups comes when they work together, join up, and coordinate more broadly. In the case of a protest, for example, one affinity group could be in charge of cooking, one in charge of media, one in charge of making leaflets, and one in charge of making signs. Working even further outward, groups with similar goals could create national or international networks that operate independently, yet allow for more coordinated and larger-scale action. Such groups would form from the bottom-up, in contrast to the top-down leadership currently popular in the mainstream of the movement.

In sum, affinity groups have a great deal of potential. Not only are they an entry point for those interested in getting involved with particular struggles, they are flexible and responsive collectives for activism, as well as models of non-exploitative, non-hierarchical social relationships that highlight mutual aid and conviviality, while also respecting individuality.

* BE INTEGRATIVE AND REACH OUT *

In his book *Gramsci is Dead*, Richard J.F. Day quotes transgender activist, Leslie Feinberg, as saying that the best way for diverse trans populations to build solidarity is to be committed to being “the best fighters against each other’s oppression.”20 Day continues on, quoting Feinberg, and adding his own commentary:

The goal is not to “strive to be one community” (*Sittlichkeit*), but to build many linked communities; not to “find” leaders, but, as to recognize that everyone is a leader, that “we are the ones we have been waiting for.” That this potential is not merely theoretical is shown by the intense activity that is going on in activist circles around the world, to find ways to build concrete, practical links between disparate struggles, and to begin to engage in the extremely important task of dealing directly with the divisions that exist among us while resisting the temptation to pass this responsibility off to a state (or corporate) apparatus.21

Day’s point is particularly apt given the state of the animal rights movement. As I mentioned in previous chapters, much of the activism in the animal rights movement, as it is currently constructed, is
very narrowly focused. The way to overcome this is to find ways to be integrative, to reach out to others, and to help create the linked communities that Feinberg and Day point to. It is naïve to imagine that we’ll ever have (or will ever want) a single movement for social justice—I’m not even sure that such a movement could be effective in any real way—but we can have struggles that recognize other struggles, and which work together for a better world. The way to approach this is to base all struggles in the development of a social consciousness that understands the exploitative and oppressive relations of capital. We must focus on the system of domination itself, and the varying kinds of oppression that the system produces, even though these oppressions are not necessarily equally felt in each group. It is important to keep the relations of social oppression in mind, and to focus on the common roots of oppression. By doing this, groups with what appear to be fairly different approaches and emphases can begin to connect, reach out, and support one another, working across difference. It is also important that we take the time to patiently educate ourselves and others, drawing connections between varying forms of oppression. Integrative work can also help to solve some of the problems—particularly classism, sexism, racism, and speciesism—that plague our movements. With some work of this nature, thoughtful activists within the animal rights movement could begin to actually turn back the decades of damage that the movement itself has done to its own reputation with other causes. We can also begin to solve the relations of human domination that serve to reproduce our domination of nature.

* Eschew the big groups; stop worshipping idols; start asking questions *

The animal rights movement—like much of our society—is caught in a cult of personality, including a blind reverence to “famous” figures within the movement. Certain people are revered, garner attention and press coverage, and are exalted as minor and major deities in a complex pantheon of celebrity gods. Though many should be respected and their counsel heeded, a significant number of people within the animal rights movement seem to check their faculties of rationality at the door when it comes to certain movement “celebri-
ties." Were this simply respect for the ideas or actions of the person in question, it might be understandable; instead, it is an identification of that person as "famous." Earlier in the book I mentioned how, when I critique Peter Singer, people get angry with me—not for the substance of my remarks, but because I was criticizing the father of the animal rights movement. To many, Singer can do no wrong, not because of his positions, but because of his history and standing. This is absurdly hierarchical and patriarchal thinking. Why should we simply respect someone because of their past contributions, particularly if their present positions—including advocating for the consumption of animals and using them in vivisection—are troubling? The short answer is that we shouldn't.

Like the Feinberg quote above says, we are the ones we have been waiting for—we can be the leaders, we can be the activists, and we can be what we need the movement itself to be. There is no point in waiting for others to do the activism that needs to be done, or in relying on corporatized professional activism from multi-million dollar organizations and the thinkers or celebrities they support. We need to begin working from our own bases of knowledge, experience, and understanding to create a more vibrant and living movement to challenge exploitation. A corollary of this reliance on our own knowledge, intuition, and experience also means that we need to start asking questions of those who are "in charge." We need to think critically about the conventional and received wisdom that constitutes activism in the movement, and accepting nothing at face value. Critical thinking backed with analysis, asking tough questions of ourselves and others, and challenging authority are requirements for moving forward in new and vital ways. We shouldn't elevate people to gods, or let them be our masters. Only we can make the world we want to see. We can't rely on others to do it for us.

* Use the Internet *

The power of the Internet has been overplayed in recent years, but it is still a useful tool for activism that should not be ignored by any contemporary activist. Because the cost of communication is so radically reduced, almost anyone can do outreach, organizing, and education using a variety of media. Forums, mailing lists, and chat
rooms can provide tools to create community and organize actions and outreach, simultaneously supporting activists in both the “real” and “virtual” spheres. Moreover, those with media experience can create podcasts, video blogs, YouTube videos, or other forms of media to reach a burgeoning audience of users. If you’re part of a local affinity group and you produce good literature, you can post it on the Internet for others to use in their work. Similarly, you could use the Internet to find a virtual affinity group that produces educational materials, that does outreach or any other form of activism. The options for using the Internet are endless. It is another tool—a powerful one that should not be ignored.

Though a lot of people view computer work as passé and not directly influential, my personal experience runs contrary to this. A few years ago, after co-authoring a book on veganism, my partner and I started an online forum and a podcast, and began doing serious vegan outreach on the Internet. In just two years—and with very little money—our online radio show has grown beyond our expectations, with thousands of listeners from all around the world. Many of our listeners come to us not as vegans, but as vegetarians or even omnivores, and listening to the consistent vegan message on our show, they often write to us to tell us they’ve become vegan. The online community that we started at the same time also has almost two thousand members, and serves as a meeting point for people to plan gatherings and activism around the globe in the “real world,” as well as a place to find virtual camaraderie, companionship, and friendship. I mention all of this not to brag about our accomplishments (in truth, they’re really rather meager, and I always wonder how we can be more effective), but to illustrate what can be done with little money and a modicum of effort. Truth be told, we don’t have any exceptional skills that many other people don’t also have. We don’t have a lot of money, and we didn’t have a ton of experience, but we figured we had something to contribute, and being fairly good with computers, we tried to do what we could to support veganism as well as we could, with the talents we had. Of course, the world only needs so many podcasts, forums, mailing lists, and the like, but these are not the only ways that the Internet can be leveraged to support activism and activist communities. Indeed,
the limitations of the Internet's tools are really only limitations of our imagination.

UNENDING TASKS

In an oft-quoted essay on fascism, Umberto Eco writes that “freedom and liberation are an unending task.” We cannot sit back and assume that the work of freedom and liberation will be done for us by more experienced people. Instead, it is up to each of us to do what we can to work toward the kind of world we want to see—not only in terms of activism for animals, but for freedom for everyone. The longer we fail to recognize that our freedom is bound up with the freedom of even the least among us, the longer we will damn ourselves to a world of oppression and domination. Social problems are failures of social relations; to be successful, we must change the social relations that underlie our world, including those of capital and other forms of needless domination and hierarchy. As I have shown throughout this book, capital is amoral. It values neither human lives nor animal lives, except insofar as they might provide value. In our movements, we must confront the amorality of capital head-on by asserting the inherent value of ourselves and of the least among us. We must challenge capital on ethical grounds and articulate a vision of a world which is free of hierarchy, domination, oppression, and abject suffering. To do this, we must reach across the boundaries that seemingly divide us, look for commonality, and cultivate a systemic understanding of oppression. Only then, can we begin to move forward. We know another world is possible. All we have to do is reach for it.

It will be a long and complex process to educate people, to change our social relations, and to produce a better world, but we have few other options. Gramsci talked of a pessimism of the intellect and an optimism of the will; the world often looks quite bleak, and the chances for changing things look overwhelmingly against us. However, we have to start somewhere, and we cannot merely give up because the goal is too big and too ambitious. The truth of the matter is that if we want to change the world, we have to begin doing it in our lives and in our activism. If we want to live in a world that is not burdened by hierarchy and domination, we have to begin to create that world today, in the
present, or we will forever be stuck in the same dynamics of oppression that make up the world as we know it. We cannot trade off our values and principles in the long run in the hopes that by trading them, we will produce some kind of magical “tomorrow” where all is well. No—our principles and our values are what must guide us now, and everything we do that runs contrary to them in the name of expediency, pragmatism, or “politics,” is a step away from a better world. People will often argue that a position such as this is idealistic; as both humans and non-humans suffer, we cannot afford our principles, that the cost of idealism is too expensive when we should just be doing what we can to stop the suffering. Though I am sympathetic to this idea, it is also dangerous. When we give up what matters to us in the hopes of producing something better, we get into a dangerous game where our ideals are divorced from our practice. Instead, as Bookchin urges, we must do the patient work of making connections, educating, and drawing out the common roots at the heart of domination. As LeGuin’s character Shevek says, “you can only be the revolution.”

There is no other alternative.
NOTES

Notes to Chapter I

2. Ibid., 4.
3. According to a 2006 study in the journal Science summarized by the BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6108414.stm), if we continue to fish at current rates, fishery stocks will be depleted in fifty years.
5. Ibid., 155.
8. Ibid., 173.
MAKING A KILLING

13 Curiously, no one ever seems to make these arguments when humans get mauled by bears or eaten by crocodiles or sharks.
14 This isn’t to suggest that all exploitative systems have the same historical genesis; certainly, the oppression of women has different historical precedent than the oppression of people of color, or of animals. The history of each is quite different, but it is important to note that each has been happily and readily used by the processes of capitalism.

Notes to Chapter II

3 Ibid.
4 Yes, I’m serious here. This is a commonly raised objection that is worth addressing.
5 Bob Torres and Jenna Torres, Vegan Freak: Being Vegan in a Non-Vegan World (Tofu Hound Press, 2005), 30.
6 It is worth noting that were we to use “human” here instead of “pig” we also could not directly know whether the human was experiencing pain. Philosophers often refer to this as the problem of other minds. We cannot have direct access to the subjective experiences of other minds, but certainly, the external evidence is compelling enough—in the case of a human or a pig—to convince us that the subjective experience of pain in being touched with a burning poker is not pleasurable.
7 Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?, 8–9.
8 Ibid., 9.
9 Ibid., 96.
10 You might wonder how I can be opposed to the instrumental use of animals and still have companion animals. While I believe that the institution of animal ownership is inherently flawed and exploitative, there are also millions upon millions of animals who—because of human whims, fancy, and irresponsibility—are euthanized in shelters every year. We have the resources to take some of these animals in, and so we do. I, however, remain
opposed to breeding, to purchasing animals, and to most tenets of animal "ownership."

11 Ibid., 99.
13 Ibid.
14 Marx often refers to exchange value as just "value," but I prefer to follow the lead of other authors on the subject who use the term "exchange value" to make a clearer distinction between these two different aspects of a commodity.
16 If you're familiar with this passage, you are certainly familiar with the debates over whether or not this is Marx sliding off into economic determinism, dangerous and hasty dichotomies, and the like. It is beyond the scope of this work to enter into dialogue with these debates, though my own particular inclination—given my reading of Marx—is that there is at least a strong argument to be made for an imbalanced mutual conditioning, with some greater weight being brought to bear on the economy. This, however, should not be read as a descent into economic determinism and the problems that it presents.
17 Harry Cleaver, Reading Capital Politically.
19 Ibid., 322.
20 Harry Cleaver, Reading Capital Politically, 71.
21 Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals (Black Rose Books, 1997).
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 436.
26 Ibid.
27 Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals.
28 Ibid., 18.
29 Ibid., 18-21.
30 Ibid., 20.
32 Most often, the "education" is about how wholesome eggs are. Childhood indoctrination may be a more apt description, especially when this perspective is put in gradeschool textbooks.
gindustry_generalsstats.aspx> (2 March 2007).
35 Ibid.
37 These figures came from reports generated by the United States Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Marketing Service web site, <http://
marketnews.usda.gov/portal/lg>.
39 "Broilers" are chickens under thirteen weeks old that are destined for con-
sumption (as opposed to egg production).
43 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 82.
47 Ibid., 85.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 87–88.
50 Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?.
51 Ibid.
53 C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002).
54 Mark Rowlands, *Animals Like Us*.


56 C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, *Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals* (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002).

57 Mark H. Bernstein, *Without a Tear: Our Tragic Relationship with Animals*.

58 C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, *Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals*.

59 Ibid., 61.

60 Ibid.


62 Ibid.


64 In his report for the Physician’s Committee on Responsible Medicine on the problems with Vioxx animal models (*The Need for Revision of Pre-Market Testing: The Failure of Animal Tests of COX-2 Inhibitors*), John J. Pippin, M.D., F.A.C.C. points to the possibility of human clinical pharmacology, microdosing technology, *in vitro* and *in silico* approaches, human stem cell technology, and pharmacogenomics as potential avenues for testing that “will provide data far superior to current animal testing and typically limited clinical trials.” A thorough review of alternatives is beyond the scope of this book, but readers are encouraged to visit Greek and Greek, *Sacred Cows and Golden Geese*, for a more thorough review of alternatives to animal testing and vivisection.


66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Gary L. Francione, *Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?*, 70.

70 Ibid.


73 Mark H. Bernstein, *Without a Tear: Our Tragic Relationship with Animals*, 133.

74 Ibid.

75 Jim Mason, *An Unnatural Order. Why We Are Destroying the Planet and Each Other* (New York: Lantern, 2005).

76 Ibid., 262.

77 Ibid., 263.
Notes to Chapter III

2. In reality, most dogs who are unwanted end up on the street or in shelters where they are often euthanized. Some unwanted dogs also end up being purchased by Class B agricultural dealers and resold to testing facilities. This was well-documented in the HBO documentary, Dealing Dogs.
3. This sounds outrageous, and most veterinarians would probably refuse, but there is nothing illegal about doing this if I could find a veterinarian who would oblige. Indeed, thousands of perfectly healthy companion animals are killed in shelters every day as "unwanted" animals. (Thanks to Gary Francione for clarifying the law on this for me.)
7. Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?,
9. Ibid., 55–56.
10. We do, of course, use our property to help us reproduce ourselves so that we can labor again, but this is different than the productive uses of capital which leverages property to create profit.
11. This is quite obvious with turkeys. Wild turkeys are not at all uncommon where I live in upstate New York, and one can often see these beautiful and graceful birds pecking about in the forest or in open fields with their young. Domesticated turkeys—some of whom are so large and round that they have difficulty moving—look almost like a different species of animal.
15. Ibid., 55.
16. Ibid., 54.
NOTES 161

18 National Animal Interest Alliance. National Animal Interest Alliance homep­


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 This sounds like an exaggeration, but one need only look at the writings of
groups like NAIA to get a sense of how many actually believe animal rights
activism to be just about this dangerous.


29 Ibid.


31 Ibid., 135.


33 Ibid., 59.

34 ———, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy, 68.

35 Ibid., 102.

36 Ibid., 123.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 112.

39 Ibid., 143.

40 Ibid., 153.

41 Ibid., 189–90.
Notes to Chapter IV


9 Ibid., 234–35.

10 Erik Marcus, Meat Market: Animals, Ethics, and Money, 83.


12 Ibid., 36–38.


Arizona Proposition 204: An Initiative Measure Proposing Amendment to Title 13, Chapter 29, Arizona Revised Statutes by Adding Section 13-2910.07; Relating to Cruel and Inhumane Confinement of Animals. http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop204.htm


Ibid., 2.


Ibid.

Cf. Mark Dowie, Losing Ground, for a compelling analysis of how this happened to the environmental movement.


Ibid.


Chris Hedges, American Fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America (Free Press, 2007).


A fairly good summary of Pat Buchanan’s life and political views can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pat_buchanan.


Francione pointed this out in Rain Without Thunder back in 2006 (page 8), but if anything, things are no different, and likely worse today.


It would probably be a cheap-shot for me to mention here that Singer has also promoted infanticide in cases where the infant is severely disabled. Apart from the fact that this uses ableist criteria to judge what counts as a life worth living, this is also a dangerously slippery slope, as “disability” and what counts as disability is culturally contextual and potentially shifting terrain.

Or, perhaps, the god is Peter Singer.


Here, I follow the terminology proposed by Jensen in The Heart of Whiteness: Confronting Race, Racism, and White Privilege (San Francisco: City Lights, 2005). Jensen writes: “I want to put ‘white’ at the center, but not in the sense of valorizing it or claiming it as a norm. Just the opposite. I want to frame the issue as white and non-white to highlight the depravity of white supremacy and identify it as the target. In this sense, I think ‘white/non-white’ more clearly marks the political nature of struggle, whereas ‘people of color’ for many tends to shift the focus from white supremacy to the varied cultures of those non-white people.” (3)


I have, however, heard some privileged white males argue this when frustrated with those “uppity” non-whites or women who are demanding too many rights.

I follow Jensen’s definition of white supremacy here, from his book The Heart of Whiteness: “By ‘white supremacist,’ I mean a society whose founding is based in an ideology of the inherent superiority of white Europeans over non-whites, an ideology that was used to justify the crimes against indigenous people and Africans that created the nation. That ideology also has justified legal and extralegal exploitation of every non-white immigrant group, and is used to this day to rationalize the racialized disparities in the distribution of wealth and well-being in this society.” (4)


Michael Albert, *Remembering Tomorrow: From SDS to Life after Capitalism, a Memoir* (New York Seven Stories Press, 2006), 141.

Ibid.


**Notes to Chapter V**


3 It is also worth noting that this is a widely accepted view in the discipline of sociology, though the extent to which sociology is successful at this is debatable.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


12 According to <http://freegan.info>, “Freegans are people who employ alternative strategies for living based on limited participation in the conventional economy and minimal consumption of resources. Freegans embrace community, generosity, social concern, freedom, cooperation, and sharing in opposition to a society based on materialism, moral apathy, competition, conformity, and greed.” Many freegans critique veganism as too puritanical because of a general focus on animal-free products that tends to ignore the other negative aspects of commodity production.
Do you think I could make up color names like that? Check [http://www.toyota.com/prius/color.html](http://www.toyota.com/prius/color.html) for more original names, straight from the manufacturer.

http://peta.com/404.html, emphasis original.


Ibid.


Ibid.

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